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During times of war, the decision-making influence
of the American military establishment has traditionally
been exercised by chari smatic field commanders. This in-
fluence has at times been considerable, owing both to war-
time exigencies and the unfamiliar! ty of civilian leaders
with wartime situations. Thus, General Washington chas-
tised and frequently ignored a Congress he regarded as
timorous and petty. Array officers in 1813 refused to obey
orders issued by their civilian superior, the Secretary of
War. General George McClellan defied and ridiculed Lincoln
in public. General John J. Pershing used the American
Expeditionary Force of 1917-1918 virtually as he wished,
becoming almost the sole author of military decisions.
World War Two provided the American military with
the opportunity for further expansion of decision-making
influence. However, the primal military representative was
no longer the field commander. Between the two world wars,
the United States had adopted the European general staff
structure, resulting ultimately in the creation of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Decision-making authority was now
in the hands of officers who, for the most part, had never
heard the sound of battle. Nonetheless, the military staff
were better equipped to handle matters of Grand Strategy
than any other stratum of the armed forces leadership. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff served as direct advisors to the
President, and were also in close contact with British and
Soviet helmsmen. One of the most momentous issues involving
all of these decision-makers was the Second Front problem,
1941-1945.
From the first Allied conferences in Washington,
1941-1942, it became evident that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
did not function simply as objective advisors to their
Commander-in-Chief. They regarded themselves as the sole
competent architects of strategy and accordingly displayed
a fierce loyalty to their strategic proposals. The mili-
tary staff was not especially deferential to the opinions
of the Commander-in-Chief, as he was considered an amateur
at war. This attitude was a traditional one displayed by
the American military toward civilian decision-makers.
Additionally, the Joint Chiefs perceived their British and
Soviet Allies as impelled by political considerations and
thus incapable of originating militarily sound strategy.
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As a result, the Joint Chiefs entered into a qua si-adversary
relationship with their Commander-in-Chief and with the
alliance leadership.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were determined to see
their Second Front proposals implemented, despite opposition
from other quarters. They saw their plan as based on
strictly military considerations. Any indication that the
Commander-in-Chief favored other policies was viewed as a
capitulation to political influences (usually thought to be
British-inspired), and the Joint Chiefs worked to thwart
such influences. In this manner the military overstepped
their authority, and exceeded their advisory capacity.
Because of the persistence with which the Joint
Chiefs argued their position, and because of the limited
success achieved by British strategic options, Roosevelt
eventually endorsed the American Second Front proposals.
As policy advocates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proved to be
more influential than any civilian leader other than the
Chief Executive. They enjoyed a close relationship with
the President, to the virtual exclusion of all other offi-
cials. Nevertheless, with the exception of its obduracy
on the Second Front issue, the military did not attempt to
extend its prerogatives.
Finally, despite the merits of their Second Front
proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff displayed a lack of
political sensitivity in their role as decision-makers.
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Their singular dedication to "military" conaiderationa
ignored the fact that wars are waged for political reaaona
and that political issues are not suspended during hostili-
ties. The failure to realize this would cause further
problems during the Korean War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
failed also as members of a coalition war effort, and re-
tained a nationalistic outlook to the end of the war.
ix
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1CHAPTER I
AMERICAN MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS IN WARTIME
Introduction
Military organization have historically been
regarded with ambivalence in democratic societies.
Although clearly necessary instruments of maintaining
the security of a state, armed forces have also posed a
constant potential threat. Possessing combative exper-
tise as well as a monopoly on the use of legitimized
violence, armies could be, and frequently have been, used
by ambitious commanders to bring about political change.
Constitutional and legal safeguards have proscribed such
activity, but military interference in politics has not
in fact been legislated out of existence. 1 At the same
time the military has been a fundamental ingredient in
a successful foreign policy. The influence of the
military obviously becomes more pronounced during times
of war. The prestige and responsibilities of military
leaders increase accordingly, which is to say that
Such military intrusivenes s was common in the
West even as far back as the Roman Empire. As Tacitus
notes in his Annals (A.D. 14-66), every period of succes-
sion was usually accompanied by military Intrigue or re-
volt. In more recent times, the roles of the Wehrmacht
and the Imperial Nipponese Army provide illustrations of
military involvement in high politics. The frequent
military coups of South America Indicate that this in-
clination still exists.
2military loaders become more powerful.
But have military helmsmen in wartime consis-
tently sought to abuse their power and extend their pre-
rogatives? Have they been mindful of the constitutional
limitations of their authority and have the parameters
of their authority been clearly spelled out? The involve-
ment of the United States in the Second World War pro-
vided a debilitated American military with a position
of vast power. But precisely how sweeping was military
power in 1941-1945? Did military leaders merely assist
and advise the Commander-in-Chief in the making of
strategy or did they make strategy largely on their own
initiative? Were they involved in political issues?
Was their relationship with the civilian authorities
(mainly the Chief Executive) antagonistic? Did they
understand the requirements of alliance? All of these
questions are used to clarify the role of American
military leaders in decision-making during World War Two,
This investigation is a case study of a single
historical incident, with the purpose of examining the
extent of wartime military decision-making, A case
The federal expenditures allotted to the armed
forces in the period 1919-1938 were consistently and
appallingly low. Low tide for the military budget was
1933, a resurgence not taking place until 1938 with the
approval of Roosevelt's first major rearmament proposal.
3study of the Second Front decisions is useful for a number
of reasons. First, these decisions constituted "Grand
Strategy," strategy at the highest level. The wide scope
of this strategy calls for the involvement of civilian-
political leaders as well as military figures. Grand
Strategy enjoys a dual existence; it is clearly a matter
for the military decision-making sphere, but also for the
political sphere. Political decisions are necessary for
the direction of such strategy and the determination of
ends, but military competence and advice is also essential.
^
Both military and political spheres have laid claim to
Grand Strategy as "their" arena, but in truth neither
civilian nor military leaders alone can determine it.
Whatever the intentions of generals and statesmen, Grand
Strategy, of which the Second Front issue is an excellent
example, demands the cooperation of both. The nature and
scope of Grand Strategy make this cooperation inevitable.
Grand Strategy is quintessentially military, that is, it
consists in plotting the effective use of armed force.
^Since the end of war is the alteration or
restoration of the status quo , it is ultimately a
political matter. As Raymond Aron observes in Peace
and War , war is waged between political units with
ramifications extending beyond wartime. Similarly,
Augustine notes that it is "with the desire for peace
that wars are waged." City of God , XIX, 11-13? trans.
Marcus Dods.
Thus the maxims of military science and the special know-
ledge provided by military training are indispensable.
Further, Grand Strategy is directly concerned with the
waging of war; thus, to a considerable extent, warriors
must be its architects. Despite this inescapable fact,
the vast scope of Grand Strategy necessitates the involve-
ment of political helmsmen. The decision to go to war is
a political one, hence the ends of war are not strictly
military. Too, non-military considerations are a facet
of Grand Strategy. The diplomacy within an alliance,
recognition of neutrals, limitations on means of fight-
ing (rules of warfare), secondary aims of a war, domestic
political concerns, are all relevant considerations. In
this manner the military nature of Grand Strategy is
accompanied by the political implications of its vast
scope. Accordingly, decisions of Grand Strategy must
involve both political and military participation.
This sharing of the decision-making responsibi-
lity makes a civilian-military disagreement probable.
Operating within different frameworks, holding different
perspectives, generals and statesmen cannot be expected
to see eye to eye. Grand Strategy decision-making is,
to an important extent, a conflictual terrain. This
characteristic emerges clearly with respect to the Second
Front decisions, as will be demonstrated.
At this point a comment on methodology is in
order. In examining the Second Front decisions and
analyzing the military-civilian relationship, it is neces-
sary to review considerable historical detail. We cannot
properly draw conclusions or entertain notions on the
political meaning or significance of a certain incident
without first understanding that incident within its
historical context. Clearly, various historical factors
and diverse personal motives can influence decision-
makers
•
Wartime Military-Civilian Relations
Prior to World War Two
To understand the relationship between military
and civilian authorities in the United States during the
Second World War, it will be useful to review the histori-
cal record of the interaction between military and civilian
agencies during previous American Wars.
The U.S. War Department was founded on June 12,
1776 as the "Board of War." It was at first comprised
entirely of civilians, but military officers were included
before the war with Britain ended. The Board of V/ar was
formed by Congress and in fact made up of committees
without real authority. Congress, anxious to maintain
"democratic" control, decreed that the Board "could only
6study the problems and make reports, after which Congress
engaged in long-winded debates while the Army stood in
urgent need of men and supplies." 4 Thus, the conduct of
the war was to be essentially a Congressional prerogative.
Despite this initial arrangement, constant
problems and continual pleas from General Washington in the
field led to the termination of the War Board in 1781 and
the appointment of General Benjamin Lincoln as "Secretary
of War." Even so, the office was largely superfluous
since actual control over the military remained with
Congress and with the individual states, which were respon-
sible for providing troops. Nor was the Secretary of War
able greatly to influence military decisions, as the only
author of strategy and doctrine was the field commander,
Washington. There was no General Staff. Accordingly,
the War Secretary was little more than a nominal inter-
mediary between Y/ashington and Congress and in reality
almost without function. Washington and Congress con-
tinued to deal directly with each other, ignoring the
Secretary of War. Congress, for its part, remained sus-
picious of a strong military, even in the darkest days
of the war. Too, through a parsimonious control of the
C. J. Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, Ame rican
Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775 (Harrisburg:
Stackpole Company, 196i77~P» 23.
military purse, Congress virtually determined all mili-
tary policy. As a result no military establishment came
into being during the war or in the period immediately
following it.
The confused state of military-civilian decision-
making reached critical dimensions during the War of 1812.
To begin with, the war was a federal venture undertaken
without the unanimous support of the individual states,
which retained a substantial degree of autonomy. The cry
for war was initiated in Congress by the War Kawks, and
the President simply acceded to their demands. The Army,
never a popular institution, was in a state of disintegra-
tion. Officer commissions were more often than not handed
out as tokens of political favor. Entirely incompetent
men were placed in command positions with disastrous
results
.
Clearly, the most important change in the military-
civilian structure during the War of 1812 was the trans-
formation of the Secretary of War's office into a position
of considerable power. The change was due to the aggres-
sive personality of the Secretary, who took advantage of
the lack of clear-cut directives defining his role.
Secretary of War John Armstrong was inclined to bypass
his chain of command and issue orders directly to the men
in the field. This tendency may have been prompted by
the incompetence of officers but its effect was to
8exacerbate, not to remedy, the problems in the military-
civilian relationship. Generals, even incompetent ones,
are jealous of their commands. According to C. J.
Bernardo, "Secretary of War John Armstrong assumed his
duties with a fixed notion that the direction of the
armies in the field fell within his proper sphere of
jurisdiction. Convinced that he possessed a broader view
of the situation than the individual commanders, he tried
to direct all military operations, notwithstanding the
open hostility of many generals." 5 The hostility of the
military to the Secretary's interventions erupted after
Armstrong's decisions resulted in the torching of Washing-
ton by British marines. Military units refused to follow
orders bearing his seal and forced his resignation.
Armstrong's duties "were turned over to the vigorous
Secretary of State (Monroe)."
The crucial point in this affair requires further
comment. The Secretary of War saw himself as possessing
a broader view of the war than his generals. Consequently,
he felt himself to be in a superior position to dictate
strategy, especially in view of the inactivity of President
Madison in all matters concerning the war. This same
attitude was to afflict various high-level civilian
policy makers in future situations, including the Civil War,
5Ibid., p. 128
6 Ibid., p. 137
The Civil War (1861-1865) brought about more
changes in the respective military-civilian decision-
making roles. Prom the outbreak of Inutilities onward,
various members of the Lincoln cabinet acquired extensive
influence in the shaping of military decisions. As a
biographer notes, "The President, the Secretaries of State,
War, Navy, and the Treasury, together with the Congres-
sional Committee (To Investigate the Conduct of the War)
each claimed special powers over the conduct of the war.
All of this meant constant interference with the plans
of military commanders by civil authorities who were
uninitiated in military affairs." 7 The greatest civilian
offender was, as in 1812, the Secretary of War. Secre-
tary of War Cameron ignored rather than cooperated with
the Army Chief, Winfield Scott. In addition, he refused
to obey the directives of his Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln.
Cameron was grossly insubordinate and acted as high-
handedly as Armstrong had, eventually suffering the same
fate, removal from office. On this occasion it was the
President rather than the military that sponsored the
forced resignation. Too, Lincoln selected the new Secre-
tary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, a lawyer of some repute as
well as an ambitious politician. The selection of Stanton
was to prove unfortunate for the President. Stanton
Ibid.
,
p. 215.
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persisted in maintaining what had by now become a pattern:
the use of the Secretary of War's office as a sort of
counter-Executive device, rather than as an integral part
.of a smoothly running military-civilian machine. The
extent of Stanton's political ambitions remains unclear,
but it is certain that he courted the Army in an attempt
to turn it against the Commander-in-Chief. The most
prominent military figure during the early years of the
war was not the Army Chief but a field commander, General
George McClellan, in charge of the Army of the Potomac.
It was McClellan that Stanton attempted to influence.
McClellan in his memoirs noted that Stanton "often advo-
cated the propriety of my seizing the government and
o
taking affairs into my ov/n hands." McClellan rejected
this advice and no military elements were ever involved
in planning a coup.
Despite the rejection of Stanton's intrigue,
the military was not on generally good terms with the
^Burton Hendrick, Lincoln 's War Cabinet (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 19467^~p« 43. Although loyal to
the civilian leadership, McClellan occasionally acted
with arrogance toward the Chief Executive. One evening
McClellan refused to see Lincoln when the President
called at his room in Washington, informing a presiden-
tial aide that he was going to sleep. "It is the first
indication I have yet seen of the threatened supremacy
of the military authorities." Lincoln a nd the Civil War
Diaries of John Hay (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1939),
p. 35.
administration. Winfield Scott, the ancient and senile
Chief of the Army, was a ceremonial figurehead, trotted
out for parades, and was involved in little else.
McClellan was perhaps the most important military leader
during the war and he constantly protested the drafting
of strategy and doctrine by Congress and the Cabinet.
Similarly, he believed Lincoln inept in military affairs
and frequently ignored his Commander-in-Chief. As a
result, McClellan eventually fell from favor and was
replaced by Ulysses Grant. But even Grant was hampered
by Congressional and Cabinet interference, a situation
which persisted until the end of the war.
Thus, the influence of Congress upon military
affairs was still notable at the time of the Civil War.
The President did occasionally determine strategy.
Lincoln 1 s interest In the course of military affairs was
great. Also, the post of Secretary of War had become a more
powerful office than It had ever been during the long
course of the Revo3.utionary War. Secretary Cameron
attempted further to increase the power of his office at
the expense of the Commander-in-Chief and failed. But
the Secretaryship under Stanton remained an important
factor, though it suffered from Cameron' 3 legacy of abuse.
Military authority once again existed in the personage of
a field commander (McClellan and later Grant) and not In
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the appointed Chief (Scott) who was ignored for all but
ceremonial purposes, it is also significant that the
politically inclined McClellan, constantly at loggerheads
with his Chief, was eventually replaced by the a-political
and taciturn Grant. Nor did the military gain responsi-
bility or power in the civilian realm despite the exigen-
cies of war and the cries for military control heard in
some civilian quarters.
The Spanish-American War of 1898, a relatively
unimportant struggle in military terms, underscored the
lack of communication between the civilian political
officials and the military. The War Department assumed
responsibility for conducting the war but failed to
coordinate the war effort or to provide the needed trans-
portation and logistical support. If nothing else was
accomplished, the blunders of the War Department during
that conflict illustrated the need for extensive reforms. 9
As a result, Secretary of War Elihu Root created a
General Staff of the Army in 1903, whose purpose it was
to provide an "official" Army viewpoint on various matters
and so prevent the re-emergence of unofficial charismatic
9
Preparations for the war "became chaotic under the
genial misrule of the politician who ran the War Depart-
ment. Russell Alger seems to have been the sort of man
who meets problems in logistics with a cheerful smile."
Robert Leckie, Wars of America (New York: Harper & Row,
1968), II, 28.
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spokesmen ~ field commanders such as McClellan. The
General Staff was also to advise the President and the
Secretary of War on military affairs. It was hoped that
a regular channel of military advice and influence would
minimize the military decisions made by civilians, thus
averting the problems of civilian meddling that had
hindered military efforts in the War of 1812 and the Civil
War. The General Staff would eventually serve in this
capacity, but did not do so during the First World War.
With American involvement in the First World War
in 1917, Secretary of War Newton Baker stated that "The
Chief of Staff, speaking in the name of the General Staff,
will coordinate and supervise the various bureaus, offices,
and departments of the War Department; he will inform him-
self in as great detail as in his judgment seems necessary
to qualify him adequately to advise the Secretary of War." 10
But it was not to be. Congress distrusted a strong mili-
tary establishment in Washington, the same fears that had
afflicted this body in 1776. Too, commanders in the field
regarded the Staff with contempt and preferred to make
their reports directly to the President rather than to an
intermediate military authority. Finally, "President
Wilson himself, seemed determined in 1917 to keep the
-
L0Harvey DeWeerd, President Wilson Fights His War
(New York: MacMillan Co., 1968)", p. 204.
*
14
General Staff weak." 11 And the General Staff remained
weak, either through design, as has been shown, or through
sheer governmental indifference. In any case, real mili-
tary power resided with the Secretary of War Baker and with
the senior army field commander, General John Pershing.
The General Staff was reduced to windowdressing, largely
impotent to effect the unfolding of events in Prance. In
the end even the Secretary of War was relegated to a
secondary role in regard to strategy and the employment of
troops: Pershing made these decisions and was shrewd
enough to guide the Secretary of War's hand in matters
actually beyond a field commander's purview. Wilson's
influence on Pershing was even less pronounced than Baker's,
and his interest in determining strategy or outlining
political considerations was apparently minimal, "in his
only wartime meeting with the President, Pershing expected
that Wilson would say something about the part he wanted
the American Army to play, along with the Allies, in the
war against Germany, but the President said nothing about
12this." Thus, Wilson remained aloof from military affairs
and decisions, the General Staff was unable strongly to
1:LIbid., p. 204.
12Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson; War Leader
(New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1939), p. "410.
no
s
partake in such decision-making, Baker was frequently
beguiled by Pershing, and the Commander in the field be-
came the single most important decision-maker in the con-
duct of the American war effort. Even so, there were
decisions of great controversy, since there were no issue
of great controversy. Nor were there any especially
delicate points in the alliance of the United States with
Prance and Britain.
The decision-making roles of World War One were
to prove temporary. The emergence of technology and
political complexities reduced the authority of field
commanders and proportionally increased the responsibili-
ties of politically-attuned civilian decision-makers.
It may also be true that the unprecedented carnage of the
1914-1918 struggle irreparably damaged the public status
and trust accorded military figures. Improved communica-
tions increased the participation of the General Staff,
along with some reforms in Army structure. Strategy
now became an arena with vast political implications.
The alliance structure was fraught with difficulties and
not nearly as monolithic as the alliance of 1917. In
addition, the United States had left the First World War
as a senior partner, with France and Britain lesser
members in the international concert.
As we have seen, the creation of the General
Staff organization and the Chief of Staff office took
Place rather late in American military history. El ihu
Root promoted the concept of the General Staff ln 1903
and Congress assented (though not without misgivings)/
Nonetheless, the actual role and powers of the Chief and
Ms staff were never adequately formalized, and as a
result the new Staff organization had little influence
upon the course of World War One.
In an attempt to increase the participation of
the General Staff ln military affairs and to define its
role and function more precisely, piecemeal organizational
revisions were effected from 1921 on. These revisions
proved largely unsuccessful: the role of the Chief of
Staff remained unclear, records of his decisions and
activities were not regularly kept, and large numbers of
civilian and military members of the War Department
influenced the General Staff.
The disarray of the General Staff was due, at
least in part, to governmental policy following the First
World War. After the cessation of hostilities in Europe
in 1918 the American military had been hastily demobilized.
Throughout the twenties and early thirties the Regular
Army suffered constantly from a lack of adequate approp-
17
nations. Concurrently the necessity of a standing Army
was questioned by congressmen of an isolationist persua-
sion. As a result, the state of the General Staff was
not regarded as a crucial issue in most governmental
circles. In addition, the internal failings of the General
Staff were not overwhelmingly noticeable to the political
community since the nation was not at war. Perhaps the
only group aware of the need for sweeping reorganization
of the General Staff was the General Staff itself.
As the likelihood of American participation in a
large-scale war increased in the late thirties, the General
Staff became more aware of its own deficiencies. The Staff
was not well equipped to operate in a time of national
emergency. The Chief of Staff, General George Catlett
Marshall, believed numerous organizational changes were
needed if the General Staff were to cope with American
participation in a full-scale war. There were a number
of factors supporting such an assessment:
1. The General Staff itself was not
coordinated; various elements of
the Staff operated independently
of the others. The Army as a
whole was unorganized, with various
troop commanders viewing their
divisions as almost personal armies.
Furthermore, troop commanders were
suspicious of the General Staff.
As a result, the General Staff had
only limited authority even within
the Army. Coordination of the over-
all military machine was thus
difficult to achieve.
18
2. Because of this lack of coordina-tion and the hostile attitudes ofCongress and civilian members of thegovernment, the General Staff hadbeen reduced to a paper giant:issuing reports and plans, which
were frequently ignored.
3. The General Staff operated in an airof unreality. Seemingly ignored bythe government, given unclear
authority, and dealing with an Army
crippled by minimal appropriations,
the Staff was unable to conduct
m?
aliStlc contingency planning.The War Plans Division of the
General Staff was limited to plan-
ning counterof fensives with divi-
sions that did not exist.
4. The Chief of Staff was as a rule
not on close terms with the President.
This inhibited the creation of a
chain of command with the Commander-
in-Chief at the helm, the Chief of
Staff in the middle, and various
field commanders below.
If the Chief of Staff and his subalterns per-
ceived these flaws, few others did. The problem came to
a head in early 1941 with the Army once again gearing up
for war. If the General Staff did not coordinate and run
the Army, no one would. Still, no governmental authority
had heeded the pleas for reorganization or a broader grant
of authority. The General Staff decided to act anyway.
The Staff,
In the interest of the rapidly expand-
ing field units had to make swift and
binding decisions of a command nature,
(and) could not limit itself to
"planning, policy, and supervision"
19
without serious sacrifice of effi-
ciency in a time of national crisis.
Accordingly, the decisions were
made, with or without clearly stated
authority. 13
Frustrated by Congress, ignored by the War
Department and elements of the Army, victimized by dubious
formal powers, the General Staff nonetheless achieved the
role envisioned for it by Elihu Root. Not having been
granted extensive powers, the General Staff and the Chief
of Staff assumed these powers in 1941. Such a move
probably would not have been tolerated prior to 1941.
But the obviously chaotic state of the military in that
year, coupled with the inexorable approach of war, allowed
the General Staff to play its hand. Also, the initiative
shown by the organization was due in large part to the
dynamic new Chief of Staff, George Marshall.
Staff in 1941 was formalized in March of 1942. Under the
aegis of "Army Reorganization" and with the endorsement
of the President and Secretary of War Stimson, General
Marshall expanded the role of the General Staff. The
General Staff was now given a command function over the
entire Army. The Army was divided into three branches —
13Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Po st: Ope raj:
tlons Divi sion (Washington, D.C.s Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of Army, 1951), p. 74.
The more powerful role acquired by the General
20
Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Services of Supply -
each overseen by a deputy to the Chief of Staff. The
three deputies were in constant contact with the Chief of
Staff and transmitted his orders to the various Army com-
mands. Never before had such unity of command existed in
the American military. In addition, Marshall expanded the
Operations Division of the General Staff and gave them
responsibility for strategic planning.
Perhaps even more important than the Army
reorganization was the creation of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, another development sponsored by Marshall. The
creation of the Joint Chiefs made possible close contact
between the Army Chief of Staff and his Naval counterpart.
The commander of the Army Air Force, actually a deputy to
Marshall, was allowed to sit as an equal on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. This organization served to minimize
inter-service rivalry and made possible the presentation
of "the military opinion" rather than "the Army opinion"
and the Navy Opinion." General Marshall was selected to
head the Joint Chiefs as a first among equals. He was
given the title "President's Chief" and became the spokes-
man for the triumvirate.
All of these developments strengthened the role of
the military, and especially the Army, at the expense of
the Secretary of War. The reorganization of 1942 forced
Secretary of War Stimson into a rather modest role. In
the War Department Stimson "retained direct control only
over the Bureau of Public Relations and the administration
of his own office." 14 To his chagrin he became known in
administration circles as "the Army's housekeeper." The
War Department, initially a civilian-dominated agency, was
by 1942 almost entirely a creature of the armed forces.
In addition, military influence extended far beyond the War
Department. Faced with the complexities of a two-theatre
war, President Roosevelt frequently turned to his Chief of
Staff for advice. The problems of coordinating the huge
new American armed force made the General Staff invaluable.
The need for estimates of enemy capability and intentions
likewise underscored the important role to be played by
the General Staff. The sometimes shaky alliance with
Britain and the Soviet Union made it imperative that the
highest levels of American military authority be aware of
political considerations. All of this served to increase
the role of the General Staff and to limit the power of
14Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper Bros., 1948),
p. 415"^ "Stimson, as Secretary of war, was neither a
professional soldier nor the finally responsible political
leader, and the organization which made the Chiefs of Staff
directly responsible to the President left him with no
formal responsibility in matters of military strategy..."
p. 414.
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commanding generals in the field. For the first time in
American military history, the armed forces were run from
Washington; important decisions were no longer made in
the field.
The importance of the General Staff structure in
1942 was clearly formidable. It was the ultimate authority
over the armed forces and virtually ran the War Department
on its own. Too, the nature of the war forced the Presi-
dent to listen to its advice. But the power of the military
was not without limit. We shall explore these limitations,
as well as areas of civilian-military friction, through an
examination of the "Second Front" decisions made between
1942 and 1944.
With the American entrance into the war on
December 7, 1941, the need to develop a coherent military
strategy became evident. Where was the main American
commitment to be made? How could the U.S. military most
effectively carry on the war? How were the hard-pressed
Russians t o be relieved? These questions were given much
attention by the General Staff, but there were other
voices attempting to influence the Commander-in-Chief's
decisions as well. A brief examination of civilian
decision-makers will be useful.
Cordell Hull, Roosevelt's Secretary of State,
did not play a significant role in designing overall
military strategy. Roosevelt tended to ignore him after
the breakdown of negotiations with Japan. 15 As a result>
by 1941 the Secretary and the State Department as a whole
were not participants in the making of importa„t military
decisions. Thus, a potentially powerful source of
civilian advice was stifled.
Secretary of War Stimson fared somewhat better
than his counterpart in the State Department. A personal
friend of the President, Stimson was frequently included
in discussions of military affairs. Almost invariably,
however, Stimson echoed the sentiments of General Marshall,
with whom he was in almost constant contact in the War
Department. Their likeness of mind seems due, at least
in part, to a rather curious sense of loyalty to the
Army's interests, and to Stimson's perception of the
duties of the Secretary of War. Stimson himself noted
that "You back your subordinates as the Army's
chief it is (The Secretary of War's) duty to act as
the defender of the Army against its enemies and detrac-
16
tors." In addition, Stimson's biographer McGeorge
Bundy allowed that "It is not always easy to be sure ...
15One reason for the eclipse of Hull and the
State Department was the Secretary's volatile attitude.
Exasperated at the state of negotiations with the
Japanese, on November 27, 1941, Hull told Stimson, "I
have washed my hands of it — it is now in the hands of
you and Knox, the Array and the Navy." Ibid., p. 407.
16 Ibid., p. 409.
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whether an idea or a decision started in Stimson's mind
or in Marshall's." 17 This in effect meant that ^ Secpe _
tary of War was an advocate of Army ideas, or even a pub-
lic relations man acting on behalf of the military elements
in the War Department. Stimson became a sort of cheer-
leader for Marshall and in so doing became a subordinate
himself to the people who were supposedly serving him.
Traditionally, the Congress had maintained an
active interest in the conduct of American wars. As noted
previously, the Congress had crippled the war effort dur-
ing the Revolution through an unwillingness to appropriate
funds. Congress had also interfered with the conduct of
the Civil War by continually "investigating" and fre-
quently reprimanding generals. Following the near-
unanimous Declaration of War in 1941, however, Congress
fell into a state of dormancy as regards participation
in military matters. To insure that Congress would not
interfere with the war effort, Roosevelt originated the
War Powers Act of December 18, 1941.
The Chief of Staff thenceforth had an
administrative recourse for solving his
command and staff problems without
entering into the long and trying process
of getting legislation through Congress...
The executive order from Roosevelt...
clearly affirmed the paramount authority
of the Chief of Staff under the President
Ibid
., p. 414
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in the broad sphere of strategy tac-
tt
C
l'<?
nd °Peratl°^, the moat Impor-tant functions of command. 18
In this manner the executive prohibited Congress
from interfering with the military. Accordingly, the most
effective Congressional avenue of affecting the war effort
was abolished. Congress, in fact, had been told to tend
to other chores.
This illustrates that three important sources of
civilian political influence (Secretary of State, War
Department, Congress) were, for various reasons, unable to
equal the influence acquired by the military. That fact is
of itself significant as it again illustrates the amount of
power the military had acquired. The military dominance in
Washington is especially staggering when one considers the
low ebb of military fortunes in the mid-thirties.
The Initial Military-Civilian Framework
It is clear that the American Army entering into
the Second World War was a vastly different structure from
the American Army of 1914-1918. The General Staff, in
coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had replaced
the field commander as the primary source of military
authority. In addition, the alliance situation of 1941
"1 QRay S. Cline, Washington Command Post,
(Washington, D.C; Government Printing Office, 1951),
pp. 92-93.
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was sensitive and fragile, at ti.es reminiscent of the Holy
League of 1571; in both cases political considerations
were needed to maintain a cohesive military machine, "m
a degree not true of an earlier g^atwar, the Second War,
above the field level, was not fought; it was administered.
It was directed not by great military geniuses but by
political leaders and staff planners." 19
Despite the political implications of the alliance
structure, the American military staff was not by nature
or training kindly disposed to "political considerations."
This was due in part to the fact that the Army had suffered
greatly from inadequate appropriations ever since 1918.
Even the Roosevelt Administration could be held accountable.
In 1933 Roosevelt urged Congress to cut the Army budget
by $144,000,000 and reduce Army manpower by 16,000 men.
As late as 1938 Roosevelt was still working against massive
expenditures to the Army. As a result, senior officers
tended to regard politicians and civilian officials as
adversaries rather than as partners.
It is also crucial to understand that the officers
comprising the General and Joint Staffs were professional
military men. Most were schooled in the spartan atmosphere
of West Point or other military academies and regarded the
-^Walter Mills, Introduction to Sir John Kennedy,
The Business of War (New York: William Morrow and Co.,
1953)7 p. vii.
service as a career, not as a temporary occupation. This
educational background and length of duty in the service
instilled an institutional loyalty in the officers and
infected some with an exaggerated xenophobia. Trained to
think in military terms such officers could not be easily
persuaded to entertain non-military considerations in
their decision-making. The term "political" was regarded
as anathema in military circles. Eisenhower was quoted
by a shocked British observer as delivering "a disserta-
tion about 'damned politicians.'" 20 Similarly, General
Marshall baldly stated that "My thinking was military
thinking. I would make a decision without considering
the political consequence. That was for the politicians." 2
Thus, the American military of 1941 regarded itself as an
autonomous institution, set apart from the "political"
departments of the overall decision-making structure.
Shunned for years by Washington, the military, and most
particularly the Army, attempted to remain aloof from a
political environment it regarded as reprehensible.
Interestingly, this Army distrust of civilian
officialdom did not extend to the civilian staff of the
War Department itself. Secretary Stimson maintained an
2?bid.
,
p. 251
!1Trumball Hig
Macmillan and Co., 1968), p." 167.
^-Trumb gins, Soft Underbelly (New York:
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attitude of deference to the military staff and held
General Marshall in particular esteem. This in effect
made Stimson part of the Army team (he had, in fact, been
a Brigadier General in the Army Reserve in 1922). Because
of this situation at the top level of the War Department,
lower echelons of civilian workers also cooperated with
their military counterparts, allowing the military
planners to make all important decisions regarding the
war. As a result, military-civilian conflict within the
Department was avoided — because the civilian participants
refused to do battle, and because they were able to win
Army confidence as "part of the team."
This happy cohabitation did not extend beyond the
War Department. Aware that any final military decisions
rested with the Commander-in-Chief, the General Staff was
suspicious of any non-military adviser who might influence
Roosevelt. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, potentially
a powerful countervailing force, did not prove to be a
great adversary of the military. This was due to Roose-
velt's apparent loss of confidence in Hull as well as to
Hull's discomfort with military matters. He declined
involvement in strategic planning, declaring it "beyond my
province," satisfied that such affairs were "being handled
op
exclusively by the President and his military assistants."^
Cordell Hull Memoirs of C ordell Hull (New York:
Macmillan and Co., 1948), II, 1180.
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But Hull's concept of a decision-making clique
that was entirely composed of military men was inaccurate.
The military did not hold exclusive access to Roosevelt
for the purpose of deciding strategy. Roosevelt frequently
listened to Harry Hopkins's opinions on military matters,
and this able White House adviser was not hesitant to
state his views. An even greater influence on Roosevelt
was another head of state, Winston Churchill, with whose
involvement in the war effort we will deal later. In any
event, the General Staff remained suspicious of both of
these men, jealously attempting to limit their influence
on Roosevelt and at times engaging in open conflict with
them.
What we have seen up to this point is an attempt
by the military leaders in Washington to maximize their
influence with President Roosevelt. The military regarded
the waging of war as a task uniquely suited to warriors.
The nature of their profession and the historical experience
of the military at the hands of civilian politicians
prompted them to regard any civilian role in the war as
"interference." Accordingly, the military acted to mini-
mize the civilian political role in the decision-making
process. But despite vigorous efforts by the military,
civilians both domestic and foreign did influence the
Commander-in-Chief. In addition, Roosevelt himself took
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an active part in military decisions (unlike Wilson) and
did not passively receive advice from various quarters.
As a result, tension between military and civilian decision-
makers arose in 1941 and persisted for the duration of
the war.
With this background in mind, we will now proceed
to examine the conflictual relationship which developed
between military and civilian authorities over the issue
of a Second Front in Europe.
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CHAPTER Ii
THE MILITARY AND THE ARCADIA DECISIONS
The iasue of a "Second Front" was the first
major decision of the war which involved the combined
military and civilian leadership of the United States
and Britain. Both the American and British military
staffs held firm opinions on the matter and were intent
on "selling" their respective strategies to the civilian
decision-makers. The civilian leaders - Roosevelt,
Churchill, Hopkins, Lord William Beaverbrook - were willing
to listen to military advice but realized that any decision
would have to be based on more than strategic military con-
siderations. Churchill, after two and a half years of war-
time leadership, was especially able to see implications
beyond the mere winning of battles, and probably already
possessed a germinal postwar vision. Additionally, the
British General Staff served the Prime Minister in a
strictly advisory capacity, and did not act as a counter-
vailing decision-making force. 1 Roosevelt was the
neophyte in the business of war leadership, and at this
stage leaned heavily upon advice from his military staff.
Nonetheless, certain facts had to be faced by both men.
Forrest C. Pogue, George C
. Marshall. Ordeal and
Hope (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 262. The British
Chiefs "were always conscious of the Prime Minister's con-
trol of policy even when he was absent from the scene."
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In December of 1941 the only major theatre
where the German armed forces were engaged was on the
thousand-mile front of Soviet Russia. There the Red Army,
despite a massive winter offensive of limited success,
was hard-pressed. This situation made it manifestly
clear to all Allied civilian and military planners that
the Germans must be engaged on another front to split
their forces. A "Second Front" would allow the commit-
ment of large American and British armies and would
eventually cause the collapse of the German war machine.
The need for a Second Front was obvious and
thus the idea itself was never controversial. There
was unanimity of Anglo-American opinion that the German
Wehrmacht must be engaged and defeated in the West,
The Soviets were most anxious that this be done with
celerity, since any delay necessarily put additional
strains on the exhausted Red Army. The differences be-
tween the British and American military arose over the
location of the proposed Second Front, This issue proved
to be an area of bitter disagreement between the British
and American military staffs, and threatened to cause
problems within the alliance at an early date.
British and American military representatives had
met to discuss joint strategy even before the United States
entered ifre war, from January 22 to March 27, 1941. Anglo-ArErican
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intelligence estimates at this time predicted Hitler's
"Operation Barbarossa," (the June 22, 1941 attack on the
USSR) and the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war.2
It was evident that if Russia survived the initial German
onslaught, the English-speaking Allies would be able to
launch a Second Front against weakened enemy resistance.
Beyond this general mutual conviction, the British and
American military found themselves in serious disagree-
ment. The Americans strongly endorsed invasion ideas,
favoring a quick amphibious assault on continental Europe,
perhaps in time to save a faltering Soviet Union. The
British Staff, almost certainly influenced by the disasters
at Narvik and Dunkirk, were not anxious to launch such an
invasion on Europe itself. They favored the reduction of
Germany through extensive airstrikes, and the engagement of
German forces in peripheral theatres such as Africa, Greece
or the Balkans. The British military felt that this indirect
2Stalin had been informed by Allied sources of
Hitler's intentions, but steadfastly refused to believe
the reports. Stalin's suspicion of his allies is a good
measure of his xenophobia and also of his eagerness to
remain at peace with Germany. This subject will be further
discussed in the following Chapter. Liddell Hart states,
"Despite German precautions, the British Intelligence Ser-
vice obtained remarkably good information of Hitler's
Intentions long in advance, and conveyed i t to the Rus-
sians. It even accurately predicted the date for the inva-
sion.... But its repeated warnings were met with an atti-
tude of disbelief..." Liddell Hart, History of the Second
World War (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 153.
A German decoding machine acquired in 1939 and code-named
"Ultra" was responsible for this windfall of intelligence
information.
34
approach would critically weaken Germany while causing the
Allies minimal troop losses. They were convinced that an
invasion of Europe could only be undertaken once Germany
had her strength drained in secondary theatres. In addi-
tion, great hope was placed in the bomber offensive against
the German heartland. 3
The position of the American Joint Chiefs at
this early date tended toward offensive action. They
regarded the British scheme of an "indirect approach »
as timorous and insufficient to pulverize the German
Army, the bulk of which was in Europe, and not in
peripheral areas. Because the Joint Chiefs believed
indirect attacks would never deal a death-blow to the
Germans, they regarded such attacks as wasteful, as a
frittering away of manpower. Further, the American mili-
tary, even the Army Air Staff led by General H. H. Arnold,
were not as optimistic as the British about the effect of
the bomber offensive. While conceding that the air war
could deliver a devastating blow to German armaments and
5Another Anglo-American dispute arose over bomb-
ing tactics. The British desired to restrict bombing mis-
sions to night hours, in this manner minimizing their losses
The American Air Staff under Arnold believed such a limited
undertaking was too modest and pressed for "around-the-
clock" raids. Eventually, the British bombed by night, and
the Americans by day. This incident further indicates that
caution was the hallmark of the British strategists, while
the Americans were eager to adopt riskier forms of combat.
No derision of this British characteristic is intended here,
but simply the observation that the British military atti-
tudinal structure differed markedly from the American.
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production, they were reluctant to believe that the
German armed forces could be neutralized by air strikes.
Thus, even prior to American entrance into the
war, the British and American military staffs were in
serious disagreement on the crucial strategic question of
where the Second Front should be launched. At this early
stage, strategic discussions were entirely a military con-
cern, and the disagreements between the British and Ameri-
can staffs did not yet influence their political superiors.
Although Churchill was not directly involved at this pre-
liminary stage, he constantly criticized his own military
leaders for being strategically conservative and unimagi-
native. It was evident that there were differences of
opinion on the British civilian-military team, as well as
between the British and Americans.
Because of the differences between American and
British strategic planning and the non-participation of
political decision-makers, further conferences were con-
vened in Washington close on the heels of American
entrance into the war. The initial round, code-named
"Arcadia," and held in Washington, was the first wartime
meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill, and their personal rap-
port was to play an important role in Second Front decision-
making. The first meeting, called to discuss strategic mat-
ters, took place on December 23, 1941. It was attended by
military ard civilian representatives of both countries. Chief of the
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Joint Chiefs of Staff Marshall headed the American mlll_
tary team, accompanied by General Watson, General Arnold
representing the air arm, and Admirals Stark and King
speaking for the Navy. The British Staff, cast as adver-
saries to the Joint Chiefs, had three representatives:
Admiral of the Fleet Pound, Field Marshal Dill, and
Brigadier Hollla
. Roo3evelt was Con3tantly in the
of Harry Hopkins and Secretary of War Stimson, while Chur-
chill was accompanied by the politically ambitious and
opinionated Lord Beaverbrook, who was to resign from
government service within the year.
At this meeting, as at numerous other meetings
during the following weeks, General Marshall seemed to
dominate the floor, arguing incessantly that the war could
be won in two steps. First, there should be a massive
build-up of American troops in England. While in England,
the American and British forces would jointly train for an
invasion of Europe. The proposed build-up of Allied inva-
sion forces was given the code-name "Bolero." Second, a
cross-channel attack on the French coast would be launched
sometime in 1942, code-named "Sledgehammer." Marshall
spoke of this plan as ensuring a short war, hoping thereby
to convince both Roosevelt and Churchill of the desir-
ability of the American "direct approach." We cannot know
if Marshall was purposefully. overestimating the effect of
an invasion in order to persuade his civilian superiors.
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Some incidents in Marshall^ World War One staff experience
suggest that this may have been the case.* it la clear,
however, that he was motivated solely by military con-
'
siderations, and tiuly believed in the efficacy of the
American plan. He also argued that an investment of
Europe would in the long run minimize Allied casualties
since the Allies would be taking the shortest route to
the German heartland. Secretary of War Stimson heartily
endorsed Marshall's plan, whereas Roosevelt remained non-
committal, preferring to hear what the British military
thought, particularly any suggestions that might be
offered by Churchill. Roosevelt, while relying heavily
on his military staff, evidently was not in awe of them.
The President's eagerness to hear the Bri tish s trategic
view was disturbing to Marshall, who saw the British plan
as not only ineffective but as endangering the Allied
military position. 5
4
Marshall, in his Memoirs of My Servic e in the
World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 44 relates
with relish how he had learned the art of double talk and
half-truth from French staff officers. "The lesson learned
was invaluable to me in my later dealings with our Allies."
Marshall relates an amusing anecdote concerning agreements
"en principe ." By 1918 he himself was adept at such tech-
niques. Perhaps significantly, a number of his WW II
memoranda contain the phrase "in principle."
5Marshall, more so than the other Joint Chiefs, re-
garded the British plan as doomed to catastrophic failure.
At a December 28, 1941, conference, "The President asked
about the possibility of landing under fi re a t Casablanca.
General Marshall stated that this would be a very dangerous
operation to attempt because of the hazards involved..."
Historical Office, U.S. Foreign Service, The Conferences
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The British Staff did not begin by countering
Marshall's Second Front proposal, but, like professional
debaters, first pointed up what they saw as shortcomings
in the plan. Their main objection was that, given the
strength of the German war machine, a 1942 invasion of
Europe was not realistic. Since any invasion would have
to contend with numerous experienced German divisions,
active Luftwaffe intervention, and possibly the German
Hochseeflotte off the French coast, the chance of Allied
success would be slim. Moreover, the Germans had the
capability to rush reserve forces to the invasion front
from Italy and Germany. All of this, the British empha-
sized, conspired to make an early invasion of the
at Washington 1941-1942 and Casablanca^_JJM5. "Minutes ofMajor Sexton, Defense Files" (Washi'ngton7~D7c
. : United
States Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 130. In part
Marshall's anxiety was caused by fear that the Vichy French
would tenaciously defend their strongholds. Army Intelli-
gence estimated that "the resistance of the French was cer-
tain and that it would be impossible to get supplies in
North Africa if the French in Morocco were hostile." Ibid.,
"Notes by Lt. General Arnold," p. 153. Moreover, Marshall'
apparently gave some credence to reports that the Germans
would strike through Spain if a Northvrest African landing
were made. Also, like Roosevelt, Marshall sew the first
contest of American arms as critical. He stated on
December 27 that "A failure in this first venture would
have an extremely adverse effect on the morale of the
American people." Ibid., "U. S. Minutes of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, December 27, 1941, p. 114. Marshall's fears were
largely unfounded. For further information see Arthur Funk,
The Politics of TORCH (Wichita, Kansas : University Press
of Kansas, 197477 p. 72.
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continent appear military unreallstlc
. „ ^
to the, that no invasion could be launohed mtll^
armed forces had been weakened, and the Oer^ns could only
he weakened if they were engaged piecemeal in theatres
other than Europe proper, while German war production was
substantially reduced by Allied bombing. In short the
British Staff objected on purely military grounds [ o ^
broad strategic possibilities envisioned by the African
Joint Chiefs.
In particular the British Staff representatives
pointed out that the Germans were already engaged in a
non-European theatre ~ North Africa, and that the objec-
tive of the British Eighth Army in Egypt was the destruc-
tion of all German and Italian forces on that continent.
As an alternative to Marshall's plan, American forces
might be employed in a support capacity in North Africa
and the Middle East, releasing British troops for actual
combat duty. The American Joint Chiefs were not taken with
this plan, objecting as they did to the use of American
troops merely as back-up forces for the British Army.
This apparent slight to the fighting abilities of the U. S.
Army put further strain on the already tense Joint Chiefs-
British Staff relationship. Anxious to avoid animosity
between the two military staffs, Churchill offered a more
active role for American forces: a joint Anglo-American
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landing somewhere in French Northwest Africa, perhaps in
Morocco or on the Tunisian ih* ii;ne l ms littoral. The always ambitious
Churchill also pressed for an invasion of Norway but
abandoned the scheme when informed by his military advisers
of the logistics of the undertaking. The Prime Minister
then pressed with renewed vigor for a massive invasion of
North Africa.
Despite Churchill's suggestion, Marshall and his
subordinates still favored an invasion of Western Europe,
inasmuch as Marshall felt that the way to win the war was
to fight toward Berlin, not away from it. He also ignored
the British assessment of German strength in Europe.
Further, the American Naval representatives, Admirals Stark
and King, were disturbed by the prospect of shepherding an
invasion force through the Straits of Gibraltar and into
the Mediterranean because of the presence of U-boat wolf-
packs in such restricted waters.
Roosevelt had now heard all the major strategic
arguments, but had yet to suggest a course of action or
to endorse one. He was no doubt impressed with the elo-
quent arguments of the always persuasive Churchill, who
saw many advantages in the North African venture, the
destruction of strong Axis forces, the preservation of
British control in the Middle-East and India, and the
possibility of a major Allied victory after a long run
of defeat.
According to one historian: 4
To Churchill, and to most British
What England had been bleedW forwhat the embattled garrison S2Malta was tenaciously sufferW forwas to hold the traditional life-'
RnU
6
« it
he GaSt
-
And P^sidentRoosevelt, unlike his military
advisors, sympathized with thispositi on. D
The American Joint Chiefs did not find these
goals particularly salient. Churchill had, they believed
succeeded in introducing
"political" issues (the preserva
tion of British colonies and areas of influence) into a
military discussion. To Marshall, the only valid aim of
the war was the destruction of Germany, which could be
accomplished solely through an invasion of Europe. The
Middle East, India, and other areas of concern to the
British, did not interest him, since they were not cru-
cial to the waging of the war against Germany. The pos-
sible use of American troops for the protection of non-
strategic British possessions was reprehensible to him as
well as to the other members of the Joint Chiefs. The
war, as they saw it, was a military matter and should be
stripped of all political considerations.
Despite Marshall's vigorous arguments and the
unanimous advocacy of a European invasion by the Joint
gArthur Layton Fund, The Politics of TORCH
(Wichita Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 1974)
p. 31.
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Chiefs, Roosevelt expressed interest in Churchill.
s
African proposal. By the end of the Arcadia conferences
in mid-January, 1942, Roosevelt backed the British plan
for an Anglo-American landing, ideally against positions
held by Vichy French forces of dubious loyalty. This
placed the Joint Chiefs in the awkward position of arguing
against their own Commander-in-Chief as well as their
British allies.
Roosevelt did not elaborate on the basis for his
decision, and the reasons behind it are not readily
apparent. We do know, however, that from 1940 on, he had
exhibited great confidence in his own military team, and
regarded Marshall as an especially able adviser. Accord-
ingly, it appears unlikely that he endorsed the British
plan because he regarded American military advice as
unreliable. A number of more convincing possibilities
merit attention:
mADmr 3
S °me authors (notably Arthur Funk in Politics ofTORCH and Robert Sherwood in Roosevelt and Hopkins') h^Tpostulated that Roosevelt viewed North Africa with romantic
attachment and, hence, favored operations in that area.
Funk writes that for Roosevelt, North Africa was "the mag-
net whose attraction never failed," p. 72. This explana-
tion tells us little and is not convincing. Roosevelt was
also fond of France, having traveled there, but he did not
allow this sentiment to become a factor in his decision-
making. It is unlikely that he treated North Africa
differently.
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(1) Roosevelt had some appreciation of Churchill.
s
pride and the shared responsibilities of wartime coalition.
Despite its actual and potential military superiority, the
United States could not dictate strategy unilaterally.
This may partially explain his open-mindedness during
Arcadia. Roosevelt was, after all, a politician by pro-
fession and thus in a position to regard flexibility and
compromise as the cardinal virtues of an alliance.
Acceptance of a major British proposal at an early date
would effectively "seal" the alliance, and facilitate
future teamwork.
(2) Despite his respect for American military
opinion, the President had reason to regard the British
military as more experienced in the realities of the war.
His acceptance of the British scheme probably was a simple
reflection of that conviction.
(3) The African plan had another attraction.
American participation in this theatre could be accomplished
quickly, far more quickly than the launching of an attack
on Fes tung Euro pa . American popular opinion was already
clamoring for a visible American war effort, and the
African invasion "might give the American people the feel-
ing of being in the war." 8 Thus, Roosevelt favored
Herbert Feis Roosevelt (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957), p. 47.
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joining the fight already underway ln North Africa for
his own political reasons. Unlike the military, the
President was not immune to popular sentiment.
(4) The proposed African invasion was also a
low risk enterprise. A newcomer to wartime leadership,
Roosevelt had no desire to preside over a military disaster
in 1942. Despite his regard for the Joint Chiefs, he was
disturbed by the British account of overwhelming German
strength in Europe. Given the extent of British military
experience, he was not willing contemptuously to discount
their warnings. An invasion of North Africa was unlikely
to fail, even though the yield of military benefits would
be more modest than that of a successful invasion of the
Continent. 9
(5) Hopkins and various British observers noted
that Roosevelt and Churchill took an instant liking to
each other and worked well together. Churchill was an
eloquent and persuasive orator. Too, Roosevelt was much
impressed by the strength and determination the Prime
9The domestic political trouble which might be
expected to occur after a failed military expedition was
brought home to Roosevelt by Churchill's predicament.
British criticism of Churchill intensified during times
of crisis, and he had to face a vote of "no confidence"
twice; with the debacle at Singapore in February, 1942, and
the surrender of Tobruk in June, 1942.
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Minister had shown throughout England's darkest hours. As
a result, Churchill's suggestions were given careful con-
sideration by the President. The North African plan was
initially proposed by Churchill.
This combination of factors probably determined
Roosevelt's decision to back the British plan, which became
known as "Super-Gymnast." The President was not overly con-
concerned with preserving the "traditional life-line" of the
British Empire, but was willing to assent to the plan for
a number of other reasons. Some of these, such as the
deference to public opinion, were clearly political, m
any event, Roosevelt had not ruled out the establishment
of a Second Front in Europe, he had merely postponed it.
And further, by doing so, he retained his option for action
at a later date.
The reasons for Roosevelt's decision were not
convincing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The North African
operation would contribute little to the defeat of Germany.
Once again the American military leaders demonstrated that
caution was not their hallmark. Caution, in their eyes,
was the equivalent of timidity. More importantly, the
American military was not comfortable in the atmosphere of
flexibility and compromise necessary for an alliance.
Considerations of coalition warfare meant little to
Marshall or to the rest of the American staff, at least
during this stage of the war. Further, the American
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military team did not 3eem to share
for the British General Staff, for reasona wMch we^
examine later.
With the Commander-in-Chief having decided in
favor of a course of action, the American Joint Chiefs of
Staff had no choice but to accept his decision, even if
they doubted its wisdom. Though resentful of what in
effect was a vote of no confidence, there was nothing
left to do during the final days of Arcadia but discuss
operations plans with the permanent British liason officer,
Marshal John Dill. It was decided that the best place Tor
a seaborne invasion of North Africa was the area around
Casablanca. To facilitate American planning of this and
future military operations, the Chiefs of Staff of both
nations were fused into a "Combined Chiefs of Staff,"
although each would still retain its discrete identity.
Reports could only be issued under the aegis of the Com-
bined Chiefs when there existed unanimity of military
opinion. And even then, there was frequent behind-the-
scenes special pleading by one side or the other. The
Janus-faced nature of the arrangement became evident during
the closing days of the Arcadia conference. It was clear
that Roosevelt had endorsed "Super- Gymnast" and the Joint
Chiefs, after having registered their dissenting opinions
on military grounds, were obliged to obey their Commander-
in-Chief. Accordingly, they assented to a memorandum
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drafted by the British which in part declared
QDen
S
the
Zi
M?,?f
N°rth Afrlcan coast **7op editerranean to convoys thus
S?^USly4.3h0rtenlnS the route to theMiddle East and saving considerable ton-
thfCane
em
*l°?* in the long haul around
iq2p o T 063 not Seem likely that in1942 any large scale land offensive
against Germany.
. .will be possible. 10
Thus, the Joint Chiefs, nominally accepting the
British plan for North Africa, formally abandoned the idea
of launching an early cross-channel strike at Prance.
Nevertheless, they (as well as Secretary of War Stimson)
still felt allegiance to their own plan and attempted to
sabotage "Super-Gymnast." This was partially effected by
sending unsolicited private memoranda to the President.
In a series of communications, General Marshall and Rear
Admiral Turner persistently described the proposed African
invasion in pessimistic terms. Marshall was particularly
determined to sway the President. Knowing that Roosevelt
was enamored of garrisoning Northern Ireland with American
troops, and of quickly building up forces in England, he
wrote of Super-Gymnast, "if the above operation is ordered,
shipping will not be available for other overseas move-
ments in the Atlantic." 11 He hoped that such "either/or"
Historical Office, U. S. Foreign Service, The
Conferences at Washington 1941-1942 and Casablanca, 1945
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1968), "Memorandum by Joint British and American
Chiefs of Staff," p. 213.
11 Ibid_.
,
George C. Marshall, "Memorandum to the
President," Dec. 26, 1941, p. 239.
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statements would cause Roosevelt to abandon the North
African venture in favor of other pet projects ~ at which
time Roosevelt might be persuaded to allow an invasion of
France. 12 The President, probably sensing Marshall's
intention, refused to reconsider his decision.
Aware that Roosevelt was influenced by British
opinion, the Joint Chiefs also attempted to dissuade Churchill
from carrying out the proposed operation. On January 4,
1942, in a session with Roosevelt and Churchill, Admiral
Turner, while expressing agreement with the invasion plan,
noted that such an operation would take at least four
months before any complete occupation of the Casablanca
area could be secured. This prediction was purposefully
bleak and made to frighten the British, who feared that
their capital ships would be endangered by any extended
stay off the African coast. Churchill, evidently as sensi-
tive as Roosevelt to such ploys, stated that "it had not
required the Japs four months to get ashore in Luzon." 13
12The Joint Chiefs regarded North Africa as a hot-bed of political activity and intrigue. An OSS team was
sounding out Admiral Darlan and other Vichy officials as
to their loyalties. Roosevelt and Churchill were engaged
in negotiations with the Free French forces of Generals
Henri Giraud and Charles DeGaulle.
13Ibid
., Conferences at Washington.
. .
"U. S.
Minutes January 4, 1942, Meeting atfthe White House," p. 164.
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Marshall, undeterred, continued to produce lntelllgenoe
estates indicating that any Invasion atte.pt In the area
was doomed to failure ti-. He dld
'
ln fact
,
have doubts about
the operation's probability of success, but his main objec-
tion was still the concept of an indirect approach to
Germany. Churchill and Roosevelt continued to dismiss
Marshall. 3 dlre warnings> but Kapsh&11 did succeed ^
worrying his British military counteroart^j ou uo ip Sj who grew more
anxious about Super-Gymnast as time went on. Despite
their initial optimism, they began to entertain doubts
concerning the likelihood of a successful invasion.
Whereas they had at first believed that French forces would
not resist, they now thought otherwise. Even an attack by
a Vichy surface fleet was not ruled out. Too, American
intelligence information about a possible German thrust
through Spain to Gibraltar worried them. In addition,
the German expeditionary force in North Africa had been
reinforced; the invasion might be repulsed on the beaches.
The British military was no longer inclined to regard a
seaborne North African assault as a "sure thing." Only the
civilian leadership, British and American, believed in the
probable success of Super-Gymnast. But that alone was
enough to keep the plan operational.
The special pleading of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
indicates the commitment that they felt toward "their plan."
50
Convinced that the "indirect approach" w*.as a monumental
folly they found it difficult- *•« ona in lt to accept Roosevelt's deci-
3io„ as flnal
. perhaps M Qccur ^ t^ ^
P-osing for a "pure iy milita ry strategy" they_^ing in political subterfuge themselves. Their one .slded
situation estimates and duplicity attest to a tension
between their oath of allegiance m f-w,J-J-egianc , on the one hand, and their
professional military convictions, on the other. As a
result, the American military in Washington obeyed the
Commander-in-Chief i„ le tter, but their continued reserva-
tions affected the perforce of their duty. The Joint
Chiefs "dragged their feet" on Super-Gymnast while appear-
ing to comply." The dellberate Amerlcan pe3sim . 3m had
through the^velopme^K^
bYaTlocatel tTsT^ ? the time and mate rial that^couldoe A loca d o Super-Gymnast. Thus, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff decided to utilize transports to withdraw Marinesfrom Iceland, to use cargo vessels to garrison Ire^anT
WonVhJloWf1" ?°tthe ?aCifi" theat
"
e
.
Edi-tion, the Joint Chiefs maintained that they were not vet
quatTu S° ant
r
'L°
Ut
^
e/'rlCan -*™turJ since "adf-"ate U . iaircraft defense cannot be provided prior
su'll7 a?1 nf
n
^-° ther lm?
lements war were in s nor?
tS n 7V } ° ^ hi S WaS a disc^te form of sabotage. Toohe continuing distaste of the Chiefs for the British '
ff^ 3 /f J in }anSua Se of some of their memos.
Jnn h ?° r ra3t) is ordered, shipping will not beavailable for other operatioRTlLn the Atlantic." Confer-ences at Washington ..." Memorandum to the PresidentDecember 26, 194TTp. 239. The Joint Chiefs made it
clear that their work on Super-Gymnast was not voluntarybut in deference to orders. '
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unnerve* the British mllltary
, but ^ ^^
velt. The two statesmen, i„ concert with the ubiquitous
Harry Hopkins, could not be persuaded Qr ^^
Military subalterns. Yet despite civilian Anglo-^erican
solidarity, subsequent events were to destroy
By mid-January, 1942, the situation in the Pacific
theatre had become ominous. The Japanes e had conducted a
naval blitzkrieg and inflicted serious losses on the Allied
forces. Generals MacArthur and Wavell pleaded for more
supplies to cope with an ever-darkening situation.
Although it had long been decided to treat the Pacific as
a secondary theatre, it became obvious that something had
to be done there to prevent disastrous reverses. Aid was
sent to the Pacific, m addition, it was becoming evi-
dent that Axis resistance in North Africa was stiffening,
and the name of a new nemesis entered military conversa-
tion, German General Erwin Rommel.
Both these developments caused the postponement
of Super-Gymnast. Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to
free forces to defend the garrisons in the Pacific, and
both were worried at the German build-up opposite the
Eighth Army on the Egyptian frontier. It became apparent
that a major invasion of Africa would have to wait until
at least May. This meant that one of Roosevelt's prime
reasons for supporting the operation -- a quick entrance
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>ose-
of American forces into the war ~ had evaporated. Ro,
velt and Churchill both pledged to see the invasion through
but began to doubt that it would succeed. The uncertain-
ties of war had worked in favor of General Marshall. With
Super-Gymnast temporarily abandoned, it was possible once
again to argue for a frontal assault on Europe. Further,
the British delegation returned to England in mid-January,
removing that source of influence from direct contact with
Roosevelt. Most importantly, the United States and Britain
were faced with military reverses, and political considera-
tions necessarily faded into insignificance. Even so, the
Super-Gymnast operation had only been delayed, not aban-
doned. The American military staff still feared that they
would become entangled in a war partially dictated by
political concerns, and, even worse, political concerns of
a foreign nation.
The Allied war effort went badly during the first
half of 1942. Malaya fell in February, the Philippines in
April. The Battle of the Atlantic was being won by the
U-boat tactics of Admiral Doenitz. The garrison at Malta
had been nearly neutralized from the air. The German
front in Russia had stabilized, and the Germans were
clearly gearing up for a spring offensive aimed at cap-
turing the Caucasus and Moscow. These events cast a
shadow of unreality on the decisions reached during the .
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Arcadia conference. The unexpected strength of the Gor-
ans i„ North Afrioa _ mo3t
there were always promptly brought to Roosevelt, attention
by a persistent General Marshall, and Roosevelt's hopes of
launching Super-Gymnast, even in May, began to fade. More
carefully than hefore, he considered the advice offered by
the American military staff, 15
Paced with a crisis, the British military staff
also began to urge on Churchill the indefinite postponement
of Super-Gymnast. An invasion of North Africa in 1942 was
likely to end in disaster (as was any offensive action),
that the British could ill afford. The troops and trans-
ports needed for the invasion would be better used shoring
up defenses in the Pacific and at Malta. Churchill,
although desiring to see his African project through, began
to see the grave risks it now entailed. It was apparent
that the situation called not for offensive action but for
desperate defense of areas under Allied control. The British
15
,
Following the reverses of early 1942 th<* TMnfChiefs used their frequent situations reports to the P?esi-t ° advantage "...to no small degree they could helpin determination of a policy by merely indicating theirown powers and limitations in implementing such a policy,
^"unrecorded personal influence by the Chiefs of Staffis difficult to trace and impossible to measure, but its
existence is a certainty." Mark Wat 3 on, Chief of Staff(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, De~pt. of Army,
i.y4o ) , p . 6 •
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military staff, llke their American counterparts, con-
vinced their civilian leader to drop the North African ven-
ture, at least for a matter of months.
From January until at least April, the Allies were
forced into a period of waiting, assessing the changing
situation and speculating on future enemy activities. The
American Joint Chiefs, as well as Stimson, utilized this
time to renew plans for an invasion of Europe in late 1942.
Admiral King suggested that the transport vessels and
escorts of the invasion fleet could be used in the Pacific
operations, but Marshall convinced him that the bulk
should remain on assignment in the European theatre. With
the exception of such minor disagreements, the Joint Chiefs
as a whole still endorsed the idea of European invasion.
Marshall became increasingly determined that a cross-
channel attack be mounted. At every meeting with Roose-
velt, Marshall, flanked by one or another of his sub-
ordinates, maintained that an invasion of France could be
launched before 1942 was out. This rekindled Roosevelt's
hope that the United States could soon get into the war
against Germany. In any case, Marshall declared, it was
evident that Super-Gymnast was doomed to failure.
The selection of a better course had
been urgently argued in a series of
discussion at the White House during
March. Vigorous Stimson, with im-
pressive Marshall, in accord with the
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staff planners headed by ner-
suasive Eisenhower, explained overand over why it was essential to
p\°
"dispersion" and to concen-
tt V£e build~uP of forces in theUnited Kingdom for a cross-chapel
assault. The supporting reason^
were impressive .16
Roosevelt was impressed by the fact that Marshall
had earlier predicted that Super-Cy^st was ill-convei ved.
His predictions had, apparently, been borne out. This
increased Marshall's influence with the Commander-in-Chief,
and, by April, Roosevelt tentatively endorsed a shift in
grand strategy. Super-Gymnast could not be launched in
May or June, and probably not soon thereafter. Nonethe-
less, Roosevelt was still convinced that American partici-
pation in the war against Hitler must take place in 1942.
Public pressure for a visible American role mounted
steadily. Partially as a result, and partially because he
saw few alternatives, Roosevelt allowed the Joint Chiefs
to begin contingency planning for a European operation.
He now endorsed the plan of his military staff, although
not for military reasons. He was greatly concerned with
domestic political opinion, an important fact which
apparently had escaped the Joint Chiefs, who were happy
to have finally secured the approval of their Commander.
^Herbert Feis, Roosevelt (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1957J7 pp. 48-49.
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Roosevelt now asked Marshall to consult the British mili-
tary and to win their approval of a European operation,
a task which Marshall accepted with relish. The President
would attempt to persuade Churchill to approve the pre-
viously rejected American plan. 17
The Joint Chiefs had achieved a good deal during
the early months of the war. First, their fledgling
organization had proved to be a workable unit. With only
minor points of disagreement, the Chiefs of the military
services had acted in unison, presenting a cohesive
American "military position." The traditional inter-
service rivalry was virtually eliminated, and this in turn
increased the value of military advice. Secondly, in
tq/io n* ?°,
tG Roose velt's message to Churchill, April 1.1942: As I have completed survey of the immediate andlong-range problems of the military situation facing theUnited Nations, I have come to certain conclusions which
are so vital that I want you to know the whole picture and
ask your approval. The whole of it is so dependent on
complete cooperation by the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates that Harry and Marshall will leave for London in afew days to present first of all to you the salient points.
It is a plan which I hope Russia will greet with enthusiasm
....I think it will work out in full accord with trend of
public opinion here and in Britain. And, finally, I would
like to be able to label it the plan of the United Nations."
Francis Loewenheim, ed., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their
Secret Correspondence (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,
1975), p. 200. As if to clarify matters, Roosevelt noted
in his next missive that "What Harry and George Marshall
will tell you all about has my heart and mind in it."
Ibid., p. 202.
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presenting a united front, the mllltary wa3 able to galn
control of the War Department and reduce the Secretary of
War to supporting status, further, their obvious expertise
coupled with other factors, eclipsed the power of Cordell
Hull's State Department. 18
The sometimes bitter disagreements that arose dur-
ing the Arcadia discussions made the American military
staff aware that they could not survive by insulating
themselves from "politics." Strategic plans, if they were
to be adopted, had to be presented vigorously. Military
18
from all nf^^ DePartment representatives were absenti of the important Arcadia meetings. "There wereat least eight major White House meeting? of tne ?res?dentPrime Minister Secretaries of War and Navy, Beaverbrook 'Hopkins, and the British and American Chiefs of Staf? andtwelve meetings of the Chiefs of Staff by themselves in
and Sokfns
1
^"T Robert sLrwood RooseveltH pki (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948) dd 444-44SNote the absence of the Secretary of state? ^Setery t£liwas in part responsible for his modest decision-making
status. He had drafted the M^mo_oji_tte_Proposed StandingMason Committee o f the StateTWaTTTnTl^Departments^(State Department: Government Printing Office April 8 "1938), which increased the accessibility of the Executiveto the military staff. During World War Two the StateDepartment was largely ignored by Roosevelt who worked
mainly with Stimson and Marshall. Hull himself stated
The question of the second front was outside my provincebeing handled exclusively by the President and his mili-
'
tary assistants." Cordell Hull Memoirs of Cordell Hull(New York: MacMillan Co., 1948), ~II, p. li80T"Other
sources confirm that the State Department was relegated to
a secondary role during the war. "Military and personal
advisers like Harry Hopkins overshadowed the State Depart-
ment. Russell Buchanan, ed., The United States and World
War Two (Columbia, S. C.s University of South Carolina
Press, 1972), p. 87.
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logic alone did not guarantee the approval of a strategic
scheme. Thus, it was necessary to beguile the civilian
leaders, to cater to their personal wishes, and to approach
them with selected facts. Marshall demonstrated consider-
able cunning in this technique, probably as a result of
his World War One dealings with Marshal Ferdinand Foch and
General Douglas Haig. Whatever the reasons. Marshall had
been able to see American Second Front plans adopted and
British strategy eventually rejected. To be sure, he was
assisted in this task by the exigencies of war.
Perhaps the most important, and troubling, point
in the Joint Chiefs' attitude during the early months of
the war was the apparent fact that their fidelity belonged
less to their Commander-in-Chief than to a military plan
they viewed as indispensable. Throughout 1942 the Joint
Chiefs retained the strategic view they had presented dur-
ing Arcadia. For a clique of men trained to think in mili-
tary terms, this inflexibility is understandable. This is
not to say that they were guilty of refusing subordination
to the Commander-in-Chief. Their obligation required
obedience, not approval. During Arcadia, and in the months
following the conference, the military staff did not
attempt to ignore Roosevelt, but to convince him that his
initial judgment on a Second Front was faulty. In doing
this they were legitimately acting within their assigned
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roles as advisors to the Commander-in-Chief. The point
on which they can be faulted is the
_r in which they
tried to win Roosevelt's endorsement of their operations
plan. There was an element of deceit, quite probably
unconscious, in the deliberate pessiml sm of Marshall and
King. The military predictions of the dangers of North
Africa were certainly more fatalistic than an objective
reading of the facts warranted. But this, of course, is
the crux of the problem. The Joint Chiefs were not objec-
tive. They had developed a single-minded obsession with
launching a Second Front in Europe. Similarly, they were
unduly suspicious of the British and were more willing to
tolerate their Allies than to work in true concert with
them.
Roosevelt and Hopkins did not have this diffi-
culty. They might disagree, sometimes strongly, with the
British, but they were not ill at ease in their presence.
The attitude of the Joint Chiefs toward the British, as well
as their fear that Roosevelt might be swayed by what they
regarded as non-military vectors of influence was cer-
tainly due in part to the peculiar nature of their mili-
tary training and insulated careers. As Marshall time and
again stated, the thinking of the military staff was
strictly military thinking. Those who seemed to entertain
other considerations were automatically suspect. Con-
vinced by training and education that their own military
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the
doctrines were sacred anl ln the best ^
United Stat6a
, the Jolnt CMefs regaixJed any Qther^
- a fo™ of heresy from wMch RoQsevelt^ ^^
A Military havlng
. mQre ^ ^ ^
not dedicated to any single strat e gic plan, might have
served Roosevelt better. Thi s la especially true when we
consider the lack of advice that Roosevelt received fro.
other sectors of the Government.
Up to this point we have seen the attempt by the
African military General Staff to "sell" their Second Front
strategy to the Commander-in-Chief. We have also noted
the Joint Chiefs- mistrust of the British authorities,
both civilian and military. It is necessary to understand
this relationship, since it will affect the later course
of Second Front decisions. Accordingly, we shall briefly
examine some additional details of the Joint Chiefs' deal-
ings with the British decision-makers at the Arcadia
Conference
.
During the Arcadia Conference the Joint Chiefs of
Staff had directed their efforts at persuading Roosevelt
to adopt their strategic plan for the Second Front. How-
ever, they found themselves faced with competition from
their British allies. The British had achieved a notable
(and to the American Chiefs, an unexpected) victory during
the Washington meetings when they converted Roosevelt to
their view of a North African expedition. This situation
produced tension between the American and British General
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Staffs, and heightened the competitive atmosphere. This
atmosphere permeated the Arcadia meetings, not only on the
issue of a Second Front but in other respects as well. A
review of some of the additional issues is helpful in ex-
plaining why the American military felt the way they did
toward the British.
The pre-eminent British decision-maker was Prime
Minister Churchill, and the American military staff was
especially suspicious of him. Their mistrust essentially
stemmed from two factors. First, it was widely known that
Churchill, though a civilian head of state, was interested
in all military matters from strategy to tactics. This
predilection is not surprising. Churchill had been
gazetted a Second Lieutenant in 1895, after graduating
from Sandhurst. For years thereafter he drifted from
military to political post, and back again. An early
statement of his is revealing: "The more I see of soldier-
ing the more I like it, but the more I feel convinced that
it is not my metier." 19 As First Lord of the Admiralty
during World War One, he had been responsible for the
20attack on Gallipoli, a Turkish peninsula. This 1915
19
Martin Gilbert, Churchill (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1974), p. 14. Churchill resigned his commission
four years later, in May 1899.
20
For an authoritative account of Churchill's
role in the Gallipoli fiasco, see Brig. Gen. C. F. Aspinall-
Oglander T s Military Operations, Gal lipoli (London: Heine-
mann Ltd., 1929), II, pp. 40-45\
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invasion failed miserably and was a charnel house for the
British Army. The Gallipoli affair also pointed up another
penchant of Churchill's ~ his fondness for indirect attacks
on an enemy. During the 1914-1918 war, he ceaselessly
advocated the defeat of Germany through efforts aimed at
Turkey. During the Second World War he favored an invasion
of North Africa, Greece, and the "soft underbelly" 0 f
Europe. The Joint Chiefs thus perceived Churchill as a
military dilettante. Secondly, the American military staff
feared Churchill's persuasive abilities. General Marshall
and Admiral King even hesitated to let Roosevelt alone with
him and always worked frantically to head off such private
meetings. Marshall believed that Churchill would beguile
Roosevelt into accepting British schemes that would pri-
marily benefit Britain, and not the United States. Mar-
shall was not entirely mistaken in this conviction.
Churchill was an imperialist to the core, and declared
more than once that he had not become Prime Minister to
preside over the dissolution of the British Empire.
The suspicions the American military felt toward
Churchill were not without substance, as became evident
during an incident which occurred during the Arcadia Con-
ference. On the evening of December 25, 1941, Marshall was
handed a memorandum of British origin detailing a private
discussion just concluded between the President and the Prime
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Minister. The memorandum purported that Churchill had per-
suaded Roosevelt to turn over to the British large Afri-
can units previously allocated to MacArthur at Bataan. The
British desired to use the American troops to shore up the
defense of Singapore. Marshall was scandalised that Afri-
can lives would be squandered to defend a British colony
and one of no strategic value, in preference to reinforcing
MacArthur. Even more, Marshall was crestfallen that Roose-
velt had not conferred with his military advisors before
making such a decision. He asked Stimson to bring the
matter directly to the President. Stimson agreed, equally
angered at what he regarded as a Presidential blunder of
the first order. He records that on meeting Roosevelt the
following day,
Incidentally and as if by aside he(Roosevelt) flung out the remark that
a paper had been going around which
was nonsense and which entirely mis-
represented a conference between him
and Churchill. I made no reply of
course as he had given up, if he had
ever entertained, the idea of discus-
sing the surrender of MacArthur 's
reinforcements
.
1
Stimson concluded that the incident demonstrated "the
danger of talking too freely in international matters of
such keen import without the President carefully having
Historical Office, U. s. Foreign Service The
Conferences at Washington...
.
"Proceedings of the Con-
fe re nee, " p. 95
.
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his military and naval advisors present."
" is still impossible to determine if the memoran-
dum was misinformed, or if Ro03evelt simply hacked down on
a Pledge made to Churchill. Whatever the faue story the
incident served to confirm the Joint Chiefs- suspicions of
Churchill as a politician to watch, and as an orator who
might mesmerize the President.
The American Joint Chiefs' reservations about
Churchill extended to his military staff at Arcadia. Their
objection was a belief that the British Army leadership was
considerably eras tianized; that they thought in political
as well as military terms, and were as concerned with pre-
serving the British Empire as with defeating Germany.
This trait was vexing enough in a politician such as
Churchill, it was intolerable in professional soldiers.
A number of incidents substantiate the claim that the
British staff was not an a-political organization. By way
of example, a few of these incidents are included here.
Toward the end of the Arcadia sessions Field
Marshall Sir John Dill was named first-ranking British
officer for the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
There was some difficulty about
this appointment at first, as Dill
was designated personal represen-
tative to the Prime Minister, Mar-
shall protested that this would
give Dill a special, detached, and
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therefore anamalous po3ition
exercising political aa well'as military authority.^
Marshall.a ardent made an impreaslon
. ,
Dill was given the appointmentj
t^
understanding that he would act purely as a mllltary
^nctionary. Nonetheless, oespite this tacit understand-
ing, the incident convinced Marshall that the British staff
was as much a political creature as a military one. Other
events during Arcadia served to confirm this. On several
issues, the British „il itary took stands dictated as ™ch
by political mo tives as by a milltary asaes„ Q .f ^
aituation. The British, for examp le, deslred that the
headquarters of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be
located in London. This was military nonsense to the
American Joint Chiefs. London was nearly a combat zone,
subject to aerial attack and possible invasion. To place
the Allied military nerve center in such an area flew in
the face of military logic. The American staff insisted
that Washington, D.C., was the only reasonable base. The
American capital was halfway between the two theatres of
war and due to its location unlikely to be subject to
enemy attack. When the British military continued to
press for the London site, it became evident to General
470.
22
Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins , pp. 469-
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than of convenience. The Amerlcan team
military men to thil* in atrlotly ^ ^
British were eventually forced to aocept the Washington
site, after Marshal! and Sti ra3on had rather tactlessly
hinted that the Unite* States was contributing the bulk of
men and materiel to the* wa»e r, and thus was entitled to choos
a site that was to American liking.
A final area of Anglo-American tension at Arcadia
revolved around the issue of 4--n munitions and supply. Roose-
velt and Chnrchill had come to the conclusion that a
Munitions Board should be established to coordinate the
allocation of munitions to Allied forces in the field.
The American military had no objection and endorsed the
idea. But Churchill, in league with his military advisors,
made two proposals which the Americans could not accept.
He urged that the distribution of munitions be bandied by
two offices, one in Washington and the other in London.
Since London was closest to the European battlefields
this meant that London would largely determine how ammuni-
tion would be distributed in that theatre. Marshall
countered that such an arrangement would be unsatisfactory,
that munitions concerns should be merged and handled by
one office, a sub-section of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Churchill in turn believed that the Munitions Board should
not be dependent on the Combined Chiefs and should be run
^ civilians. Marshall angrl _
"ons were
. aillta
-
«*> Plan. Munl.
^ Placed under mii1t
consequently mstli ary jurisdiction. A civlni .
run the ao-encv b,,t <-
L ian might
°
i y
'
u ""St be subiect t-r, «.v .=
Combined chiefs To d
de0lSi °nS of *»»
att b „
demonstrate the importance heached to the issue of military control u „* Marshall
threatened to resign a3 chief of Staff lf th R
was accepted. Paoed wlth
" BmiSh
'
f c i this threat p rt «mi Roosevelt inter-
Churchill insisted that the munitions fi*i„i eld was beyond thepurview of military CQ *
allocation of munitions,
^ said, demanded decisions of a politic ,
A11 .
P litlcal nature (whichllies and which Neutrals were to ^P 0
^
et suPPly Priority, andm exchange for whaM6 -Lur nat;. The military n 0HHp 0n •Politically insensi-
tive, wa3 not qualified to run the Munitions Board. „The
Pl,iDie MlnlSter
*** ^ thought the military rep-
resentatives would take the purely strategic view
This was, of course, the only view that the American mili-
tary representatives believed it was proper to take.
Churchill lost the debate, and the American Chief of Staff
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had once again assented his power.
The various incidents described, while quite pes-
sibly unimportant as separate cases, collectively demon-
strate (1) the notable tensions between the Joint Chiefs
and the British (both civilian and military), and (2) the
power possessed by the Joint Chiefs even at this stage of
the war. Marshall, especially, as senior member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, was more an active decision-maker
than a mere advisor to the President. He did not restrict
himself to offering advice of a technical nature (as did
King and Arnold), but became involved in all aspects of
wartime decision-making. This is clearly illustrated by
his fight to keep the Munitions Board part of the military
structure. Further, he did not merely offer opinion, but
"would shape the discussion by the nature of his ques-
tions." 24 Marshall presented his recommendations strongly
and defended them stubbornly against opposition from Roose-
velt and Churchill. Too, when some proposal struck him as
particularly injurious to either the Army's or the nation's
war effort, he was not adverse to threatening resignation.
24 One author points out, "After the war General
Marshall conceded that there 'was too much anti-British
feeling on our side; more than we should have had. Our
people were always ready to find Albion perfidious.'"
Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope(New Yorki Viking Press, 1965 ) , ~pT~264.
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This indicates that Marshall did not serve in a passive
advisor capacity. Hi 3 power was such that, after Aneadia
Churchill
- the leader of a foreign power - always
insisted on knowing Marshall's "view" of strategic issues
This position of power, coupled with his hostility toward'
the British, ensured that the tensions evidenced at
Arcadia would be a permanent feature of the alliance.
Marshall- s suspicions were not illusory. British military
leaders were, as we have seen, more inclined to entertain
political considerations than their American counterparts.
This is not to say that the British General Staff was a
political creature, only that it was in the nature of
this establishment to go beyond purely military considera-
tions, as the military had never been entirely divorced
from the rest of the governmental structure. The British
military staff, for their part, viewed their American
counterparts as unskilled provincials playing at war.
The American Army, after all, had not been tested in
battle since 1918. Accordingly, the capabilities of the
Army were an unknown commodity. The British attitude
was thus one of "caveat emptor ." In addition, the
British officers were infected by a certain arrogance,
and this was quickly felt by the Americans at Arcadia.
Although we cannot know to what degree this contributed to
Anglo-American tension, its influence should not be sum-
marily dismissed., In blunt terms, and allowing for some
exceptions
p the British and American staff officers did
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not like each other. This was a curious state of affairs
for coalition warfare. R^her, Marshall was not incorrect
in his belief that Churchill intended to protect British
interests through the conduct of the war. The British were,
in Churchill's view, equal partners with the United States/
Yet Marshall bluntly informed him that the British were not
equal but junior partners in the alliance. Marshall was
correct in this assertion, but his constant reminders of
the fact did not ease Anglo-American tensions. As the war
progressed, the American role became increasingly greater,
and the British found themselves forced to assent more and
more to American decisions.
If nothing else, the Washington meetings of 1941-42
had made it plain to the participants that the Anglo-
American alliance was not as cohesive as the world was led
to believe. Despite Churchill's flippant remark, the
British and American leaders were separated by more than a
common language. Grave differences existed between the
American and British teams. Roosevelt, although willing
to agree with the British on a number of issues, was
deterred by his forceful military advisors. The Joint
Chiefs made it plain that they were not concerned with the
interstices of maintaining an alliance, but solely with
fighting Germany. Ironically, in pursuit of this goal,
the Joint Chiefs found themselves engaged in running
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battles with the British decision-makers.
With the exception of his role in approving a
British Second Front decision, Roosevelt remained fairly
P-sive throughout the Arcadia conferences. He only became
involved in Anglo-American squabbles when forced to do so
as he was by General Marshall's threatened resignation
Roosevelt.
s
lack of involvement in Anglo-American problems
-y be telling in itself. Had he wanted to exercise his
authority, he could probably have caused the Joint Chiefs
to be more courteous in their relations with the British.
His failure to do so seems to indicate that he also was
concerned about the British proposals, and that Marshall
had succeeded in planting some seeds of doubt in him as
regards British intentions.
Churchill and his advisors were generally satis-
fied with the results of the Arcadia Conference. Nonethe-
less, there were some reasons for disquiet. By the end of
the Washington meetings, it was apparent that England was
not the senior partner in the alliance, and would have
difficulty even in maintaining a role as an equal of the
United States. Neither Churchill nor the "experienced"
British military staff could dictate policy to Roosevelt,
though their influence was considerable. The President,
although still inexperienced as a war leader, was not pre-
pared blindly to follow British advice. But i f Roosevelt's
attitude could be ve been anticipated, the attitudes of the
American Joint Chiefs of Staff could not. The American
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r ' aUth°rltleS PrW6n * be argumentative ratherthan eoneili atory, and lncllnefl fco^ ^
Allience interests. The^^ ^^^ ^
as attempting to preaerve Empire ^ expenae
of eoalition warfare. por the r,<k v.f British military, the most
troubling a3pect of the Joint Chiefs- behavior was their
determination to launch a Second Front in 1942. This
appeared (in terms difficult to overstate, absolute madness
to the British. In their eyes it revealed the American
staff as rank amateurs with a minimal grasp of the diffi-
culties involved in fighting a powerful Germany. Thus,
the Anglo-American Staff antagonism was mutual.
If nothing else, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
assumed an import.nt decision-making status as members of
the Anglo-American alliance. Highly professional, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff acted to defend their military esti-
mates against "political" interference. This parochial
bent, combined with an active decision-making inclination,
necessarily led to conflicts with the Commanier-in-Chie f
and the British Allies. The Joint Chiefs were prepared to
go to great lengths to see that their Second Front concept
was realized. In thus acting to block political considera-
tions from contaminating wartime decision-making, the Ameri-
can military itself became a powerful political force.
We have noted the anxiety and indignation with
which the American military leadership regarded "political"
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motives and considerations during the Arcadia discussions
For Marshall and others who had held staff positions dur-
ing World War One, political interests were something new
luring 1917-1918, General John Pershing had made virtually
all of the decisions governing American conduct of the war.
Further, he saw to it that the American Expeditionary Force
operated as a free and independent organization, despite
the supposed alliance with Prance and Britain, and nominal
subordination to Marshal Foch. As a result, Marshall and
others who shared his experiences were unprepared for
decision-making by non-military sources. At best, politi-
cians and "allies" were suspect in the minds of American
military leaders. Earlier we suggested that the genesis of
this attitude could be traced to (1) the abuse historically
suffered by the U. S. military at the hands of politicians,
and (2) the peculiar insulation of the military profession.
In some sense, it can be said that American military
leadership during World War Two subscribed to the Luden-
dorff notion that politics ends where war begins. Mar-
shall and his compatriots clearly regarded war as their
realm and tended to view non-military figures as outsiders,
and even intruders. The waging of war was regarded
exclusively as a contest of arms; as a remorseless exchange
of blows to determine which combatant was victor and which
was vanquished. Thus, there seemed to be little need for
a political referee.
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Such an attitude may be easily dismissed as
naive, out we cannot dismiss its very real impaot Qn ^
wartime decision-making process. Thia parochialism set the
Joint Chiefs apart fron all other members of the Allied
teaM
.
The African Mlitary staff was an outsider from the
•tart, a burr in the side of the Allied body. It l8 note.
worthy that the difficulties that arose during Arcadia
were a lraoa t exclusively due to objections from the Joint
Chiefs. As we have demonstrated, the Joint Chiefs not
only advocated various wartime plans, but were also quick
to condemn the introduction of any consideration they per-
ceived as non-military.
The question must be raised as to whether the
military versus political dichotomy made any sense at all.
Could the war actually be divorced from politics? Did
clear-cut distinctions between military and political con-
siderations actually exist? Is it possible that the
American military team was arguing against a spectre?
To answer these questions we must first note
that the term "political," as used by the Joint Chiefs, is
general and imprecise. The U. S. Chiefs apparently
regarded as "political" any course of action other than
their own formulations. According to American military
opinion, the defeat of Germany was the prime goal of the
r. If Germany were defeated, Italy would collapse
. The
r against Japan was considered a secondary operation,
wa
wa
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almost a diversion (though never by MacArthur), with the
ultimate outcome never in doubt
. Accordingly> military
operations were judged meritorious to the extent that they
contributed directly, to the defeat of Germany. Signifi-
cantly, the rest of the Allied team tacitly accepted this
assessment, but occasionally lost sight of ^ blinded ^
the day to day flow of events. During the opening months
of the war the Joint Chiefs were placed in the position of
reminding Roosevelt and Hopkins time and again that "Japan
First" was not a strategically valid plan. Defeating
Germany was the key to winning the war. The Joint Chiefs
were also anxious to defeat Germany quickly, before her
hold on the continent became unbreakable. This was the
"military view," a strategy dedicated to achieving direct
and immediate military results. m this respect the
American military perceived the war in nationalist terms,
excluding or ignoring the perceptions and interests of the
British, Russians, and Free French.
As we have seen, the Joint Chiefs were convinced
that combat in North Africa would do little to defeat Ger-
many. The fact that the British continued to press for
such a commitment convinced the U. S. military, in words
best expressed by General Stanley Embick, that "The British
view on operations in the Mediterranean was 'persuasive
rather than rational' and was 'motivated more largely by
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political than by sound strategic purposes.'"25 Was this
actually the case? To some extent it was. Churchill
especially had not abandoned the idea of maintaining the
threatened colonial possessions. Indeed, the most heated
exchanges between the Prime Minister and Roosevelt were
sparked by the President's criticism of British colonial
policy. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude that
such "political" interests were the main reason for British
advocacy of a Northwest African invasion. The British
military staff held a strategic view which differed from
their American counterparts. In military terms, for mili-
tary reasons, the British favored peripheral theatres of
war. This had been the case when the British Invaded
Norway in 1940, and when they confronted the Germans in
Greece and Crete in 1941. The Middle East proposals are
thus a combination of Churchill's concern for the Empire,
and a military disinclination to attack Fortress Europe
directly as well. Y/here the American Joint Chiefs were
audacious, the British military was cautious. In this
sense the British Second Front contributions were not moti-
vated solely, or even essentially, by political ambitions
unconnected with the war.
Beyond the area of a Second Front there were
Trumball Higgins, Soft Underbe lly (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 24.
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other issues regarded by the Joint Chiefs as having sinis-
ter "political" content. This was certainly true of the
decision to render assistance to the Soviet Union. The
Joint Chiefs, while agreeing that this was a concern of
some importance, did not regard it as critical. Roosevelt
and Churchill, apparently thinking in a larger strategic
context, were convinced that aiding Russia was crucial to
winning the war. This issue, and the Soviet role in it,
were to have an important impact on Second Front decisions
in 1942. For the moment, however, it suffices to observe
that the Joint Chiefs feared that this issue was a Pandora'
box of political interests and intrigue.
It is clear from the preceding statements that
"political" versus "military" considerations can become a
largely semantic exercise. For example, the retention of
India within the British Empire was a manifestly political
concern, but it was not without military significance as
well. India provided a base for British operations, acted
as a block to Japanese incursions in the area, served as a
port-of-call, etc. During total war (a state of bellicosit;
that WW II closely approximated; Goebbels was Plenipo-
tentiary for Total War, 1944), a nation's international
Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War
(New York: Random House, 1972), p. 481.
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policy and military strategy tend to merge. Where dif-
ferences of opinion arise, it is usually between Grand
Strategy and particular strategic exercises to effect
Grand Strategy. Roosevelt agreed with the Grand Strategy
enunciated by Marshall: the destruction of Nazi Germany.
He also agreed that an eventual investment of Europe would
be needed. Roosevelt rejected the notion that a Second
Front in Europe was immediately necessary. This, however,
is not to say that Roosevelt acted politically instead of
militarily (as Marshall understood it), but that his stra-
tegic view differed in detail from the Joint Chiefs. The
destruction of Germany remained the primary goal of Ameri-
can foreign policy, and, accordingly, of American military
strategy.
Too, Roosevelt was more apt to entertain postwar
considerations than his military technicians. Consequently,
he would be inclined to inquire into the general as well
as the immediate effects of a strategic move. Would an
American victory in North Africa ultimately benefit the
United States (through a presence in Africa, a demonstra-
tion of might, a show of solidarity with Britain), even
though it did not cripple Germany? Roosevelt was more
apt to think in such terns than Marshall, though much less
than Churchill. To state that such a view marks Roosevelt
(or Hopkins, or Harriman) as a "politician" and not a
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3trat6Si3t b6ClOUdS
^ iS- S » ^ "l-UT -mmthe point. 21nce international pollcy>
,^ ^^tics, involves the que3t fop security> anfl gince ^ ^Vision of nations! security is toe primal mi33ion of ^
notary, it is erroneous to suppoae that political and
military issues are actually divorced fpom „
Roosevelt's concerns about the British, the Free French
ana the Soviets, were a sort of meta-military concern
.
'
The
difference between military strategy and the political is
-re quantitative than qualitative. Put yet another way
in the Clausewitsian formula, diplomacy is one side of the
fist, military force (Macht) the other. There is a dis-
tinction without a precise separation.
We might also add that any sacrifice of British
or American national interest made to benefit the coali-
tion is best understood in a similar way. National
interests temporarily submerged would ultimately be estab-
lished, or compensated for by equivalent gains, through
the triumph of the coalition. The "sacrifice" of, say,
American national interest in fighting in North Africa
(essentially of interest to the British) had the effect of
strengthening the coalition (e.g., making it a more effec-
tive fighting machine) and thus of expediting the war.
Again, military ends are not really "sacrificed" to
political considerations; the military ends are accomplished
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through the application of different means. Certainly
Roosevelt and Churchill understood this, at least intui-
tively if not expressly. The American Joint Chiefs of
Staff simply did not.
There is, however, one sense in which "the politi-
cal" can be understood to stand against "the military," and
which would appear to vindicate the suspicions of the Joint
Chiefs. When domestic political pressures dictate mill-
tary policy, military concerns have clearly become subject
to politics. Hence, to the extent that domestic pressure
for an active war role influenced Roosevelt, the President
was ignoring military strategy ~ as well as international
policy. As we have seen, domestic politics did influence
Roosevelt's Arcadia decision regarding a Second Front, but
it was not a sole or main determinant of his choice of
action. It is doubtful that Roosevelt ever ignored mili-
tary advice in favor of domestic political expediency.
Within the context of the Arcadia Conference, the
Joint Chiefs' complaint of "political interference" was
largely an inveighing against a straw man. "in the making
of decisions military wisdom was not always enough, for
there were non-military considerations which at times out-
weighed the military." 27 For the Joint Chiefs,
27General Mark Watson, Chief of Staff (Washing-
ton, D.C.j Historical Division, Dept. of the Array, 1945),
p. 11.
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"non-military considerations" had »°n3 ^ assumed an invidious
character. if the decisions of pRoosevelt and Churchill
could be sain t0 be non.mllitary) they eertainiy coum
not oe said to be counter
_„mtary< Like joint
the civiiian leadeMhlp endorsea
. ^ &&
>
ffema"y flr3t
- ^ *** CMe tS) the clvilian el6 .
-nts po3sessed
. broader^ ^ ^
(rUdlm0ntary
" ~y have been). Thu3 the civilian
manner of th lr*ine was not as ™ch WmUita^. as it
was supra-military.
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CHAPTER in
ALLIANCE POLITICS AND THE SECOND FRONT -THE SOVIET CONNECTION
The importance of the Anglo-American decisions
of Arcadia should not be minimized, but at the same time
it would be inaccurate to suggest that they were the sole
determinant of initial Second Front policy. Although
not a party to the Washington talks, the Soviet Union had
a substantial influence on them despite the absence of its
representatives. For the English-speaking Allies the role
of the Soviet Union in the war was clearly impossible to
ignore. Aside from the rather modestly scaled Anglo-German
contest in Libya, the Red Army was the only armed force
directly confronting the Wehrmacht
. As Adam Ulam has
noted, 1 Soviet casualties for any given week in 1942
numerically exceeded the entire Axis fighting strength in
North Africa. The scope of the Russian war effort made
British and American contributions fade into insignificance
by comparison. Indeed, any reference to the creation of
a Second Front was an indirect admission that Russia alone
was maintaining the "First Front" against Germany. These
facts were not lost on Roosevelt or Churchill, or on the
British and American publics,.
Adam Ulam, Stalin (New York: Viking Press, 1973).
83
The Soviet Union was a partner in the anti-Axis
alliance, hut there was nonetheless a wide gulf separating
it from the other members of the team. This was partly
to geographical factors (Moscow was in an isolated
Position), and partly attributable to the uneasy history
of international relations between Russia and the rest of
the world. Another imp0rtant factor, however, was the com-
plex personality of the Soviet Generalissimo, Josef Stalin.
To an extent not true in wartime Britain and the United
States, political power in the USSR remained in the hands
of one person. For the purposes of this paper it is
necessary to make a slight digression, and to consider
the enigmatic "Man of Steel" and his role in Second Front
decisions. We shall briefly examine Stalin's role in the
war years preceding 1942.
With the approach of European war in 1939,
Stalin had jealously guarded the neutrality of the Soviet
Union. Despite the militarization of German society, he
avoided massive Russian mobilization, probably aware of
the effects of such action on 1914 Russia. He maintained
that the approaching war would be a struggle "among the
Imperialists," for which Britain as well as the Third
Reich was culpable. On a less theoretical plane, Stalin
found it expedient to make distinctions between the war-
ring "Imperialists" and sign a non-aggression pact with
Hitler in 1939. With the unexpected rush of German
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victories in 1940, Stalin went a step father and found
it politic to inveigh against the British. As Churchill
somewhat irritably recalled in his postwar memoirs, "Their
radio diffused its abuse and slanders against us. They
were at any time ready to reach a permanent settlement
with Nazi Germany... and to accept with complacency the
final destruction of the British power."2 In any event,
Stalin was anxious to remain at peace with his National
Socialist neighbor. This desire apparently colored his
perception of reality, since throughout 1941 he continued
to reject British and American intelligence warnings of an
imminent German attack on the USSR. These warnings were,
in Stalin's eyes, cunning attempts to get Russia into the
war against Hitler. Only with the June twenty-second
German assault on the Soviet frontier did Stalin actually
grasp what was happening. Only the necessities of war
had forged an alliance between Stalin's Russia and the
British Empire. But the alliance was not an easy one
and proved to be fraught with difficulties.
The disasters which befell the Soviet Union
in the early months of the war have become conventional
knowledge. For our purposes, we have noted that the
situation on the Russian front was ominous at the time of
Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (New York:
Bantam Books, 1962), p. 492.
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the Arcadia meetings. This fact was dually apparent to
Stalin and the Anglo-American team. Almost immediately
after Asia's entry into the war, Soviet diplomats urged
Britain to open a Second Front in France. Such pleas were
unrealistic in the 1941 timeframe. Too, the British still
did not regard Soviet Russia as a reliable ally. Churchill's
message to Ambassador Maisky's demand for a Second Front is
typical. "Remember that only four months ago we in this
island did not know whether you were not coming in against
us on the German side
.. .Indeed, we thought it quite likely
that you would." 5 Despite such British reproaches, the
Soviets persistently urged the immediate formation of a
Second Front. The Soviet position was vocalized with
additional intensity after America's entrance into the war.
In arguing for a Second Front during the Arcadia
Conference, General Marshall had stated that such a move
would take pressure off the Russian Front. Although assist-
ing Russia was never the primary reason for Marshall's
Second Front advocacy, the General certainly saw it as an
important side-effect. Stalin, on the other hand, saw a
Second Front solely in terms of relieving the USSR, and
not in any broader strategic context. An understanding of
this attitude goes a long way toward explaining why Stalin
H/V. Averell Harriman, Special Envoy to Churchill
and Stalin (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 81.
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Pleaded for a cross-channel attack even when such an expedi-
tion was likely to meet with probable failure. Stalin was
not concerned with the fate of Western Allied armies but
only with the effect that an invasion would have on drain-
ing German strength in Russia. This exclusively national-
istic bent also explains Stalin's attitude toward the Lend-
Lease program: America should fill every Russian order,
even to the detriment of the American war effort. Similarly,
the Arcadia decision to invade Northwest Africa was not
viewed by Stalin as a significant Allied commitment to
assist Russia. Only a frontal assault on Europe would
relax the German death-grip on the Eastern Front.
Stalin did not regard the Arcadia decision in
favor of Super-Gymnast as final. Convinced that the
Soviet military position was tenuous, he hastened to per-
suade the British and Americans to launch a Second Front
in Europe and to abandon their North African scheme. To
accomplish this Stalin relied upon two devices. First,
Foreign Commissar Molotov journeyed to London and Washington
during May of 1942 to press for the Continental attack.
Secondly, at the same time, domestic Communist elements in
the United States and Britain began a well-orchestrated
campaign "demanding" an immediate Second Front.
The motives behind Molotov's London trip continue
to be controversial. The alleged purpose was the finaliza-
tion of the Anglo-Soviet alliance. But it is clear that
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MoXotov had also been lngtmctea fco a British
ment to a Second Pront operatlon> ^ ^ ^^ " alli-Ce ™ have been
cootie affall
, tea lt not faeen for Soyiet ingigtence ^
one point. Stalin had ortere4 Moiotov to bring up terril
torial
.natters and try to obtain Britain's assent to a
postwar scheme which would make Poland and the Baltic
states Soviet
"protectorates." A„y Anglo-Soviet treaty
would depend on the fulfillment n-p +->>•xiium of this request. The
British were baffled by this farsighted issue, given the
uncertainty of Asia's day-to-day survival. In any case
the British refused to assent to the plan, even though
Moiotov described it as a coMcj^anitaire against future
German aggression.
Only Lord Beaverbrook viewed the request sympa-
thetically. According to him the Soviet territorial request
has to be seen within the context of their Second Front
anxieties. It is possible, of course, to accept the terri-
torial proposal at face value as an attempt to legitimize
hegemony in the East. If the Allied team was victorious,
certain territorial spoils of war would certainly be
annexed by the victors. If Britain agreed in advance to
Soviet spheres of influence, postwar problems would be
enormously simplified, he concluded.
However, this explanation is not entirely convinc-
ing. Both Stalin and Moiotov were aware that the British,
more so than the Americans, were hesitant to. endorse
Plans for a ^ropean a3sault
. Again ^^ ^
that the launching of a Second Front was the Issue of
paramount importance for the Soviets. Given this, Stalin
and Molotov may have formulated a sophisticated ploy to
gain British approval for a Second Front. The issue of
Soviet territorial demands very likely served as a red her-
ring of sorts. British resistance to the territorial issue
was no douht anticipated by the Soviets. It is conceivable
that Molotov insisted on these demands even though he was
aware that the British did not intend to approve them. And
if the British rejected the territorial solution, he could
argue for a Second Front on an either/or basis. The Soviet
Union would drop the territorial issue in the interest of
preserving a cohesive alliance. Molotov could then argue
that, in recompense, Britain should throw its weight behind
a Second Front endeavor. If Britain refused this second
request, she would be placed in the position of appearing
unreasonable. Thus, the territorial question was a straw
man, utilized to negate British Second Front hesitancy.
Such a view of Molotov' s visit is by no means
farfetched given (1) the tremendous importance of a Second
Front to the Soviet Union and (2) Stalin's devious nature
and the diplomatic skills of his Foreign Commissar. It
would be absurd to suggest that postwar territorial matters
were more important to Stalin than a Second Front at a
time when the fate of the Soviet state was in the balance.
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It is our contention that this sophisticated
diplomatic ploy was at the heart of MolotoVs London
visit. Since BrlU3h oppQsltion tQ fi SecQnd ^
wen known, Molotov simply tried a new taok fcQ
them from their position. The scheme failed. Beaverbrook
was amenable to the Soviet territorial issue and also
eager to see a cross-channel invasion. Sir Stafford
Cripps, British Ambassador to Moscow, likewise was im-
proved with the need for a Second Front. But Churchill
and his personal staff were the ultimate source of
political decision in London. Churchill and his minis-
ters reused to accept the territorial demands (as Molotov
probably expected), and also remained hesitant to pledge
themselves to a Second Front in 194S (an unexpected
development for Molotov). Churohill continued to rely on
infomation from his military staff, who were unanimously
convinced that a large-scale assault on Europe would be
folly. This conviction was as firm in May as it had been
in April when Marshall had visited London (this episode
will be dealt with in the following chapter). For
Churchill, Molotov's insistence on an invasion was fanci-
ful imagining. Despite this intransigence, other sources
were to assist Molotov and Stalin in their quest for a
Second Front commitment.
The difficulties in the Anglo-Soviet alliance
were known in Washington, and Roosevelt found the problem
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vexing. Prlraal,lly conoepned winn . ng ^ ^ ^
viewed any internal bickerlng as ^ ^^the hard-pre33ed Amea could m afforf> ^ ctorohiii
Roosevelt was personally opposed to granting the Soviet
'
territorial reauest-e, .quests. But, as noted in the previous
Chapter, Roosevelt was hy this time agreeable to Marshall-
Second Front operation. He was thus inclined to placate
Molotov and act against British intractability. The
President played his hand during Moletov-s secret visit
of May twenty-ninth. Molotov arrived in Washington
gravely displeased with the course of the London discus-
sions. His territorial scheme had failed, and he had been
forced to withdraw the issue "temporarily." He had also
failed to accomplish his primary goal - drawing a Second
Front commitment from the British. Despite this setback,
Molotov was aware that the United states was the senior
'
partner in the Anglo-American team, and that Roosevelt had
doubts about the advisability of Super-Gymnast. If the
United States formally agreed to launch a Second Front it
seemed likely that Britain would be forced to go along
with the plan. With this in mind, Molotov sought to
impress Roosevelt with the critical nature of the Eastern
Front situation. It was entirely possible, he informed
Roosevelt, that the Red Army would suffer serious defeats
from German spring offensives. The Soviet drive at
Kharkov had been foiled and was in danger of becoming a
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German position ln the West wQuld be greatiy strengt;ened>
The German Reich might indeed last , thousand^
entrenched in Portres3 Europe
. „ _ ^ ^^
fit of the West to keep Russia in the war. Molotov urged
that the Anglo-Americans should draw off forty German
divisions from Russia.
Roosevelt fully realized that the situation in
Russia was critical. Army intelligence had informed him
that the Soviets could not be expected to hold out
indefinitely. Roosevelt was also anxious to ^ai n Stalin's
trust as he had gained Churchill's and desired to end the
Anglo-Soviet rift endangering the alliance. As a result,
he was prepared to indicate to Molotov his approval of
Marshall's Second Front proposal. Even so, American mili-
tary leaders
- the initial advocates of a Second Front -
cautioned Roosevelt that any pledge should be tentative.
Marshall favored the invasion plan, but realized that
events could force its postponement. He pointed out
that it was one thing to intend to launch a Second Front,
and another thing to promise that such an operation would
be carried out. As usual, Marshall's reasoning was mili-
tary: he would not have an American Army sacrificed simply
to meet the Russian timetable. The evidence suggests that
Marshall personally believed that a Second Front could be
opened in 1942 or early 1943, but that he realized the
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uncertainties of war If. , for example, the Battle of the
Atlantic was decided in favor of the rvr,01 Germans, a seaborne
invasion would knm -»-^ia nave to be postponed, still and all
Marshall, and the War plang ^
stated that an invasion could probably be launched within
the year. This was enough for Roosevelt.
wan£ed°Jn
0tr de ? lared "La governmentt to know in frank terms what nos1tion we take on the question of asecond front, and whether we were pre-pared to establish one," Roosevelt?s
lft^PZt ter n°ted - " HS ^quested astraigh answer. The President turnedto General Marshall and asked if tocould assure Stalin that the Unite!States was preparing a second front.When Marshall replied
.yes,. Roosevelttold Molotov to inform Stalin that 'We
tSryear:.^mati0n ° f * f™ nt
Marshall's hesitancy had not been lost on Roose-
velt. His answer to Molotov was sympathetic but ambiguous
The President had stopped short of promising that the
Second Front would be opened in 1942. This ambiguity was
again revealed in the official communique released to the
world on June 11, 1942. The communique stated that dur-
ing the Soviet-American discussions "full understanding
was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a
Robert Divine, Roosevelt and V/orld War Two(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Pres 3
,
1969, 1969), p. 90.
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second front la Europe ln lg^ n5 ^ ^
this carefully worded mes3age may^^ ^ proraise
a Second Front- hif u^ x-xvini: out it was evident tn H-t*^vj.uenr o diplomats what the
-sage meant, and what lt d„ ^^ ^^
ment had i„ effect been made to Molotov.
Molotov had gained more from Roosevelt than from
the British. Roosevelt and the American milltai7 were at
least pressing for a Seoond Front. In addltlorlj Roo3evolt
promised that the Amerioan Joint Chiefs would attempt to
gain British aoceptanoe of the operation during the next
meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Too
,
Molotov
and Stalin could expect that the official communique
would have some effect upon the Germans, who might feel
it wise to build up their Western defenses, perhaps at
the expense of their Eastern designs. Despite these
positive developments, Molotov was certainly aware that
Roosevelt had not absolutely committed the United States
to a 1942 cross-channel attack. The ambiguous implica-
tions of Roosevelt's statements did not escape him.
Nonetheless, Molotov was a consummate political actor and
everywhere gave the impression that Roosevelt had made a
pledge, thereby further increasing pressure on the
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull(New York: MacMillan, 1948), II, p. 1174.
~
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President to open up a Second Front. Stalln was
fied that he had the Africans boxed into a corner-
Roosevelt would reel obliged to go through wlth a
'
0VQSa_
channel attack.
Stalin-
s
second device to secure Allied conmit-
ment to a Second Front wsq D ,«,vk* as a public campaign organized by
pro-Soviet elements within the United States and Great
Britain. The vocal campaign served to keep pressure for
an invasion at fever pitch, and, later, to underscore the
"promise" made to Molotov in Washington. This organized
campaign promoted the image of "spontaneous" demonstra-
tions and generated considerable attention in the press,
to which the campaign appeared as a groundswell of popular
sentiment. As one contemporary source noted, "The British
and American people are becoming daily more restive about
the relative state of inactivity on all fronts." 6 This
affair had political impact as well. Time magazine
accurately observed that "Not only have common people
jammed Trafalgar Square to demand a Second Front in 1942,
but the old guard in the House of Lords have paid glowing
tribute to Russia." 7 Both Roosevelt and Churchill came
6Foreign Policy Bulletin (Aug. 7, 1942): p. 1.
7Time (June 15, 1942): p . 25. Also the June eigthissue of Time carried the cogent observation that "The war's
developments called for the second front. Russia needed itbadly, but the establishment of a western European front
also needed Russia badly: if Russia were first allowed to
fall, the problem of landing in Europe would be collossal."
p. 23.
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under puWio fire for ^^^^ ^^lining a Second Front. Roosevelt was an especially ea3y
target since he had decided upon a "Europe First" policy
while midway into 1942 American troops in that theatre
'
had done nothing more than to garrison Iceland a*
Northern Ireland. It was clear to Roosevelt that a more
forceful American participation in the war was needed and
that it would now be nnUhVoiivo politically advantageous for him to
preside over a Second Front operation.
Despite these pressures on the Anglo-American
leaders, and the apparent triumph of Molotov in Washington,
Stalin never entirely trusted the British or Americans to
'
open a Second Front. Again, the reasons for his suspicion
are deep-rooted in his personality, in the nature of Soviet
politics, and in the assumptions of the Marxist-Leninist
ideology. Whatever the multiplicity of reasons governing
Stalin's behavior, it is evident that he regarded the
alliance with Britain and the United States as a necessary
evil, and not as a true partnership. Conversely, Churchill
was not overly enamored of the Soviet regime, in view of
the pro-German stance of Stalin until 1941. The mutual
antagonism, concealed under a veneer of pleasant insin-
cerity, placed the United States in a unique position.
The United States managed to remain somewhat aloof from
the problems plaguing the Anglo-Soviet relationship. As
a result, disputes frequently ended up in Washington, with
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British ana Soviet advocateg ^^^
respective ideas to Rooseveit. This ia e ssentially what
Molotov had attempted to aooomplighwlth Second^
Plea. It may appear that Molotov succeeded in this effort
and that Roosevelt offered his Second Front
"expectations"'
to appease Russia, and to strengthen the uneasy alllanoe
with Stalin. Herbert Peis ard other historlans have^
that Roosevelt was attempting to placate Russia, and
probably trying to convince Stalin to drop his territorial
demands. Feis in effect states that Roosevelt in offering
a Second Front was operating from a political perspective.
Thus, the inclination to launch an invasion was net mainly
prompted by military considerations but by political ones.
The Feis thesis is not convincing, however. To be
sure, Roosevelt made his Second Front statements and equi-
vocal pledges appear to be a concession to the persuasive-
ness of Molotov. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that
he had decided in favor of a Second Front prior to Molotov'
s
visit in May of 1942. It is difficult to deny that the
Presidential decision to pursue a Second Front resulted
from the persistent advice of Marshall and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. As previously noted, the Joint Chiefs and the
Secretary of War had urged the formation of a European
front even prior to the Arcadia meetings, and they did not
abandon this position in 1942. There is no reliable evi-
dence that Roosevelt's decision was prompted mainly by a
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desire to appease the Soviets. Molotov may have relnforced
Roosevelfs conviction to enoo.se a cross-chennel operation
but the P0TOign Co^isser wa3 not the prlmry innuence ^
'
the President. Thl s position is further substantiated by
the fact that Roosevelt's fallure aotual ly to promise a
Second Front wes also due to advice from African mllitaryquarters. Peis-s contention that Roosevelt made a political
and not a miliary decision ignores a series of facts:
1. The Second Front plan was not the
creation of Roosevelt but of tL
W»r
r
p?o
n ""itwy »taff, meinly theVfar pians division of the ArmvGeneral Staff. y
2. Roosevelt was persuaded of the
utility of a cross-channel a ttackin iate Kerch or early Anril 104.?
while MoloWs visiJ to London andWashington, and the territorial
proposals, did not take place untilMay Thus, it is clear that Roose-
velt had endorsed the Second Frontplan before he was approached bv
Molotov.
3. Roosevelt never actually promised aSecond Front, but simply asserted
that he "expected" one in 1942.
This ambiguous stand was promptedby Marshall's advice.
4. Since the Soviet territorial demands
had been "temporarily" dropped dur-ing the London talks, there was no
longer any need to offer the Soviets
a Second Front as a trade-off.
In view of these facts it appears likely that
Roosevelt subscribed to the Second Front idea not as a
political concession to Russia but because he was
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convinced of the military merit of an invasion of the
Continent. Greatly influenced by Marshall, he made his
decision primarily on military grounds. Thls underscores
once again the considerable ability of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to influence decision-making with respect to a
Second Front.
Aid to Russia: Effect on Second Front Decisions
As we have seen, the American Joint Chiefs of
Staff viewed the creation of a Second Front as an indis-
pensable instrument in wartime strategy. A Second Front
was crucial for two reasons: (1) only a direct assault
could destroy the German war machine and Nazi state, and
(2) only a Second Front could offer substantial relief to
Russia. The importance of keeping Russia in the war was
obvious. If Russia were conquered, or forced to sue for
peace terms, the bulk of the V/ehrmacht and Luftwaffe
would quickly be transferred to the West. Such massive
German reinforcements would make the task of the Anglo-
American forces extraordinarily difficult, just as a
similar move in 1918 had sorely tested the Western
3Powers. Military logic thus emphasized the critical
nature of preventing a Soviet defeat.
Q
On March 3, 1918, Russia had signed the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, the terms of which were humiliating, and for
which Trotsky, the signatory, would later suffer some
abuse. The German Imperial Army East was transferred to
France and took part in the devastating March 21 offensive
around Amiens,
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Since a Second Front could not be created imme-
diately, even if quickly launched, intermediate form
of assistance had to be devised. The main assistance
effort was accomplished by providing Russia with extensive
seaborne aid. American involvement in this task predated
American entrance into the war. m the First Moscow
Protocol of October. 1<*1, the United States, in concert
with Great Britain, agreed to convoy supplies to Murmansk.
Vast quantities of foodstuffs and war materiel were sent
to the Soviet Union in this manner, despite enormous losses
to German U-boats and surface raiders. Despite the impor-
tance of these shipments to the Russian war effort, this
form of assistance alone could not prevent a Soviet defeat.
Although the aid strengthened the Soviets, it did not
directly weaken the Germans. Aid to Russia was thus under-
stood to be correlative with, and not a substitute for. a
Second Front. Ironically, however, the provision of aid
to Russia ultimately clashed with American plans for an
invasion of France.
For Stalin and Molotov, the First Moscow Protocol
was important not only for the aid it promised, but also
as a litmus test of American intentions and fidelity to
the Soviet Union. If the Americans lived up to the agree-
ment, it would be an indication that they took the war,
and the alliance, seriously, Further, if the Americans
honored the terms of the Protocol, they might also honor
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their "intentions" to launch a Second Front. The Protocol
was important to Roosevelt for similar reasons, as it con-
stituted the first form of American-Soviet interaction.
As Roosevelt noted to Henry Morgenthau,
"i do not want to
be in the same position as the English (who made promises
to Russia but didn't keep them).
...The only reason we
stand so well with the Russians is that up to date we have
kept our promises. "^ Anxious to demonstrate Ms goodwm
to the ever suspicious Stalin, Roosevelt was determined to
provide impressive aid and pledged a total of 4.1 million
tons to be delivered in early 1942. At first the opera-
tions went smoothly, and substantial amounts of goods were
transferred to the Soviet Union from New York and Phila-
delphia, But despite this auspicious start, problems
developed by the end of January, 1942. An intensified
U-boat war off the East Coast of the United States,
coupled with MacArthur's increasingly strident demands for
aid, caused the amount of shipping to the Soviet Union to
be drastically cut. Admiral Emory S. Land, Chief of War
Shipping, decided on military grounds that assistance to
American forces and the protection of American lives had
priority over supplying the Soviet Union. As a result,
the United States failed to meet the Russian aid
John M. Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years
of War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 81.
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requirements from January through March. Stalin lost no
time in accusing the United States of a breach of faith
Sensitive to such criticise, and aware of the grave mili-
tary situation confronting the Asians, Roosevelt deeded
in late March, 1942, that all pledges to the Soviet Union
be met. Not wishing to be charged with putting Soviet
ahead of American interests, Roosevelt insisted that both
the USSR and the Pacific could receive satisfactory aid.
The implication of this was that the War Shipping Division
was not operating at peak efficiency, an allegation that
the Navy resented. Nevertheless, the Navy made herculean
efforts to meet all demands, although MacArthur was later
to charge that his theatre had been insufficiently pro-
visioned. The importance that the President attached to
aiding the USSR was plain enough for all to see, and it was
equally clear that he would not tolerate a breach of the
First Protocol. This "determined effort to placate the
10Russian Bear" and to win Stalin's approval indicates
that Roosevelt already possessed a germinal postwar vision.n
10C. J. Bernardo, American Military Policy: ItsDevelopment Since_1775 ( Harrisburgr^ti^p^Ii~CcTri^m
p. 43d. ' 9
i:LAverell Harriman in Special Envoy to Churchill
and Stalin (New York: Random House, 1975) attributes such
postwar concerns to the President. Roosevelt hoped that
the "Big Three" would create a "Pax Europa" of sorts,
though the details of this concept remained nebulous.
James MacGregor Burns claims that Roosevelt had no postwar
vision and that he ignored "the relation between winning
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Roosevelt's political motive3 ln p ^
ZT riet aM — » «- Joint Chlef3 ofstarr. Unooncerned with winning staiinig^ ^Siting American gooawm> oertainiy infeot^heady postwar plans, the military leaders^ ^ ^
program simply a3 a me prolong „„ a ,longing Russian resistance
to the Sedans. Hoosevelt and the military Were agreed on
the advisability or sending ald
, but for
The existence of these two differed ™ulIlerent Perspectives on aid-
ing Russia were to result in occasional military-executive
clashes. The difficulties of supplying the Soviets have
already been mentioned. The exi^nM^ *xigencies of war sometimes
demanded to military minds that other geographical areas
(Guadalcanal 1„ the Solomons, for instance) receive
temporary shipping priority. Roosevelt had no objection
to this policy £er se, as long as shipments to the USSR
were not affected. Such a dual mission could not always
be met, however, and Roosevelt eventually came to realize
this. Even so, his persistent efforts in promoting Rus-
sian aid did make the military cautious in cutting such
(New
W
Yo*"
d
«^
ndi
?S 2
emocra°y." The Lion and the Foxfle rk: Harcourt, Brace & World 19561
—
5
—Zg?
™erva«onfm3 °Ve fstat^ when compared to Harriman's
hand w^tnes::
Harrlman
'
*" ^ 6V6nt ' as a «»t-
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rces
was
aid. As
. result, the natural tendency Qf ^
second, was balanced by RoogPvpUIoy K se elt»s more international
perspective.
Stalin was no t terribly interested in balanced
perspectives, or in the needs of the African Armed Po
in the war effort. It can be safely asserted that he
interested in the American aid proSram only for what it
would provide the Soviet Union m a ^c u l
'
His brusque, sometimes
insulting, communiques reveal that he was not concerned
with "American-Soviet interaction" or goodwill. An agree-
»nt had been made to provide the USSR with certain speci-
fied goods on a given timetable, and Stalin expected that
the terms of the agreement would be met. This seemingly
narrow and unsophisticated outlook is more understandable
if one considers the situation in which Stalin found him-
self. The Soviet's plight was desperate by any standard,
at least until 1943, and it was fighting the Germans
virtually alone, as Britain had done in 1940. Stalin
needed the proffered American aid, but he also knew that
the Americans needed to keep the USSR in the war. Accord-
ingly, he could in some sense deal from a position of
strength. Too, he was certainly aware of Roosevelt's
desire to please him, and used this psychological calling
card to advantage. In any event, Stalin's singular aim of
acquiring as much American aid as he could, as quickly as
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possible, blinded Mra t0 other factor^ ^ Mithei>
understood nor oared that the United States needed ships
to ferry armor and munitions to New Zealand and Australia
Nor did he appreciate ( ln any 3enae of ^^ ^ ^_
mendous losses the Allies took in the Murmansk convoy3
.
Some convoys suffered one out of every three ships sunk
with others damaged.*2 Stalin's failure to give proper'
consideration to America's war situation am military needs
put him at loggerheads with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs, the War Department, and War
Shipping had, by June of 1942, come close to fulfilling
the requirements set down in the First Moscow Protocol.
The military had even, albeit reluctantly, agreed to send
the Russians over a hundred fighter planes that could have
been put to use in the Pacific or in Britain. Clearly,
the military was prepared to make sacrifices in order to
realize their strategic goal of keeping the Soviet Union
in the war. It must be emphasized that the American mili-
tary at all times regarded the USSR purely as a component
12 n
k ^n°7J^~ 1Q > leavinS Britain for Murmansk inSeptember, 1942, had lost one out of every three ships.Of those arriving at Murmansk, many were cripoled or hadbeen forced to jettison cargo. As a rule, Stalin choseto decry such loss of supplies rather than note the sac-
rificial spirit of his Allies. See Donald Maclntyre
The Naval War Against Hitler (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1971), p. 292ff.
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of strategy, and that their actions were not dictated by
altruistic or political motives. As a result, once
preparations for a Second Front were underway, the mili-
tary felt no qualms about suggesting that Russian aid be
cut to free shipping for invasion use. Just as military
aid had been offered to fulfill a military plan, so It
would be cut better to implement that plan. Although the
Soviets would be temporarily hurt by the loss of supplies,
they would in the long run benefit from the launching of a
Second Front, the action which they had for so long been
demanding.
The proposal to limit aid to the Soviet Union and
utilize shipping for the logistics of invasion was pre-
sented to Roosevelt. The military argument was, succinctly,
that the United States did not have infinite war resources
and hence could not do everything asked of it. Since an
invasion was the pivotal point of American strategic plan-
ning, it must be given priority over all other operations
in terms of supply. For the Joint Chiefs these facts were
obvious and did not present any problems. The President
wa3 not so optimistic. While agreeing with the military
logic and necessity of the proposal, he felt certain that
the Soviets would resent any cut in aid, however compelling
the reasons. Nonetheless, given the limitations of American
shipping, Roosevelt saw no alternatives to accepting the
plan of the Joint Chiefs. He allowed himself some hope
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that Stalin would. qp P +--uQ 4- .
,
th3t the red^tion in aid must ulti-
mately be of advantage to the Sov . et Unio^
Aware that the decision to curtail R„ •^ xia i Russian aid
-*t threaten the cohesion of the alliance, Koose.elt dete
—
to e Xplain personally the act to the Sovie ts. Mol 0 to
was summoned to the wm wWhite House for a number of sessions inMay, 1942, and informed of the plan to reduce aid. In llne
with the argument presented to him by the Joint Chiefs
Roosevelt stressed the implications of quic kly UmJng .
Second Front and minimized the oossib^ * .UflB P sible deleterious effect
of reduced aid to Russia. Molotov was not impressed with
this reasoning and bluntly dismissed it as ill-concealed
casuistry. He insisted on knowing to what extent aid would
be cut. Roosevelt (adhering to military advice) said that
military goods would not be cut at all, but that general
supplies would be reduced by at least two-thirds. Molotov
regarded this as unacceptable and intimated that the pro-
posal was a betrayal of the Soviet-American alliance.
According to James MacGregor Burns,
}jj! rP exchange followed. Every shipshifted to England, Roosevelt repeatedbrought the Second Front closer to
realization; the Soviets could not havetheir cake and eat it, too. Molotovbristled at this. The Second Front
would be stronger if the First Front
still stood. What would happen, he asked
cuttingly, if the Soviets got less supply
and then no Second Front eventuated-? 13
13James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier ofFreedom (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1970)p • <~- 34 . '
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Molotov's remarks are notable for a number of
reasons. First, they betray an absolute lack of under-
standing of American wartime abilities. He ignores the fact
that shipping was insufficient to provide for both opera-
tions. Second, his remarks illustrate Soviet intransigence.
The importance of compromise in an alliance structure was
ignored. For Molotov (and, hence, for Stalin) Soviet
interests were the only interests that merited considera-
tion. Third, Molotov's rebuke once again demonstrates
that the Soviets still did not trust the Americans to
open a Second Front. This was motivated by Stalin's
persisting belief that Roosevelt and Churchill would try
to "bleed" the Soviet Union as much as possible, lest
it emerge from the war too strong. Although such an in-
clination may not have been absent in Churchill, this
does not explain Roosevelt's motives for cutting aid.
Molotov's accusation also ignores the a-political nature
of the Joint Chiefs, who had suggested the aid reduc-
tion in the first place.
The Molotov-Roosevelt clash could not have been
avoided, due to the unremitting obstinacy of the
Russians. The plan, formulated by the American military,
was a reasonable one. If anything, it was an ideal proposal,
remarkable for its scope. The Joint Chiefs were not acting
out of a national parochialism (as they may have occasion-
ally done with the British during Arcadia), but weighed
carefully the needs of their hard-pressed Soviet Allies
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The
with the
.enema to he expected from
. Second Pront
Soal of the plan was t0 secure the eventual conclusion of
the war; ln servlce t„ thlg ^ ^^ ^^ ^
-as P«t in proper- perspective, m this instance the Joint
Chiefs could not he accused of shortsightedness or special
Pleading. It would he especially erroneous to suggest
that they harbored anti-Soviet sentiments at this time.
It is true, i„ fact, that the military was astonished at
the violent Russian reaction to the aid reduction plan.
The America military had acted in the highest traditions
of an Allied war effort. The initial decision to send
aid to tossia had involved military sacrifice, and the
Joint Chiefs had assented to this since it contributed to
the Allied war effort. The decision to cut aid was made
in the same apirit and without malice. The Joint Chiefs
erred in thinking that the Soviets would willingly share
the burden of sacrifice to achieve the eventual success
of the Allied war effort. Unfamiliar with the nature of
Soviet politics and the peculiarities of Stalin's regime,
the Joint Chiefs had expected the alliance to move in
accordance with the dictates of military logic. It became
obvious to them that this was not the case, and that,
for the Soviets, the burden of alliance was a strictly
one-sided affair. The American military was to retain
this knowledge in all future dealings with the Soviets.
Thus, the antagonism of the Joint Chiefs and General Staff
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toward the Soviet Union can he traced to Soviet unreason-
ableness in May, 1942. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had
worked toward achieving a "United Nations." end (a Second
Front) which coincided with Soviet desires. But rather
than cooperating in realizing this end, the Soviets
objected to the means (re-allocation of shipping) and
ignored the overall implications of the scheme, m addi-
tion, the Soviets questioned American intentions. The
effect of this attitude on the American military was pre-
dictable. The Soviet demand for continued aid flew in
the face of military logic. The American military's
respect for the Soviets decreased accordingly. Further,
It is reasonable to suspect that Marshall and his asso-
ciates were angered by Molotov's questioning of American
intentions to launch a Second Front. The accusation
grated against the possibly atavistic, but very real,
code of honor which was part of the military atmosphere.
Such duplicity, or outright lying, was abhorrent to
"officers and gentlemen." In any event, from this point
on the Chiefs of Staff regarded the Soviets with a con-
trolled hostility, both in Second Front planning and other
areas as well.
The 1942 Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal to reduce
Soviet assistance precipitated an American-Soviet falling
out, but is also notable for another reason. It illus-
trated the limits of Roosevelt's deference to Stalin.
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Despite intense abuse from the Soviets. Roosevelt did not
«aver in supporting the military's plan. „, accepted their
assessment of the situation and of America's capabilities.
It may have proven politically expedient to make further
concessions to the Soviets, or to ask the military to re-
vise their plan to reduce Soviet aid by two-thirds. This
Roosevelt refused to do. Following Stimson's advice.
Roosevelt "backed his team." m so doing, the President
certainly increased his stock with the military establish-
ment and allayed seme of the fears he had aroused at
Arcadia. This conciliatory effect was important, as it
reduced some of the tensions that had been mounting between
the Executive and the military. It. in turn, contributed
to effective American participation in the war. and facili-
tated decision-making abilities with the other Allies.
The unity of opinion existing between the Presi-
dent and the Joint Chiefs was not lost on the Soviets.
Molotov informed Stalin that a decrease in aid was
inevitable. Furthermore, the First Moscow Protocol was
due to expire in July, 1942, and a Second Protocol would
have to be agreed to if aid were to continue on a regular
and formal basis. Thus, to insure that some minimal
level of aid was pledged, and to record that direct
military aid would not be curtailed, Molotov reluctantly
agreed to accept the reductions announced by Roosevelt.
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Soviet acceptance of reductions rtiri *.r di(i not mean thatthe is.ua had been put t0 rest> Although
Protocol was signed by Molotoy> ^ ^
maintained that the UnitPri <^ Q+-*n u ited States was doing less than it
could for the Soviet Union Thi<, ^± . is theme was repeated by
the Soviet press and by STmoath^f 1 oy sy p etic elements in the United
States. To worsen matters it sn.,^iu, t; oon became apparent that
even the reduced provisions of the Second Protocol would
not be met. The pledge to retain the level of direct
military aid Mainly plenes
,
tanks> and
had been made too hastily. Statistics reaching the Joint
Chiefs made it clear that more military hardware than
originally envisioned would be needed in the Pacific and
in Britain. Military equipment allocated to Russia would
have to be siphoned off. 14 Roosevelt was dismayed by this
announcement, but once again backed the Joint Chiefs. The
Second Protocol had, after all, contained a provision for
further reductions due to "unforeseen changes which the
progress of the war may require." 15 Harry Hopkins was
World »„„ fl^qk' p;, 2?5, "If there were any miracles in
Even ,n
the snipbuilding spurt of 1942 would qualify."
t7™ 5 the lag time involved in this increased produc-
sMnC?™- solution unacceptable. The effects of thehipbuilding would not be felt until 1943.
15
n «, ^ Maurice Matloff, Strategic Plann ing for Coall-tionfcrfare (Washington, D.5Tr~0ffl cT'of Chief of Mi 11-tary History, Dept. of the Army, 1953), p. 230. The phrasehad been included at the insistence of General Marshall.
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given the task of informing the Soviets of further cuts
and the ensuing chorus of protest took no one by surprise.
Throughout the remainder of 1942 the Joint Chiefs were
given a free hand in determining the type and amount of
equipment to be removed from the Soviet aid lists, signi-
ficant amounts of materiel and equipment were thus removed,
especially airplanes. The military did not act frivo-
lously, however, but seem to have limited themselves to
acquiring only those supplies that were badly needed.
Their primary aim in all of this was (aside from saving
American lives in the Pacific) to provide better for
Second Front operations. Although harboring a resentment
against the Soviets, the military did not allow this to
interfere with their strategic planning.
The growth of the military's decision-making
power with respect to Russian aid is remarkable. Roose-
velt's initial decision to send aid was based upon mili-
tary advice, but he had soon come to believe that the Navy
was "dragging its feet" in meeting requirements. As we
have noted, he demanded in March, 1942, that the program
be stepped up. This period of criticism was a low point
for the military, but it was not to last long. The Joint
Chiefs convinced Roosevelt that, if a Second Front were
to be opened in 1942, aid to Russia would have to be cut
back. In May Roosevelt endorsed this proposal even in
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had
the face of Soviet protest. By July tha pJ " UJ
-T» e President
given the military unlimited power to de> ,
were to h«
determine what item
-r e removed from Soviet retirement lists. Aia to
-sia thus hecame an aimost exclusively^^where at firsf n- v, ^. domain,ll at
" hac* seen active Presid^n
tlQn
residential participa-
in aliowin, this issue to devolve to the mi litaryHoosevelt si gnaled bo th his tmt in the Joint^ ^ *
Starr, and his desire to have a Second Front created> ^
this .anner milltary persuasiveness served to countervail
Roosevelt's political inclinations it ,o . is also probable
that^Roosevelfs increasing reliance upon military advice
Zi-rvis Russian aid corresponds to his growing dlstru3t
of Stalin. Roosevelt had now witnessed Stalin's transfor-
ation from congenial partnership to abusive hostility.
Just as these sudden shifts baffled Churchill and Karri-
man, so they confused the President. Not certain of what
to do in the face of the unpredictable Soviets, Roosevelt
was content to allow the military an increased role in
dealing with them. Not wishing to become embroiled in
arguing such a limited issue as an aid program, Roosevelt
ehose to deal with the Soviets at higher levels. Too,
by removing himself from the thorny problem of aid, hi
limited his direct conflict with Stalin and thus facili-
tated his future dealings with the Soviet leader.
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CHAPTER iv
ANGLO-AMERICAN DISPUTES AND THE POSTPONEMENT OPTHE SECOND FRONT
American relations with the British in mid-1942
were certainly more cordial than the state of affairs then
existing between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, beneath the surface, the spectre of a Second
Front continued to vex the Anglo-American alliance. The
Arcadia discussions, while fruitful in many respects,
failed to end disagreements on the propriety of a European
invasion. Roosevelt had forced his military staff to
accept the British plan for a North African invasion. The
military reluctantly followed their orders, but were not
persuaded that the venture was wise. The crisis in the
Pacific, as well as developments in the European and African
theatres, forced the postponement of the British plan in
March and left the Joint Chiefs free once again to argue
the advantages of "their plan," an assault on Europe. Roose-
velt finally capitulated, revoked his endorsement of the
British operation, and in April tried to persuade Churchill
to do the same."'"
By February of 1942 Roosevelt saw fit to declare
that the grand strategy governing operations in all areas
would continue to be the subject of study and decisions
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 510.
115
The changing of Roosevelt's Second Front decision
is testify to the abilities and power of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and especially of General Marshall. We have
previously noted the persistence and skill with which the
Joint Chiefs argued their views. To this must be added
their ability to gather intelligence, collate statistics,
and draft reports and policy recommendations. 2 To a large
extent, this efficiency and organization is attributable
to the reforms in the Army Staff structure undertaken by
Elihu Root in 1903 and continued by Marshall in the imme-
diate pre-war period. The resultant managerial and organi-
zational efficiency gave the Joint Chiefs an "expert"
appearance, a look of competence which greatly impressed
Roosevelt. In his wartime dealings with the military
they always seemed to possess facts and considered opinions
on every detail of the war. Thus, their advice was care-
fully weighed and their influence with the Commander-in-
Chief became considerable. With the sudden and unexpected
British reverses in North Africa, the President concluded
that the Joint Chiefs had been correct all along, and
2
AAmerican military staffwork was thorough and
objectively impressive. Preparations by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff for Second Front planning "require three separate
staffs'... one for the present European theater, another for
the projected North African invasion, a third for the in-
vasion of Europe from the West." Capt. Harry C. Butcher
My Thre e Years With Eisenhowe r (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1946), pp. 33-34.
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that an assault on Europe should be launched as soon as
possible
.
There were, of course, other factors involved in
Roosevelt's change of heart on the Second Pront issue. As
we have seen, Soviet pressure for a Second Front was for-
midable. Too, Roosevelt's desire to enter the war quickly
Played a role. British reverses in Africa made that area
an unlikely theatre in which to enter the war, given the
possibility of military disaster. An invasion of France
seemed a reasonable alternative, especially since Marshall
claimed an invasion there could take place late in 1942.
A combination of factors was responsible for Roosevelt's
decision to press for a cross
-channel assault. From
April, 1942, until July, the primal issue in Anglo-American
wartime planning would be the desirability of launching a
Second Front in France.
Impressed by the persuasiveness of his Joint
Chiefs, Roosevelt determined to let them convince the
British to adopt the invasion plan. General Marshall and
Admiral King were to be the main personalities involved in
this effort. Marshall had been, after all, the original
advocate of a Second Front. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs
must be regarded as more than mere advisors to the Presi-
dent, they had become diplomats as well. On the issue of
a Second Front at least, their influence surpassed even
that of Harry Hopkins and Averill Harriman, both of
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Who* became secondary figure3^ re3pect ^ ^
tion. We
.hal! now examine the role of the Joint Chiefs inthe post-Arcadia discussions of a Second Front, and the
eventual decision not to launch «niM,such an operation in 1942
or in 1943.
Roosevelt's decision to back the Second Front
proposal presented by the Joint Chiefs took place in late
March, official agreement probably being made on the
twenty-fifth. The President realized that tta British still
attached great hope to "Super-Gymnast, - despite its in-
definite postponement and the bleak state of affairs i„ the
African theatre. British fear of losing the colonial
Middle East was intense, and consequently
"Super-Gymnast,"
the success of which would alleviate those fears, was
strongly favored. Churchill especially was fojot the
proposed operation. It could thus be expected that any
attempt to abandon "Super-Gymnast" would meet with great
resistance from the British.
Before presenting their Second Front proposal to
Churchill, the American Joint Chiefs decided to ascertain
British military opinion on the subject. It was true that
the British Staff had objected to any cross-channel assault
when they aired their views during Arcadia. But the course
of the war had been greatly altered since then and it was
possible that there had been a commensurate change in
British military opinion. The U.S. Army General Staff
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found that a British memorandum dated March 16 dealt
with the Second Front problem. The document indicated
that the British military considered possible an inva-
sion at LeHavre in the summer of 1943. The British would
agree to such an invasion if German strength and morale
were greatly weakened by that time, if German morale re-
mained high, and if twenty-five German divisions remained
in France, the British would not authorize an attack.
These preconditions, and the overall cautious tone of
the memorandum, convinced the American military that
their counterparts were not serious about an invasion.
It was clear, in any event, that the British Joint
Chiefs would not assent to a cross-channel operation in
1942. This apparent impasse prompted Hopkins to suggest
that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff not deal with
British counterparts but bring the Second Front proposal
directly to the Prime Minister. Marshall, although dis-
appointed by the caution of the British military, refused
to do this. First, Hopkins »s suggestion vitiated the prin-
ciple of "chain of command," a fundamental concept in
American military training. It would have been grossly
improper to bypass the British Chiefs. Secondly, the
British and American military leaders constituted the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff for the express purpose of discussing
strategy. This imposed an obligation on the American
military to Inform their British partners of their aims.
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Nonetheless, the American Chiefs would not object if Roose-
velt discussed a Second Front with Churchill while they were
working on the British military. This dual course was
ultimately pursued.
As was true in so many other instances, Marshall
took the lead in developing the Second Front plan. Together
with Eisenhower and the Operations Division of the General
Staff (0-3), he added details to the still sketchy Second
Front concept. Keeping in mind the need to relievo the
Russians, Marshall decided that an invasion force of at
least 600,000 ground troops must be committed to the in-
vasion. Support for this massive army would demand an
air fleet of some 6,500 aircraft. Although percentages
were not yet certain, it was clear that a substantial
amount of this force would have to be British, since the
transport of Americans to England was a relatively slow
process. This would doubtless reinforce British resistance
to the plan. Despite this, Marshall continued work on the
formal proposal. It was decided that the area "Calais-
Arra3-3t. Quentin" would be the invasion site, and teams
were set to examine the tides and terrain. One problem
that developed almost immediately was the shortage of
landing craft in Britain or, for that matter, in the
United States. A minimum of 7,000 such ships would be
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needed. 3 By then most American vessel of thls type haa
been sent to the Paclfi c and could not be readily recalled
It became evident to Marshall and his staff that this was
a serious weakness in the American plan
. without lading
craft (a commodity seemingly so insignificant in the vast
panorama of the war) troops could not be moved onto the
invasion beaches, or the invasion could not take p lao e on
the scale originally proposed. Determined not to abandon
the invasion plan, Marshall sought to modify it. with the
concurrence of the military staff he proposed that , ^
invasion of France still be undertaken, but on a more modest
scale than originally envisioned. This operation
(Sledgehammer) would secure a beachhead and engage as many
German divisions as possible. Although this action would
be a limited one, it was hoped that the presence of Allied
forces on the continent would cause Hitler to divert troops
from the Russian front. Further, "Sledgehammer" would also
include a massive 3irwar above France, Belgium and the
Netherlands. It seemed likely that intensive a ir activity
would force a diversion of German Luftflotte from Russia,
and hence considerably ease pressure on the Red Army.
p. 266. There was only enough transport avail able'for one
transport division.
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The massive invasion originally proposed by
Marshall was to be postponed, according to his revised plan
until 1943, by which time sufficient landing craft should
have been acquired. This operation (Roundup) would end the
defensive posture of "Sledgehammer" and carry the war to
the German heartland, thus preventing the collapse of the
Soviet Union
.
In effect, Marshall was proposing that the
real invasion be postponed until 1943, with a token effort,
a "pinprick" invasion, being launched in 1942. This was a
substantial alteration of the plan approved by Roosevelt,
and it raised a number of troubling questions. Operation
"Sledgehammer" seemed especially flawed for the following
reasons
.
(1) Would a small landing force be able to hold
out against the strong Axis forces currently in France?
The hunter might well become the hunted, given the limited
nature of the operation.
(2) Would such a limited effort seriously affect
the course of the fighting on the Russian front? Molotov
claimed that forty German divisions must be withdrawn from
Russia; could "Sledgehammer" accomplish this?
(3) With an intense air war raging, and with the
Germans able to concentrate their forces against a limited
beachhead, would it be possible to supply the invasion
force until "Roundup" in 1943?
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(4) If the Soviet Union collapsed in 1942
, wouldthe invasion force be withdrawn, since its mH
, primary purpose
was to take pressure off of Russia? Such a withdrawal
would pose additional logistical problems.
These potential problems were considerable and
caused yet another revision in the original plan. Sinoe
it was obvious that "Roundup/, not
"Sledgehammer," was the
decisive phase of the plan, "Sledgeha^er" ought to be
de-emphasized. The main task of the armed forces would
be to implement "Roundup," not the 1942 assault. It was
decided by Marshall and Eisenhower that "Sledgeha^er"
should only be launched if the collapse of the Soviet
Union seemed imminent in 1942. if it appeared that the
Soviet forces were to hold out through the winter, no 1942
assault would be needed, and every effort would be made to
launch "Roundup" early in 1943. This decision was clearly
more momentous than Marshall realized, since it meant the
probable absence of American intervention in 1942. This
goal had, after all, been one of the original reasons for
the plan.
The revised plan did not please the Commander-in-
Chief. He had placed great hopes on American involvement
in Europe before the year was out. Marshall was now tell-
ing him that this was unlikely, whereas before there had
been no question but that a cross-channel effort would be
made in 1942. Still confident in his military team,
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understanding the loglc behlnd revi3iong> anfl unawe
to see any alternatives, Roosevelt endorsed the plan
However, it is reasonable to suspeet that he was no
longer fervently co^itted to the operation and that his
advocaey or the plan to Churchm^^
The decision of the miiltary 3eriously to alter
their original proposal is interesting for a number of
reasons. First, it indicates that as thev h*,«uiid.0, n y became more
engrossed with the details of the plan, the y began to find
problems that they had not anticipated. It was one thin,
to propose a "theoretical" invasion in general terms, quite
another to launch such an invasion against a real enemy
under less than ideal conditions. The unrestrained confi-
dence the military exhibited at Arcadia vanished as they
became familiar with the interstices of the war. The
intention to invade Prance was not enough, the capability
to do so must also exist. Originally, the Joint Chiefs
had dogmatically Insisted that a 1942 cross-channel inva-
sion must be launched; the realities of war had forced
them to become more flexible. Additionally, in revising
4
Roosevelt's fidelity to Marshall's Second Frontplan was less than complete. He frequently became enamored
£ ^fTnate schemes and had to be talked out of them byMarshall or King. Roosevelt clearly wanted to- involve theArmy in more adventures than they could handle, now and
a?^n C 0ff 0n the wi ldeg t kind of dispersion debauch.,although Mr. Roosevelt had agreed to support the idea of atrans-channel attack, the concept was not as yet his own."Henry L. Stimson, On Active Service In Peace a nd War (New
York: Harper Brothers, 1948)', pp. 416-617.
'
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their operations plan, tto Jolnt^ ^
characteristic for which they h&,^ ^
caution.
"Sledgehammer" was not an lmpo3sible^ ^troops ana material needed to launch it were available.
The reason that it was accord tentative status was that
it involved great risks. The probability of success was
uncertain, and the American military were unwilling to
lose their first engagement of the war. „ the mood of
the Joint Chiefs of staff at Arcadia can be described as
audacious, their attitude by April 104? rf M „ ,j * rij., ±942, might be labeled
"judicious." Thus a i>h«™. «„n change i„ the invasion plan reflected
a change in the temperament of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The revised invasion scheme became known as the
"Modified Plan," and "Sledgehammer" was officially referred
to as an "emergency operation." This "emergency operation"
to prevent the collapse of Russia called for a September
or October invasion by five divisions, half American aid
half British. With the Joint Chiefs agreed on ttese final
details, Marshall and Admiral King prepared to meet with
the British on April 8, 1942. Hopkins accompanied them on
the trip, as a personal representative of the President.
As had been anticipated, the American proposal met
with stiff resistance from the British Joint Chiefs. Any
notion of a 1942 landing, no matter how tentatively stated,
was viewed as both absurd and dangerous. In addition,
unless there was a serious weakening of German strength in
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the West, invasion ln 1943 wa3 alsQ floomed ^ ^^^^
The Americans, the Brltish mmtary in3igte^ ^
estimating the strength and tenacity of the Qe™„^ U1 Ln G rman armed
?orces
. Marahall ana Ms 3taff retQrted ^ Brit^
were overestimating German strength. It was true' he
argued, that any invasion in 1942 0r in 1943 would involve
sacrifices and appreciable losses, a* the purpose Qf
launching an invasion was to secure the viability of the
be made quickly. „ an lnva3lon were ^ ^
Soviets might collapse. In such an event Hitler could
throw his entire army to the West and make an invasion
of the continent virtually impossible. Not impressed with
this dire prediction, the British staff maintained that
the only way to "bleed" the Germans was to defeat them in
North Africa and the Mediterranean. The British Joint
Chiefs still believed that the old "Super-Gymnast" plan
could be put into effect sometime in the future.
The two military staffs were clearly at logger-
heads. Daily sessions took place from April 8 through
April 13, without progress being made. This complete
lack of agreement on strategy eventually caused tempers
to run high, and there was a good deal of rancor between
the two staffs. The animosity was largely due to the
British. They still regarded the American Joint Chiefs
as newcomers to war, unskilled in the waging of war. To
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be lectured on strategy by Marshall was regarded as
affrontery. As one member of the British General Staff
confessed, "We had as yet no great respect for the
quality of their staff work, and did not regard their
strategical conceptions as being based on realities."5
In view of this, it was probably impossible for the
British to regard any American proposal objectively.
Besides consulting the British Joint Chiefs,
Marshall also expressed his opinions to Churchill. He was
assisted by Harry Hopkins whom Churchill regarded with a
certain affection. Also, the Prime Minister had received
a letter from Roosevelt which pointedly mentioned the
desire of the Anglo-American public for a Second Front.
"Your people and mine demand the establishment of a front
to draw off pressure on the Russians, and these peoples
are wise enough to see that the Russians are killing more
Germans and destroying more equipment than you and I put
together." 6 Such a message, while it would not have im-
pressed the British military staff, could be expected to
have an impact on the Prime Minister. It became apparent
to Churchill that Roosevelt stood behind his military staff
5Sir John Kennedy - The Business of war (New York:
William Morrow & Co., 1958;, p. 280.
gRobert Devine, Roosevelt and World War Two
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), pp. 88-89.
'
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in this mstter. Otahm waa not enthusiastic about theprospects for either
"Sledgehammer" or ,Roundup/, ^ hedid not share the deep pessimism of Ms Chiefs of Staffindeed, relations between the Prime Mlnlater anfl ^
British military were strainea> bQth becauge ^ ^
of British military disasters and because of the "con-
servative" policies promoted by the chiefs. To be sure'
Churchill still favored his
"Super-Cymnast" proposal but
he noted that his staff was not anxious to launch this
endeavor either. The
"defense-mindedness" of the British
military was infuriating to Churchill. Too, "Unlike his
soldiers, Churchill recognized that successful Anglo-
American political cooperation was necessarily antecedent
to all coalition strategic planning." 7 Churchill decided
to accept the American invasion plan, both to please tl»
Americans and to express his displeasure with the inactivity
of hie own military staff. This did not mean that
Churchill was convinced that
"Sledgehammer-Roundup" was
militarily sound. He endorsed it because there seemed
little alternative except military inactivity throughout
1942 and possibly 1943. In accepting the "purely mili-
tary" calculations of the American Joint Chiefs, Churchill
was making a political concession to his American Allies;
op
'Maurice Matloff, Strategic Plannl ng. . . .
• C 1 "C • f p. 188,
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this was the sole reason behind his commitment. The Joint
Chiefs did not fathom Churchill's intentions but were
satisfied to have his formal agreement.
Although Churchill had accepted the modified
invasion plan presented by Marshall, he had done so only
after expressing his grave reservations. Nonetheless, it
was an official acceptance that Marshall had been
striving for and had achieved, a meeting of minds was not
as important. Churchill's endorsement of the plan
virtually guaranteed British participation, but the
British military still had to be consulted and persuaded
to desist from their criticisms. Marshall was well aware
that a hostile reception from the British Chiefs of Staff
might succeed, over a period of time, in changing
Churchill's mind. Too, unless the British military was
convinced of the desirability of the Second Front plan,
and its probability of success, they might sabotage the
implementation just as Marshall had attempted to sabotage
"Super-Gymnast." Conscious "heeldragging" by the British
military would severely hamper any invasion effort, since
the British Army and Navy constituted an important part
of the invasion force. Thus, the conferences with the
British Chiefs of Staff assumed a new dimension of
importance #
The decisive confrontation between the American
and British military staffs took place on April 14, 1942.
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Once again, Marshall presented his ease for a cress-channel
assault in 1943, possibly to be preceded by an "emergency
effort" in late 1942. The British resurrected their
familiar objection that the proposal was unrealistic, m
support they recited a litany of German divisions and sup-
port elements known to be in France. Marshall retorted
that German strength in the area was indeed formidable, but
might be even more so in the future, especially if the
Soviet Army failed to hold out. Marshall stressed that a
compelling reason for the invasion was the relief of the
critical Russian Front. The British, in turn, acknowledged
the importance of assisting Russia, but doubted that a
catastrophe on the French beaches would achieve such an
Q
end. As in the previous military meetings of the London
Conference, an impasse had been reached. Since both sides
were arguing from conviction, concessions were difficult.
Both sides remained convinced that they were following the
dictates of military logic; compromising this logic thus
meant adopting an illogical plan. The Chiefs were not, by
temperament or training, accustomed to what they regarded
as a betrayal of principle. Put another way, both teams
argued their positions with the absolute certainty that
they were correct. In addition, both side's realized that
the stakes of the issue were high. From the British
vantage point, adoption of Marshall's scheme meant the
8
Ibid.
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probable destruction of entire divisions, vast amounts
of materiel, and commensurate destruction of the morale
of soldiers and civilians alike. For the American staff,
refusal to launch a Second Front was tantamount to writ-'
ing off the Soviet Union as lost, sitting out the war in
relative inactivity, and attempting a future invasion
against depressingly superior German forces. Both the
British and the Americans, for their own particular
reasons, viewed the situation in apocalyptic terms.
In addition to their fear of a military catas-
trophe, the British Chiefs were impelled to reject the
Second Front plan for another reason as well. The
American proposal, were it adopted, would necessitate the
marshaling of troops and equipment in Britain, in prepara-
tion for the assault. Similarly, capital ships and land-
ing craft (which, as noted, were in woefully short supply)
would have to be reserved for the invasion. This meant
that efforts to reinforce the British Eighth Army in Egypt
and its forces in the Indian Ocean area would have to be
drastically curtailed. Faced with a seemingly desperate
situation already, these forces in all probability would not
survive the cutbacks. The British staff was not willing
to suffer the loss of Africa or India for the sake of
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realizing
"Sledgehammer-Roundup."9
At this crucial Juncture in the discussions
Churchill chose to exert his influence. He intimated to
Harry Hopkins (who acted as a transmission belt to
Marshall) that the British General Staff might he mo^
willing to agree to a Second Front if Marshall could
gUarSntee that N°rth Afrl
- ^d India rsed suffer no losses
of supply or reinforcement. Despite the problems inherent
in such a sweeping guarantee, Marshall understood that it
was a concession well worth making. He thus informed the
British General Staff that a Second Front could be
launched without endangering British efforts on other
fronts. Following this session, the energetic Prime
Minister instructed the General Staff to make a pro forma
acceptance of the American proposal. Churchill's theme
was that Marshall need only be given tentative assent,
not a formal pledge. In effect, the British military
was instructed by Churchill not to take the invasion
9
^ ,,4,,, Churchill feared a German-Japanese link-up inthe Middle East-India area. In fact, such an eventuality
was more chimerical than substantial. Hitler only toyed
with the possibility in an off-handed manner, and Japanedesigns on India were relatively modest, as they never
viewed India as part of their Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere. See John Toland, The RisW Sun (New
York: Random House, 1970). ~
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proposal very seriously. 10
With these behind-the-scenes maneuvering by
Churchill, the impasse in the military discussions was
apparently broken. The British agreed both to a massive
1943 invasion of France, and to the possibility of a
more limited assault late in 1942. la return, Marshall
promised that the United States would not object to
British efforts to supply North Africa and India. By
securing this British "commitment," Marshall believed that
he had achieved a notable diplomatic victory. In truth,
however, he had been beguiled by Churchill. Marshall,
'
the career soldier, was out of his metier in the world of
alliance politics, whereas Churchill was on familiar
ground. In retrospect it is clear that Churchill was the
controlling force throughout the London Conference. As
previously observed, he "endorsed" the Marshall proposal
chiefly to appease Roosevelt and to ensure the cohesive-
ness of the alliance. He then managed to illustrate to
the Americans the importance the British attached to the
defense of their colonies ( a position that had infuriated
the American military at Arcadia). Having made it clear
that every effort would be made to assist these colonies,
British General Brooke confided to intimates
that In the light of the existing situation, (Marshall's)
plana for Sept. 1942 were just fantastic." Arthur Bryant,
Turn of the Tide (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1957), p. 285.
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Churchill then Instructed his generals to "accept" the
Second Front plan, assuring them that this acceptance
would not be binding. 11 He was certain that continued
efforts in North Africa and the Indian Ocean arena would
make any 1942 assault on Europe Impossible. The realiza-
tion of the invasion plan hinged on the availability of
large numbers of British troops and vessels. If suf-
ficient numbers of these were detailed to other theatres,
the proposed invasion simply could not be carried out.
And Marshall had, after all, agreed to allow the British
a free hand in defending their colonies.
Marshall returned to the United States quite
satisfied with the results of the London Conference. He
believed that the British were in earnest, though he
thought it best to keep a close watch on them, lest some
backsliding occur. Harry Hopkins appears to have been
more suspicious of British intentions. He was troubled
by the fact that the British (both Churchill and the
military) had accepted the Modified Plan without being
convinced of Its merits. He expressed this anxiety to
llrFhe British Imperial Staff utilized their de-
laying tactics once again, and to effect. As a dis- '
gruntled American staff officer observed in July 1942,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff "had assumed that the British
could mount an attack on Cherbourg within 60 days, but it
now appears that they need at least three months — maybe
four. This would mean postponing the operation..."
Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946), pp. 27-28.
ee war
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Marshall, but the general believed that the British were
now "obliged" to take part in the Second Front operations.
Hopkins, familiar with the interstices of political bar-
gaining, intuitively felt something insincere in th
British acquiescence. Marshall, at this stage of th
in any case, tended to take assurances at face value. In
addition, it is also likely that he deluded himself into
accepting British pledges unquestioningly
, due to his al-
most obsessive desire to launch a Second Front. After
all, at that time the American military was impelled
by a sense of urgency, a craving to get into the war
against Hitler. Toward the attainment of that goal, the
Joint Chiefs felt that they had been constantly frustrated
by British hesitancy. Now, at last, it appeared that
decisive action would be taken. This was a mistaken
assumption.
Marshall's optimism concerning British inten-
tions began to fade almost immediately upon his return
to Washington. By the end of April the British command
had announced that India, Ceylon, and the garrisons of
the Indian Ocean were in desperate straits. Massive
Japanese attacks there were expected momentarily.
As a result, air and ground units in Britain had been
earmarked for this area. Marshall had, of course, agreed
in principle to such British actions. His bitterness
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stemmed from the fact that the British were allocating
troops to fend off an "anticipated" Japanese attack.
To Marshall, it appeared that the British command was
in a state of near panic. It was more likely, however,
that the British were simply insuring that certain units
would not be available for "Sledgehammer" in 1942. Des-
pite this unwelcome British action, Marshall did not be-
lieve that it would endanger his invasion plans. A
major American operation, "Bolero," was being carried out
to counteract the British dispersion of forces. "Bolero"
was designed to transport large numbers of American
troops and materiel to the British Isles, for eventual
use in the planned cross-channel assaults. If sufficient
American forces could be transported to Britain, the
invasion of the continent could be carried out with minimal
British assistance.
"Bolero" was not to be easily accomplished, however.
The large scale of the operation meant that it would re-
quire vast amounts of shipping. This in itself was a
notable military problem, but it also provided Roosevelt
with a critical political problem. Prior to April, 1942,
American shipping capabilities had been allocated to
various other operations -- with the assent of the Joint
Chiefs and the President. The Pacific, China-Burma,
the Middle East, and, most importantly, the USSR had been
promised that shipping tonnage would be utilized for
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supply operations. By the end of April it became
that the United States could not fulfill these obla-
tions as well as shoulder the "Bolero" burden. Marshall
argued that all supply efforts should be cut back to
ensure adequate transport for "Bolero." Agreeing that
the various supply efforts were important, he sJted
that they should, nonetheless, be regarded as secondary.
Aware of Roosevelt <s desire for American involvement in
actual combat, Marshall noted that only "Bolero" could
accomplish this end.
This issue was another critical juncture in the
relationship of the Commander-in-Chief with his mili-
tary staff. Roosevelt had committed himself to the
invasion of Europe. He had gone so far as to reject the
British grand strategy that he had accepted at Arcadia.
Too, he had worked in consonance with his military to
persuade the British to adopt the American plan. If he
decided not to give "Bolero" exclusive priority, he would,
in effect, be changing his mind once again. Such a deci-
sion would doubtless destroy the harmony he was now ex-
periencing with his military staff. Further, it would
probably mean that American forces would not engage the
Germans in 1942. The military reasons for "Bolero" were
compelling. A decision in favor of the operation would
also silence domestic "action now" critics. If "Bolero"
were adopted, however, grave problems with the Allies
137
were inevitable. Chinese aid would have to be reduced
drastically, and this would prompt sharp criticism from
Chiang Kai-shek. Britain had been promised aid for the
Middle East. Australia and New Zealand had communicated
their harrowing fear of invasion, and would regard any
aid cutback as a betrayal of trust (especially in view
of MacArthur's strident claims that the Pacific was
being ignored in Washington). American-Soviet relations
were constantly tense on the issue of the Murmansk-
Archangel convoys. Stalin's response to another reduction
in aid would certainly be sharp. All of these prior claims,
Important for the cohesion of the alliance, argued against
'
priority for "Bolero."
It is significant that Roosevelt once again opted
to adopt the course suggested by his military advisors.
The military chiefs were, in this instance, pitted against
the alliance structure itself. Roosevelt's friendship with
Churchill, and his desire to win Stalin's confidence and
approval, argued against adopting "Bolero." Had Roosevelt
refused Marshall's request, a chorus of approval would
have been forthcoming from the other Allied leaders.
Biographers indicate that the President valued such approval
12highly. Still, "Bolero" was approved and given shipping
IPAfter their first wartime meeting, Roosevelt told
his aide 3 "how much he liked Churchill personally." The
President had been anxious to establish a good relationship
with Churchill as well as with Stalin. Joseph P. Lash,
Roosevelt and Churchill. 1959-1941 (New York: V/. W. Norton
and Co., 1976), p. 400.
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priority. The influence of the Joint Chiefs upon Roose-
velt, even in the faoe of Allied criticism, is affirmed
by this decision. Having persuaded the President of the
desirability of a Second Front (against the advice of
the British), they had now persuaded him to continue on
the Second Front course, despite the international reper-
cussions "Bolero" would cause.
Having been approved, "Bolero" was set in motion
and American troops and air contingents began arriving
in Britain in increasing numbers in mid-1942. The Presi-
dent had made some concessions to the British and Rus-
sians, but the operation proceeded essentially as proposed.
Marshall now took another step toward achieving his Second
Front ambitions. To facilitate the implementation of
"Bolero" and to supervise contingency planning for
"Sledgehammer-Roundup," Marshall decided in late May, 1942,
to establish a "European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army"
(ETOUSA). General Eisenhower, one of the initial Second
Front advocates, was placed in command. Marshall's
objective was to signal to the British that American inva-
sion intentions were serious, and, with Eisenhower's assis-
tance, to prod the British into action. The development in-
dicates both Marshall's growing concern about British
hesitancy, and his increasingly sophisticated measures to
obtain their compliance with Second Front plans.
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Eisenhower's function was not unlike that of a spy within
an enemy camp. Returning from a London trip on June 3,
he informed the Joint Chiefs that their worst apprehen-
sions could be confirmed; the British military did not
regard the implementation of "Sledgehammer" as likely.
There was absolutely no enthusiasm for the operation
within the British General Staff. Ang6I,ed by what he
regarded (not without reason) as British duplicity,
Marshall nonetheless refused to abandon the Second Front
plan.
Just as Marshall was becoming aware that the April
London Conference agreement had been a chimera, Churchill
was acting to convert Roosevelt to the British viewpoint.
In his memorandum of June 20, 1942, the Prime Minister
stated that the British "would share to the full with
their American comrades the risks and sacrifices" 13 of a
Second Front (a statement which, as we have seen, was not
true). But, the Prime Minister continued, there were
military problems of great magnitude involved in the plan
proposed by the American Joint Chiefs. He repeated the
conviction of the British military staff that such an
invasion was doomed to failure, arri expressed his own
l3Maurice Matloff, op. cit., p. 239.
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he
desire for action in 1942. "it ia in this setting,"
concluded, "that the operation Gymnast should be studied." 14
Churchill thus appealed to (1) Roosevelt's fear of an
initial American defeat, and (2) his desire to see American
forces in combat in 1942. The Prime Minister had shrewdly
determined the President's weak points, and had hoped to
revive interest in an Anglo-American invasion of Northwest
Africa. Aware that the American military was committed to
a Second Front in Europe, Churchill suspected that the
President retained more flexibility.
Once again the pressure was on the President to
make a decision; either abandon or stand by the proposal
advanced by his Joint Chiefs. Churchill had, however,
interjected a crucial new factor into the decision-making
milieu. He argued that "Gymnast" (invasion of North Africa)
provided an alternative to "Sledgehammer" for American
intervention against Hitler in 1942. In addition, it must
be recalled that in the "Modified Plan" drafted by Marshall,
the 1942 invasion had been de-emphasized, and was regarded
only as a possible emergency operation. It remained quite
probable that no assault would be launched until the
spring of 1943. Roosevelt, though displeased with this
development, had seen no alternative but to accept it.
Churchill now offered a plan for American involvement in
Ibid., p. 240.
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1942 that had a greater degree of certainty than Marshall's
scheme. The temptation to revert to "Gymnast" was
strengthened by Churchill's dire warnings of a debacle on
the French littoral. Churchill's message combined a siren
song with a prophecy of disaster to telling effect. Roose-
velt began to hesitate in his commitment to Marshall's
Second Front plan. He did not, however, indicate that he
was willing to abandon the advice of his military staff.
Roosevelt's vacillation soon became evident to
the Joint Chiefs. Marshall and King, aware of the Presi-
dent's desire to see action within the year, began to
restate the possibility of a 1942 landing in more appeal-
ing (if less honest) terms. There was a substantial
amount of deceit in this, since, if anything, "Sledgehammer"
appeared less likely to occur now than it had in March, 1942.
That Marshall and King woro willing to engage in such
dubious tactics further indicates the almost obsessive
dimensions that their commitment to a Second Front had
assumed. Also, this act testifies to the fact that the
Joint Chiefs now realized that their plan was in serious
jeopardy.
The events of June 20, 1942, greatly strengthened
Churchill's hand in the promotion of "Gymnast." On that
date Tobruk, an important North African seaport and defen-
sive base of British, operations, capitulated to Rommel's
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srman
Afrika Korps. Over 25,000 British troops fell into Ge:
hands. In addition to its military value, Tobruk had also
been a symbol of British determination. As a result, its
loss presented Britain with a moral blow as well. Churchill
now resumed his "Gymnast" arguments from a new angle. He
asserted that an invasion of North Africa was now impera-
tive, since unless such an operation took place, the entire
Middle East might be lost. In addition, the Prime Minister
claimed that a victory against Rommel was needed to restore
British self-confidence and morale. Roosevelt was impressed
with this argument and, although not yet abandoning
Marshall* s proposal, resolved to assist Churchill in some
way. He pledged the immediate dispatch of armor and air-
craft to North Africa, with the understanding that the
equipment would be manned by British troops.
The promise of more equipment for the British
defense of Egypt did not please the American military staff,
but neither did it throw them into a state of despair.
Roosevelt had, after all, refused to abandon his approval
of "Sledgehammer-Roundup. " Even so, it was apparent that
the eloquent Prime Minister had not lost his persuasive
impact on the President. The antipathy of the American
military staff toward Churchill increased; it was an aver-
sion that was to persist until the end of the war. In
spite of the Joint Chiefs' animosity, Churchill's proposal
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was receiving increasingly serious attention from the
Commander-in-Chief. Roosevelt began to regard »,„t«
as a more realistic scheme than the problem-ridden and
vaguely-dated
"Sledgehammer-Roundup." Despite the
assurances of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt could
not exorcise the unsettling feeling that Marshall's plan
was more wishful than substantial. He did not doubt
Marshall's military logic; a Second Front in Europe was
theoretically compelling. But military logic and good
intentions were not enough, and Roosevelt doubted the
capacity of the armed forces to bring their plan to
fruition. Roosevelt's suspicions at this point seem to be
inchoate and largely intuitive, but certain facts existed
that augured poorly for Marshall's pian> pirstj the
shortage of landing craft was a continuing problem. There
was, in addition, a shortage of cargo and support vessels,
due to the naval demands of the war in the Pacific.
Second, the extent of British participation in the opera-
tion was increasingly problematical. The possibility
existed that the British might not cooperate at all in a
European invasion. Such divisiveness would be shattering
to future Anglo-American alliance politics. A third point
that vexed Roosevelt was the overall uncertainty of the
proposed European invasion. A firm date of assault had
yet to be fixed (could not really be set due to the
shortages of the materiel previously mentioned), leaving
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open the possibility that no military action might take
Place until mid-1943. Time and again Roosevelt had insisted
on a speedy commitment of American arms; "Sledgehammer-
Roundup" no longer promised such a commitment.
All of these factors contributed to Roosevelt's
growing disenchantment with Marshall's Second Front pro-
posal. Still, it is significant that, despite his appre-
hensions, Roosevelt did not order the military to adopt
Churchill's plan. To an extent, this indicates Roosevelt's
unwillingness directly to challenge his Joint Chiefs,
doubtless because he was still hesitant to contest their
expertise in things military. He also had the foresight
to realize that any order to adopt Churchill's plan would
severely irritate the Joint Chiefs. The disgruntled
Chiefs would direct their bitterness not only at the
British but at Roosevelt as well, just as they had follow-
ing the President's Arcadia decision. To avoid such diffi-
culties with his military staff, Roosevelt decided to
issue no order with regard to "Gymnast." Rather, he sought
to restrict the options open to the Joint Chiefs. In a
succinct but important memorandum to Marshall, Roosevelt
made it clear that he desired, and expected, some type of
military action against Hitler in 1942. The President's
main concern could not be misinterpreted: "it is of the
highest importance that United States ground troops be
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brought into action against the enemy in 1942. This
statement seemingly gives a great degree of latitude to
the military staff. If Marshall and King could persuade
the British to cooperate in a cross-channel assault, and
if it were absolutely certain that such an operation
could be expedited in 1942, Roosevelt would not object.
However, if the British remained unconvinced, and if a
"
1942 invasion remained tentative, contingent upon a number
of variables, he would insist that alternate action be
taken. Thus, the strategic course to be followed by the
United States depended upon the persuasive powers of
Marshall and King. Nonetheless, Roosevelt was certainly
aware (more aware than the Joint Chiefs) that any change
in the British position was unlikely.
The final round of Anglo-American talks to decide
the fate of a Second Front in 1942 began on July 18, in
London. The American military mustered an impressive
team for these obviously critical discussions. In addi-
tion to Marshall and King, Admiral Stark and Generals
Eisenhower and Spaatz (representing the Army Air Corps)
were also present. These officers were unanimous in their
endorsement of Marshall's plan, and shared an intense
dislike of any proposed North African venture. The argu-
ments and military logic of both the British and American
Ibid
., p. 277.
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camps have been described in detail above in previous
Pages. Suffice it to note that these arguments remained
unchanged and that, despite desperate activity by the
American military, the British could not be won over to
the Marshall plan. Frustrated by wha, they regarded as
British obduracy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced
to acknowledge defeat by July 22. Their anger could not,
of course, be directed against Roosevelt since he had not
actually endorsed or ordered the endorsement of the
British plan. The political cunning behind the President's
discrete directive in thus evident. He had managed to
secure the abandonment of the American military proposal
without evoking the open resentment of his military
staff. 16
It would be difficult to overestimate the impor-
tance of the July London conference. In a series of talks
spanning approximately one week, all of the conflict and
uncertainty that had plagued the Allied decision-makers
for months had been removed. Forced to abandon their own
strategic formulations, the American Joint Chiefs now
16mTrue, some resentment existed. After the
abandonment of his plan, Marshall remarked that "In my dis-
cussions with our politicians I have found more brass heads
among them than brass hats among the soldiers." Trumball
Higgins, Soft Underbelly (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1968),
p. 29. Such displays of petulance should not be over-
emphasized, however, since no real rift between Roosevelt
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed over this acceptance
of "Gymnast."
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worked energetically to ensure that "Gymnast" did not
'
meet the dire fate they had earlier assigned to it. To
be sure, their misgivings persisted, but there seemed no
alternative to an assault on North Africa. In addition,
the American military staff regarded the stillbirth of
"Sledgehammer-Roundup" as due to their own lack of per-
suasiveness, and not as the result of any external inter-
ference. If they had not possessed this self-perception,
it is clear that future relations with the Commander-in-
Chief would have been strained. Roosevelt had shrewdly
avoided this problem and maintained the cohesiveness both
of the American civilian-military team and of the alliance
structure.
For a brief period, from February until July,
1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been the principal
architects of American grand strategy. Their Commander-in-
Chief had in fact deferred to them in matters of wartime
decision-making. This was a notable achievement for the
military establishment. Roosevelt's temporary failure to
restrict the power of his military staff is curious.
Throughout the Arcadia Conference he had acted decisively
as Commander-in-Chief, properly treating his military
staff as subordinates. Willing to consider their advice,
he nonetheless retained the capacity to reject and over-
ride their opinions. But this capacity for such helmsman-
ship quickly deteriorated. This is attributable to two
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factors. First, Roosevelt was vigorous!, pressed by his
military staff to alter Ms initial decision. The fim
and constant conviction of the military that North Africa
meant disaster eventually had a telling impact. m addi-
tion, the unanticipated Allied reverses in February-
April made Rossevelt aware of his fallibility.
Axis victories ate away at the President's self-
confidence and his confidence in the British. The realiza-
tion that Churchill and the British military had been
caught off-balance in Africa and the Pacific caused
Roosevelt to pay more attention to the Cassandra-like
warnings of his own staff. Convinced by these events that
he had made a mistake at Arcadia, the President removed
himself from the decision-making process and the resultant
vacuum was filled by the military. A similar situation
occurred in the Soviet Union following the German blitz-
krieg in 1941. Stalin, shaken by a succession of rapid
German victories, was unable to exercise his decision-
making power for a number of weeks, retreating to his
dacha outside Moscow. In his absence all strategic deci-
sions were made by the Marshals of the Red Army. And
earlier in Prance, the 1940 German assault caused Reynaud
virtually to abandon the reins of government, forcing
Generals Gamelin and Weygand respectively to become the
prime decision-makers.
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Seen in this light, Roosevelt' a capitulation does
not appear unique, m all three instances cited above,
the civilian political leadership wa3 temporarily incapaci-
tated by the shock of war. The military, trained to accept
and function with the horrors and uncertainties of combat,
assumed command in their stead. In both the cases of
Roosevelt and Stalin, however, the withdrawal from
decision-making proved temporary. The Soviet leader effec-
tively regained composure and control of the government
by mid-July, 1941. Prom that point on the power of Red
Army general officers was severely curtailed. Roosevelt
resumed control of wartime decision-making by July of 1942.
His directive to Marshall informing the General to resolve
the second Front problem one way or another is an indica-
tion of his renewed authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
were served notice that they were once again subordinates
to the Commander-in-Chief. This resilience and subsequent
re-emergence of the political leader as leader bespeaks a
gradual ability to cope with a new political landscape.
The initial confusion afflicting the political
leadership is understandable. For Roosevelt especially,
the decisions he was expected to make as Commander-in-
Chief differed vastly from his decision-making role as
peacetime President. This point should not be underesti-
mated as a basal factor in explaining his temporary loss
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of decision-making control. 17 As pre-war President, his
decisions were frequently momentous but did not involve
the direct destruction of thousands of lives or possibly
fatal damage to the nations. Thus, the brutalizing impli-
cations of wartime strategic planning presented an un-
familiar and awesome responsibility. Too, whereas the
President could more or less control national political
occurrences during peacetime, he was unable to control
the course of the war. The conflictual nature and inter-
national scope of war brought with it a lessening of
Presidential ability to affect his environment. Roosevelt
could legislate domestic policy, but he could not control
the adversities of the war simply by issuing directives.
War brought in its wake the apparent dissipation of the
President's ability to affect the world around him.
Impressed by the efficiency of his military staff, Roose-
velt allowed them to make more and more decisions. Here,
after all, were men at ease in the atmosphere of war-
making. Eventually, however, after exposure to the new
terrain of war, and with a commensurate and gradual
familiarizing process, Roosevelt (like Stalin) was able to
reassert his control. With Stalin the process had taken a
17James MacGregor Burns • The Lion and the Fox
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956), Roosevelt is charac-
terized as a President essentially concerned with domestic
affairs who felt uncomfortable in the unfamiliar environ-
ment of foreign policy.
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number of weeks, with Roosevelt a number of raonths. in
both cases the military leaders were force, to relinquis h
some of their decision-making prerogatives.
To use another perspective, let us examine the
behavior of the military staff in the absence of strong
civilian-political leadership. It is evident that the
Joint Chiefs acted in a broader capacity than that usually
accorded mere "Presidential advisors" from February until
July, 1942. m effect, they were not participants in
deciding on the direction wartime strategy should take,
but formulators of that strategy. p0r five months the'
Joint Chiefs ran the war without serious interference (or
contribution) from civilian political sources. The Presi-
dent's hesitancy to act was not balanced by a resurgence
of political activity from other quarters. The State
Department under Cordell Hull remained a virtual pariah in
the decision-making community, Harry Hopkins echoed his
Chief's lack of decisiveness, and Secretary Stimson con-
sistently endorsed the proposals of the Joint Chiefs. The
military staff operated in a power vacuum in Washington;
their formulations were seriously opposed only by the Brit-
ish. Within the military establishment, General Marshall,
Chief of the Joint Chiefs, was the predominant personality.
Thus, it can be argued that he became, for a time, the
single most powerful man in Washington. As Mark Watson
states
.
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Never before did- one man, through his ownchain of command have such a large respon-sibility for the Army's very pattern.
.
. for
in'st^T tha* di ° ta^ employmentn skillful coordination with other forcesAmerican and Allied, for the very timing
of its actions offensive and defensive--
all of these involving a multitude ofpolitical and pogistical consideration
familiar at the time only to the Chief ofStaff and to a very small group around
him.-1-0
In a limited sense, it might be said that Marshall served
as surrogate Commander-in-Chief,
If the power of the military during this period
was indeed excessive, can it be demonstrated that this
constituted an abuse of power? It can be argued, of course
that the very accrual of power by the military presented
an abuse. In refutation it must be stated that the Joint
Chiefs had little alternative to accepting pre-eminent
leadership on strategic matters. Civilian political
sources failed to step into the decision-making arena.
To be sure, it is evident that the Joint Chiefs welcomed
the opportunity to determine strategy. Even during the
Arcadia conference their role v/as not passive but aggres-
sive. During early 1942 the military possessed a plan of
strategic action and worked vigorously to implement it.
The freedom of action created by Roosevelt's retreat from
decision-making was thus pleasing to them. It is signifi-
cant, however, that the Joint Chiefs did not seek to
18Mark Watson, Chief of Staff (Washington, D.C.:
Historical Division, Dept. of Army, 1945), p. 1.
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extend their power beyond the i 33ue of a Second Front.
Their interest was to see that a Second Front in Europe
be realized. Their involvement in other issues (aid to
Russia, secondary character of Middle East conflict) took
place only because these issues affected the launching of
the Second Front. Similarly, the military's concern with
postwar goals was entirely negative (if entirely naive):
postwar goals should not interfere with the waging of the
war. In short, the Joint Chiefs gave no indication of
desiring power for its own sake, but only as a means of
effecting their strategic plans. 19
Despite their control of strategic decision-
making during this period, it would bo misleading to sug-
gest that the Commander-in-Chief was ignored by tho Joint
Chiefs. Marshall's continual contact with Rooscvolt
attests to a desire on the part of the military to keep
him informed. In any evont, his constitutional supremacy
was never forgotten by the military leadership. The Joint
Chiefs were ambitious, but theso ambitions had real
19 ii
"The functions and duties of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were not formally defined during the war." Henry L.
Stirnson, On Ac tive Service
. . . (New York: Harper Brothers,
1948), p. 427. Thus an "abuse of powor" should not be con-
ceived of in a legalistic or constitutional sense. Rather,
an abuse of powor by the military would consist of
(1) an attempt to undercut the authority of the Commander-
in-Chief, and (2) an attempt at duplicity or disobedience
of lawful orders.
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limitations, and should not be viewed apart from their
dedication to a strategic plan.
Forced to abandon their plan in June of 1942,
the Chiefs did so without attempting to force the Presi-
dent's hand as they had done in February.20 In this
sense the military staff displayed more maturity and
sensitivity to the civilian-military relationship than
they had at the outset of the war.
uThis was undoubtedly due to the Joint Chiefs'
awareness that "the President insists that American
troops must be in action against Germany some place
during 1942." Capt. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years
With Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 19467,
p. 33.
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CHAPTER V
POLITICS, "TORCH,
" AND FURTHER SECOND FRONT PIANS
American top military opinion had clearly lost a
round in the debate with the British on a Second Front,
and its influence on the President seemed to have once
again declined. The Joint Chiefs' relation with the Presi-
dent was acquiring the appearance of a roller coaster ride.
The Joint Chiefs had, with grave misgivings, acquiesced in
the British proposal for a North African invasion. The
operation's codename was changed from the uninspiring
"Gymnast" to the more martial "Torch," and November, 1942,
was set as the target date. An American General, George S.
Pat ton, was named commander of the operation. 1 The further
course of "Torch" need not concern us, as it no longer
played a role in the Second Front decisions. Suffice it to
say that "Torch" did not signal the end of American Second
Front proposals, but simply served to postpone them. Although
l-The invasion took place on November 8, 1942.
Although Eisenhower was titular commander, it was Patton who
landed with the troops and carried out the campaign. "The
end of the fighting left a more complex pattern in North-
west Africa than in territories farther east. The former
Italian colonies were under British military occupation, and
Egypt for the time being under British politico-military
control, but in Northwest Africa there were first, French
authority, secondly, the American and British military com-
mands, and their civilian representatives; and thirdly,
the Sultan of Morocco and Bey of Tunis and the nationalist
movements as well." Guy Wint, Total War (New York: Random
House, 1972), p. 352.
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"Torch" appeared to indicate the triumph of British grand
strategy, this appearance was deceiving. The Second Front
concept of Marshall proved to be unexpectedly recrudescent,
testimony to the singular importance attached to it by the
American military. The Joint Chiefs could not easily
reconcile themselves to abandoning a plan that they regarded
as the only sure road to victory. Despite their pro fo;>rma
acquiescence to Churchill's Mediterranean strategy, the
American military (notably Marshall and Eisenhower) were
still convinced that an attack on Europe was imperative.
This conviction was, for a time, quietly held, as the
North African campaign ran its course.
Although Allied attention focused almost
exclusively on Africa during the closing months of 1942
and the first half of 1943, it was not the only area of
Anglo-American activity. Operation "Bolero," the ferrying
of U.S. troops to the British Isles, continued as the
African campaign progressed. Originally envisioned by
Marshall as the precursor of a Second Front, "Bolero" was
valuable in itself and thus allowed to continue. Month by
month, the American garrison in Britain grew. Some of the
men and material assembled were, to be sure, utilized in
North Africa. Even so, a massive surplus of soldiers re-
mained on the island, available and uncommitted. Quite
possibly, the mere presence of these inactive troops
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rekindled the Joint Chiefs' interest in an assault on Europe.
Despite the activity in North Africa, a cross-channel attack
might still be launched - provided the various political
leaders agreed. And, significantly, Roosevelt had not yet com-
mitted himself to any action beyond the destruction of Axis
forces in Africa. Once again, this provided a persistent
Marshall with an opportunity to lobby for his invasion plan.
Even at this stage, with fierce fighting against Rommel's
vaunted Afrika Korps still in progress, Churchill was known
to be thinking in terms of an attack on the Balkans or Greece. 2
As in the past, the energetic Prime Minister was Marshall's
main nemesis. If the American Chiefs had been opposed to
Churchill's African venture, they were appalled by the pros-
pect of war in the Balkans. Fighting in that theatre cer-
tainly would not determine the outcome of the war, and,
again, it would be a fight directed away from Germany, not
toward it. The idea of investing Greece was no more attrac-
tive to the American military for the same reasons. In addi-
tion, an attack on Greece might have been seen as an attempt
to recover the British prestige lost in the Greek debacle of
April 1941. This would constitute another "political" consider-
ation to which the Joint Chiefs had been violently opposed
"Churchill hinted at a drive through the Ljubljana
Gap and into Hungary." Robert Payne, The Marshall Story
(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 193. The Prime Minis-
ter's store of "peripheral runs" was apparently inexhaustible,
see Maurice Matloff, St rategic Planning for Coalition Warfare ;
1942-1943 (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office,
1953), pp. 200-229.
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all along. Political motives had appeared during the con-
duct of "Torch," much to the dismay of the American mili-
tary. Roosevelt and the OSS refused to treat the operation
in solely military terms. "The political complications were
provided by the existence of rival French authorities and
American misreading of their comparative values." 3 To the
Joint Chiefs, such diplomatic nuances were unimportant and
had no place in the ccnduct of war. If the war did extend
to the Balkans or to Greece, the Chiefs feared that further
political ramifications would develop. Thus, to prohibit
Roosevelt from embarking on further misadventures, the mili-
tary decided to present the President with a viable strate-
gic plan before Churchill could. This did not prove possible.
Casablanca: Churchill's Advisory of a "Soft Underbelly"
The Casablanca Conference of January, 1943, besides
providing the setting for President Roosevelt's "uncondi-
tional surrender" announcement, also saw the determination
of strategy for the remainder of the year. The strategic
picture was colored by two facts: there was a large Anglo-
American force in Britain, and another one in Tunisia. The
army group in Britain posed a threat to France, and, as a
3Guy Wint, op. clt., p. 347. See also George F.
Howe, Northwe st Afric a: Seizing the Init iative in the West
(Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, Office of the Chief
of Military History, 1957), pp. 676-677.
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a
result of its presence, Hitler had ordered the constracti
of a West Wall on that coast. The victorious army ln Tunisi
could, with equal ease, be transported to Sicily or Italy,
the Balkan countries, or Greece and Crete. For reasons of
logistics and coordination, only one of these two potential
forces could be utilized. Casablanca would determine which
force was to receive priority. A brief account of the
Casablanca discussions is necessary at this point.
The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not
undergone any change since the London meeting in June.
Marshall argued that further operations in the Mediterranean
would prove "interminable" and inconclusive, and would not
significantly contribute to the destruction of the German
war machine. A British riposte to this argument was de-
livered by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke who repeated the
logistical difficulties Involvod in preparing a cross-
Channel invasion. Because of the logistical problems,
Brooke stated, an assault on France could not be undertaken
until late summer, 1943. In the meantime, due to the
demands of the invasion, the shipping of materiel to the
Soviet Union would suffer. Thus, he argued, a Second Front
would hinder rather than assist the Red Army. In any event,
Brooke concluded, the Germans were still strong in Franco,
and an attack probably would not succeed. Marshall dis-
missed Brooke's argument as specious casuistry, but Churchill
supported the view expressed by his Field Marshal. If the
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Germans were presently strong in Prance, they must be forced
to disperse their forces. This could be accomplished if the
Allies launched attacks on various outlying areas ~ Sicily,
the Italian coast, Greece, and/or the Balkans. This would
'
have the double effect of dispersing Axis forces and also of
drawing German attention from the Soviet Union. Essentially,
Churchill was arguing that peripheral attacks served as a
first step in realizing a Second Front.
With the two alternate strategies presented,
Roosevelt "continued to occupy a middle-of-the-road position
between Marshall and Churchill." 4 The British and American
military teams continued to press for their respective
strategies. At one point, however, Eisenhower was forced
into a significant admission. Upon prodding, he agreed with
Churchill that initial estimates of the shipping needed for
invasion had been far too low. Further, the initial state-
ment on the number of divisions needed had also been too low.
This revision in "Sledgehammer-Roundup" was both unantici-
pated and serious. If the new shipping demands necessary for
a Second Front were to be met, aid to Russia would have to be
reduced. This admission (which the General Staff attempted
to make light of) almost certainly caused Roosevelt to look
more favorably upon a Mediterranean strategy. In an effort
to eliminate rancor between the British and American military
4Maurice Matloff, op. cit., p. 23.
161
staffs the President offered an unconvincing
"compromise"
which wa3 in fact a thinly-veiled acceptance of the British
position. Roosevelt proposed that (1) an attack on Sicily
or Sardinia be launched from Tunisia, (2) troop buildups in
the British Isles continue, (3) aid to Russia be reduced if
convoy losses or other exigencies became prohibitive, (4) a
Second Front in France be launched in 1943 if German strength
there deteriorated rapidly. 5 The final two points dealt
merely with possible contingency actions, and were without
real substance. The salient feature of Roosevelt's "com-
promise" was commitment to major action in the Mediterranean
theatre. The British had once again managed to persuade an
American President to adopt their military advice over the
advice of his own staff. Interestingly, the Joint Chiefs
accepted this reverse calmly, without the petulance they
had exhibited at earlier conferences. The main reasons for
this unprecedented restraint appear to be twofold: first,
the Joint Chiefs had originally described "Torch" in terms
of apoxalyptic catastrophe, and these dire predictions had
not been borne out. "Torch" had succeeded, and with a mini-
mal loss of lives. Hence, the Joint Chiefs were face to
face with their own fallibility. Secondly, the overall war
situation in early 1943 was not as bleak as it had been a
year before. The German Wehrmacht was no longer invincible,
The Conference at Casablanca (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 713-714.
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the Russian Front had held, and the Japanese offensive in
the Pacific had reached its zenith. The sense of urgency
which had been associated with a Second Front waa thus some-
what expiated. Although it remained the preferred strategy
of the American military, it had become, almost imperceptibly,
something less than a life-or-death issue. Accordingly, we
can advance the proposition that, with respect to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the intensity of their Second Front beliefs
diminished as the course of the war became more favorable.
Casablanca was remarkable for other reasons besides
the new tolerance exhibited by the Joint Chiefs. Presi-
dent Roosevelt's role at Casablanca illustrated not only
his continued superiority to his military staff in stra-
tegic decision-making, but his growing superiority within
the alliance structure as well. The enormous contribu-
tions of American production to the war effort, coupled
with recent feats of American arms, now made Roosevelt the
senior partner in the Anglo-American alliance. This had
become so apparent that certain British diplomats lodged
thinly-veiled complaints. Harold Macmillan, for example,
thought the British had been reduced to the status of Greeks
in the war court of the Emperor Claudius. Britain in the
United Nations, like Italy in the Axis, found itself play-
ing a supporting role. Roosevelt was now the primary
decision-maker for the Anglo-Americans, Cnurchill, though
still a person to be reckoned with, no longer had the
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magnetic effect on Roosevelt that he had had in 1941-1942.
Pernaps tellingly, the President did not even deign to
consult the Prime Minister before issuing his famous
"unconditional surrender" announcement. Churchill's in-
fluence on Roosevelt was clearly waning, and we should not
suppose that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unaware of it.
This may partially explain their restraint at Casablanca:
they could afford to bide their time, since Churchill was
a falling star.
Even if Casablanca seemed to signal the deterio-
ration of Churchill's influence on Roosevelt, it was still
clear that commitment had been made to an attack on Sicily,
while "There was no indication when the invasion of Normandy
would take place." The directive for an invasion of Sicily
(HUSKY) had been issued on January 23, 1943. However, this
did not necessarily mean that a long-range Mediterranean
strategy had been adopted. Given its small geographical
size and weak garrison, the conquest of Sicily would not, in
the opinion of military planners, be a military operation
of great duration. With the capture of Messina, the campaign
would end. At that time, future strategy would again have
to be decided upon. The Joint Chiefs intended to use this
opportunity to argue their case for the curtailment of
Mediterranean activity and the resumption of planning for
Robert Payne, op. cit. y p. 193.
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"Overlord." This time Marshall and his cohorts were
determined to have their way.
The next formal discussion of grand strategy was
the "Trident" conference of May 12, 1945, which took
place at Washington, D.C. Only the Americans and British
attended, as Stalin maintained that the war still prevented
him from leaving the USSR. As the conference drew near,
the Americans had only to give a cursory glance at a situa-
tion map to see what the British proposal would be. Allied
forces were in North Africa, and were in the process of
conquering Sicily. Malta provided a valuable Mediterranean
air base. In essence, the Anglo-American war machine was
poised like a dagger at the Italian peninsula. Accordingly,
Churchill and the Imperial General Staff would argue that
Italy should be invested, and that it was the logical spot
to strike, given the deployment of Allied forces. At the
same time, the British anticipated American objections, so
much so that General Brooke "Shuddered over the coming
rr
clashes with Marshall and King." This presentiment was
not without foundation. Unlike Casablanca, "Trident" was
to be the scene of intense American animosity toward the
British.
As in the past, the British presented a united
front against American military opinion. Brooke, serving
7
Forrest Pogue, George C . Marshall; Organize r of
Victory. 1943-1945 (New York: ViHrig Press, 1973),
pp. 193-194.
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as spokesman, stated flatly that the prospects for an inva-
sion of France would not be good until 1945 or possibly
1946. Prior to that time Allied efforts should be exclu-
sively devoted to subduing Italy, invading the Balkans, and
reconquering the Aegean. This strategic proposal, though
nominally the product of the British military, bore the
unmistakable imprint of a Churchill scheme. Not unexpectedly,
the Prime Minister endorsed the plan in fulsome terms. The
rebuttal by the Joint Chiefs was not presented dispassion-
ately. General Marshall insisted that the course of the
war would not be decided in Italy or in the Balkans. Tac-
tically, these areas were well-suited for defensive opera-
tions, and effective German resistance could be expected.
Strategically, the bulk of the German forces would not be
engaged in these theatres, and the operations would thus
be of little help to the Soviet Union. More importantly,
if the British proposal was adopted "Overlord" would cer-
tainly be postponed for an extended period of time. It
had, in Marshall's opinion, been postponed long enough.
Behind a thin veneer of civility, Marshall made it plain
that his tolerance of British intransigence was reaching its
o
limit. The British, in Marshall's view, had "gotten their
^Marshall's attitude was partially dictated by
logistical concerns. "The Americans demanded a firm agree-
ment on long-range strategy because they needed to set goals
for military production and allot men and supplies for the
various theatres." Forrest Pogue, Ibid.
, p. 194.
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way" since 1941, and as a result the Germans still had not
been critically taxed. I n addition, Marshall was certainly
aware of War Department reports which indicated that
British production and mobilization had reached their peak,
and were already in decline. The American contribution to'
the Anglo-American war effort was not only predominant,
but would now become increasingly so. To Marshall-s precise
mind, this decrease in British strength entailed a com-
meri3urate decrease in Br1t-l<*Vi at-a+^n «onrisn status. A continued adoption
of their strategy was thus illogical.
Other members of the Army General Staff attributed
political motives to the British proposal. General Embrick
voiced the opinion "that the British proposals were predi-
cated upon their desire to obtain a permanent control of the
Mediterranean sea." 9 Admiral King was inclined to a gree
with this assessment. Although it is possible that Marshall
instigated this line of reasoning, there is no solid evi-
dence to support the contention. More likely, this was a
spontaneous outburst against "perfidious Albion," and a
manifestation of long-smoldering anti-British prejudice.
Whatever the reasons, this hostile display by the American
military caught the British delegation off guard. Signifi-
cantly, Roosevelt did not rise to the defense of his British
Allies. He too may have believed that the British were
9Ibld., p. 200.
was
rces
o
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looking after their post-war colonial interests, m any
event, the allegation cast the British proposal ln a new
light, and put its advocates on the defensive.
In addition to attacking British motives, the
American military team unexpectedly advanced a Mediter-
ranean strategy of its own. Marshall stated that he would
not oppose a limited assault on Italy. This did not
signal a change in American strategic thinking, but
strictly a matter of expedience. Aware of the large fo
already in the Mediterranean, Marshall did not object t
the use of some of them in Italy, provided the remainde
could be transferred to the United Klngdom# In othep word^
Marshall would support a limited attack on Italy, not be-
cause he saw It as important, but because it could be
accomplished without affecting "Overlord." The Joint Chiefs
of Staff agreed that such an attack would be acceptable,
provided the campaign was not pursued north of Rome. This
acceptance hinged upon British acquiescence to two American
demands: (1) the transfer of seven divisions from the
Mediterranean to Britain by November 1, 1943, and (2) the
initiation of an intensive air bomber offensive against the
Normandy area in Prance. Churchill expressed his willing-
ness to accept these demands in return for an invasion of
Italy sometime in September. 10 It was doubtless clear to
the Prime Minister that the two American demands were
Maurice Matloff, op. clt
.. pp. 195-198.
168
preparatory steps toward the realization of "Overlord."
Nonetheless, he did not appear overly concerned. In return
for these preliminary "Overlord" activities he had received
a firm go-ahead for his Mediterranean venture, it is
likely that Churchill believed involvement in Italy would
"snowball," and the Allies would inexorably be forced from
their modest plan to a more ambitious project. This had
been his method of operation all along. Churchill had
wrung consent from his Ally on a step-by-step basis. First
the Americans had agreed to supply British forces in Egypt.
Somewhat later they had participated in the North African
Invasion. Following this, they had been persuaded to attack
Sicily. The Americans had now agreed to invade Italy and
take the Italian capital. Churchill's belief that the
President could be persuaded to endorse further Mediterranean
operations was thus not without foundation. The American
military had consistently condemned British strategic sug-
gestions, and Roosevelt had just as consistently ignored
them. Although aware that Marshall and other members of the
Joint Chiefs had some impact on the President, Churchill did
not regard them as equals in terms of influence. As a
result, he was certain that "Overlord" could again be avoided,
despite preliminary preparations.
Churchill had underestimated Marshall, however,
and also failed to notice that Roosevelt's attitude was
changing. Although Churchill had emerged the victor in
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strategic decision-making from Arcadia onward, the protes-
tations of the Joint Chiefs had, cumulatively, affected the
President. We have noted that Roosevelt was favorably
impressed by the efficiency of his military staff. This
impression persisted. Marshall had, by 1943, become
especially important. "As the conferences succeeded one
another his stature increased. He would analyze a situation
trenchantly and with a lucidity which was often lacking in
Arnold and King and which was wholly lacking in the
Commander-in-Chief." 11 During "Trident" Roosevelt had not
censured his military for their pointedly anti-British re-
marks, and had endorsed their "demands" involving a Second
Front. The significance of this apparently did not register
fully with Churchill.
Roosevelt's enchantment with the British was
clearly less intense than in the past, and this may not have
been entirely due to the influence of Marshall or other
military staff officers. A concern for the impact of the
war on domestic politics had affected the President in the
past and continued to do so. The war was dragging on,
bringing with it an increase in American casualties. It was
now apparent that British strategy would not bring the war
to a quick conclusion. If the President were to retain his
popularity at home, some hope of defeating the Axis in the
Robert Payne, op. cit
., p. 214.
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reasonably near future had to be offered. This would not
be accomplished by a war of attrition in Italy, the Balkans,
and the Aegean. Similarly, the public might well begin to
ask why American troops were engaged in such non-essential
theatres
.
It is also probable that Roosevelt by now shared
the suspicion of his military staff that Churchill was
interested in protecting the colonies of the British Empire.
In 1942 Roosevelt had offered some unsolicited criticisms of
the colonial policy, and Churchill had replied, in effect,
that the President should tend to his own business. 12
Roosevelt did not take this advice, however, and continued
to voice his distaste for British colonialism throughout the
war. Thus, Roosevelt would certainly be hesitant to pursue
a strategy that might serve to reinforce this system. It
did not occur to him that Churchill's Mediterranean
strategy might have as its purpose the creation of an anti-
Soviet barrier in Europe.
If Roosevelt's motivations for drifting apart from
the British are obscure with respect to "Trident," they
would become somewhat clearer during the conference at Quebec
in August of 1943.
The "Quadrant" conference at Quebec (August 14-24,
1943) was in many respects a repeat of the "Trident"
Francis Loewenheim, ed., Roosevelt and Churchill :
Their Se cret Correspondence . (New York: E. P. Dutton and
Co., 1975T"
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performance. The British once again attempted to postpone
decisions on "Overlord" and pursued further Mediterranean
considerations. 13 This attitade meant, of course, that
they had not taken the "Trident" decisions seriously and
regarded nothing said in Washington as binding. Yet their
fortunes in deciding Anglo-American strategy were per-
ceptibly changing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff woula not be
put off, and, more importantly, Roosevelt backed them
entirely.
Roosevelt's endorsement of the Joint Chiefs'
Second Front plans had emerged piecemeal, firat at Casablanca
and more expressly during "Trident." He was fully behind
"Overlord" and wanted to see it carried out in the spring
of 1944. His position on the Second Front, formerly flexible
and ever-shifting, had jelled. If in the past the President
had been beguiled or blinded by the cunning, delaying tac-
tics of Churchill, he resolved to dismiss the Prime Minis-
ter's arguments. Marshall's prediction that the British
would always find reasons to delay a Second Front "inter-
minably" had been borne out, and Roosevelt had tired of the
game. Further, it is possible that Roosevelt felt that
Churchill had been outwitting him, "playing him along," in
decision-making and finally determined to put an end to this.
The po33ible influence of domestic politics as a
°By August 17, with Quadrant still in session,
Sicily fell to the invading forces of Generals Patton and
Montgome ry
.
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motive for Roosevelt's hardening of resolve emerges more
clearly at Quebec than during "Trident." The 1944 elec-
tions were fast approaching and the war had not yet been
brought home to Germany. General Marshall, increasingly
perspicacious, mentioned this to Roosevelt at every oppor^
tunity. "Although Marshall made no reference to the pos-
sible reaction of the American public in the November
presidential elections, his implication was clear." 14 This,
in addition to the other factors, put Roosevelt firmly
behind the Second Front proposals.
The Joint Chiefs continued to display at Quebec
the aggressive advocacy of "Overlord" that they had demon-
strated in May. The relationship between the British and
American military staffs was not only tense but hostile.
"British insistence on expanding the Italian operations pro-
voked (Admiral) King to very undiplomatic language, to use a
mild term." 15 A British request for additional troops (to
offset the divisions sent to Britain in May) brought an
angry reaction from Marshall and a warning for the President.
"The President should also be apprised that an additional
force of seven divisions would in reality constitute an
expeditionary force available for use in the Balkans." 16
14Forrest Pogue, op. cit., p. 196.
15Admiral William Leahy, I Was There (New York:
McGraw-Hill Co., Inc., 1950), p. 175. King's bluntness
offended the British staff members on a number of occasions.
16Maurice Matloff, op. cit.
,
p. 213.
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Roosevelt heeded Marshall»s advlMn n s vice throughout the stormy
coherence. The President was no longer a referee
,ing Judgment and objectively considering all arguments.
His partisanship on questions pertaining to "Overlord" was
-nifest. This pro-"Overlord" attitude also meant that the
Mediterranean would become a secondary theatre of opera-
tions: * 7 1944 it had earned the epithet "the forgotten
front." Although planning for "Overlord" had not yet been
Put in final form, it was increasingly apparent that its
implementation was simply a matter of time.
Churchill and his staff left the Quebec conference
in a spirit of despondency. The Prime Minister had not been
able to work his customary magic on Roosevelt. At the final
session of "Quadrant,"
^^e^ent and the ?rlme Ministerratified the plan to make a cross-
ia^elT inVa3i°n from England in May,1944. it was to be the principal
Britisn-United States ground and air
effort against the Axis in Europe.
There would be no turning back from this, as Roosevelt's
mnr^ <
Partially as a result of the British desire foro e intensive action in Italy, and in hopes of breakingthe stalemate at Monte Cassino, an amphibious invasion waslaunched at Anzio-Ne ttuno. This invasion was a disaster
i°
V
J ?
Allies. Among the American casualties was GeneralMarshall's stepson, Allan Brown, Second Lieutenant, US Army,killed by a German sniper. Any effect that this may havehad on Marshall's disinclination to pursue the Italian cam-paign can only be guessed at.
"1 o
x Admiral William Leahy, op. cit., p. 177.
Marshall still did not entirely trusT"tTIo" President
. "Al-
though pleased that the President had accepted the proposal,
Marshall admitted to Stimson that he was not certain exactly
what this entailed." Forest Pogue, op. cit,, p. 196.
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long period of vacillation had ended.
Postwar evidence suggests that the reason for
Churchill's gloom transcended the issue of anti-Axis
19strategy. With the tide of the war clearly changed in
favor of the Allied powers, the Soviet Union assumed a new
and menacing significance. With the crumbling of the
German-Italian empire, the chance presented itself for the
Red Army to gobble up vast European territories. Nazi
hegemony over the Contiment might well be replaced by
Communist hegemony. Determined to prevent such an occur-
rence, Churchill presented his Mediterranean strategy. A
strong Allied posture in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans
might thwart Soviet ambitions and halt the advance of the
Red Army. Churchill, unlike Roosevelt, did not trust Stalin.
Thus, the decision against extensive Mediterranean involve-
ment was regarded by Churchill as carrying frightening
19In Cairo on December 2, 1943, Churchill confided
to his physician that "You don't understand.
.
.we 've got to
do something about the bloody Russians." His physician
noted in 1966 that "This meant nothing to me at the time...
but I wonder now whether it wasn't the first indication
that Winston had arrived at the conclusion that if he wanted
to help the Eastern Europe countries he must get there be-
fore the Red Army." Lord Moran, Churchill. Taken From the
Diaries of Lord Moran (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966),
~pl 155. Speaking in more general terms, Adam Ulam has con-
cluded that "Both in his diplomatic activity at the time and
In his writings later on, Churchill gave testimony to his
conviction that, with the war over, Russia would be an in-
vincible colossus bound to have her way on every point of
the European settlement unless checked by the mo3t deter-
mined and concerted action." Adam Ulam, The Rivals; America
and Russia since World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1971)",
p. 7.
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implications far beyond the context of the war against
Hitler.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not share Churchill
concern with Soviet designs. This is mainly attributable
to their preoccupation with the war against Germany. None
theless, they did recognize that the Soviet Union was grow
ing inexorably stronger. A Joint Chiefs of Staff memoran-
dum observed that "With Germany crushed there is no power
in Europe to oppose her (Russia's) tremendous military
forces." This was the same conclusion the Prime Minis to
had come to. In contrast to Churchill, the Joint Chiefs
did not regard the prospect as requiring a strong Western
presence in Europe. Rather, they argued,
The conclusions from this are obvious.
Since Russia is the decisive factor in
the war she mu3t be given every assis-
tance and every effort must be made to
obtain her friendship. Likewise, since
without question she will dominate
Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it
is even more essential to develop and
maintain the mo3t friendly relations
with Russia. 21
The Joint Chiefs regarded the possibility of Russian hege-
mony over Europe as demanding a conciliatory, not conflic-
tual, reaction. As a consequence, they did not see any
2
°This document, "Russia's Position" is quoted
by Robert Payne, op. cit., p. 205.
2lIbid.
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merit In Churchill's Mediterranean formula. Their pri-
mary, almost singular, concern was the war against Hitler,
their plans did not extend beyond this horizon. As a re-
sult they remained convinced that "Overlord" was without
equal as an operation of strategic significance.
Teheran: The Final Debates
Up to this point we have noted the shifting for-
tunes of the American military staff in their Second Pro I
advocacy. The year 1943 had witnessed the increasing
effectiveness of their arguments at the "Trident" and
"Quadrant" conferences, but their seeming triumphs lacked
finality due to Churchill's constant diplomatic maneuvers.
The opinionated and garrulous Prime Minister could not
bring himself to accept for long the American "Overlord"
plan. The Americans, especially Marshall, had wearied of
this inconstancy. "Wherever he turned, he was faced with
the accusing stare of the Prime Minister, who seemed
22determined to thwart him." Churchill had seemed to
acquiesce in a Second Front by the conclusion of the Quebec
conference, but soon returned to his own Mediterranean and
Aegean arguments. American annoyance at this development
reached new peaks, apparent even to the British. As
Churchill's personal physician noted in his diary,
Ibid
., p. 193.
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I have noticed lately a certainhardening of purpose in the Ameri-
can camp. They left Quebec in
great heart, assured that every-
thing was settled for good. And
here is the British Prime Minis-
ter at his old game again. There
is an ominous sharpness in their
speech when they say that they
are not going to allow things tobe messed up in this way indefin-
itely. 23
The upcoming three-power conference at Teheran would serve
as the ultimate battleground of Anglo-American differences.
As we shall see, the decisive nature of the conference
owed much to the presence of Marshal Josef Stalin.
The sessions at Teheran took place between
November 28, and December 1, 1943. As in the past, there
were both formal and informal meetings of the partici-
pants. The personal relationship between Roosevelt and
Churchill had clearly peaked, with Churchill feeling in-
creasingly slighted by the President. Indeed, Roosevelt
engaged in a number of meetings with Stalin at which the
Prime Minister was not present, and which he had not been
24
asked to attend. It is somewhat beyond the purview of
this paper to inquire into the reasons for the cooling of
the Churchill-Roosevelt partnership, but Churchill's
ord Moran, op . ci
t
. , p. 141.
24Ibid., p. 144.
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previous anti-Second Front schemes certainly played a role.
His obduracy on this point had finally become an annoyance
to the President, who regarded the political interests of
the British Empire as increasingly irrelevant. Churchill's
former role as fair-haired boy of the President, was now
filled by Josef Stalin, Additionally, the Soviet Supreme
Marshal wa3 to play a role formerly held by Roosevelt;
at Teheran Stalin would be the "tie-breaker," the man who
cast the decisive vote.
The conference sessions opened along familiar lines.
Speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and, increasingly,
for the President), Marshall detailed plans for the initia-
tion of "Overlord," tentatively set for early May, 1944.
He also pointedly noted that the British had agreed at
Quebec to give priority to the proposed cross-Channel
assault. The British had made such an agreement and this
caused Churchill some difficulties in advancing his newest
25project, an attack upon Rhodes. His argument took the
following, somewhat confused, form.
1, "Overlord" has strategic priority.
2. If "Overlord" is to succeed, German
strength and morale in France must
be sapped.
bChurchill's Interest in the Rhodes project
apparently came to him out of the blue. He makes no men-
tion of such an operation prior to Teheran.
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3. To draw off German divisions, and to
cause additional dis-spirit in the
Wehrmacht
.
the isle of Rhodes should
be attacked, along with an offensive
to aid partisans in the Balkans. As
an added dividend, such an attack
might draw off German forces from
the Eastern Front.
4. In coordination with these military
operations, a diplomatic effort
should be made to bring Turkey into
the war on the side of the Allies.
This would put further pressure on
the Reich, and further imperil its
hold on France.
5. The proposed operations might cause
the postponement of "Overlord," but
would ultimately facilitate its
implementation.
Members of the British delegation at Teheran have
since noted that Churchill expected Stalin to be enthused
by this proposal, since it hinted at relief for the Red
Army. If Stalin agreed to back the British plan, Roosevelt
would be forced into a defensive posture, and the counsel
of the Joint Chiefs might once again be thwarted.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were predictably un-
impressed by Churchill's Rhodes scheme. Strategically, it
was another example of the British preference for circuitous
thinking. Beyond that, Marshall saw it as "a British attempt
to relate a military operation with political considera-
tions."26 Admiral King's vision of a British plot to domin-
ate the Mediterranean and Aegean were once again summoned
up. Without heat, Roosevelt explained that he would not
26Maurice Matloff, op. cit., p. 359.
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endorse any plan which would delay "Overlord." The Anglo-
American strategic debate had reached its familiar impasse.
The impasse was broken by Stalin, who — to
Churchill's chagrin — dismissed the British plan as timid,
and endorsed "Overlord." In terms that were unmistakable,
Stalin declared that "Russia is interested only in "Over-
27lord." in comparison to the Second Front, all other
military adventures were insignificant. Rhodes was not a
critical theatre, and Stalin regarded the entrance of Turkey
28into the war as unlikely. As for assisting the Red Army,
this could be best accomplished through an invasion of
France and a thrust at the German heartland.
In retrospect, it seems curious that Churchill
should have expected any other reaction from Stalin.
Throughout the war, the Soviet press, and Stalin's communi-
ques, had impatiently pressed for a Second Front. The
Marshal had rebuked the Western Allies in bitter terms when
a Second Front had not been launched in 1942 and 1945.
Having regarded the North African and Italian campaigns as
minor episodes, there was no reason for him to view an
attack on Rhodes or the Balkans in a different light. One
27Lord Mo ran, op. cit
., p. 147.
pp
In addition, Stalin may have already been enter-
taining thoughts of securing Turkish territory by force of
arms
.
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suspects that only wishful thinking, and perhaps despera-
tion, blinded the Prime Minister to this fact. In addition,
we have stated that one reason for Churchill's plan was a
desire to limit the expansion of Russia through the advances
of her military forces. It is quite reasonable to expect
that Stalin, always paranoid of Western intentions, saw
this rather clearly. The presence of British and American
troops in Greece, the Balkans, and Turkey could only result
in trouble after, or during, the conclusion of hostilities.
Even while the Teheran conferences were in progress, there
was sporadic fighting between Communist and Royalist
partisans in Yugoslavia and Greece.
Stalin's support of United States military views
caught Churchill off guard, but did not silence him. He
continued to express fear that "Overlord" would be launched
too hastily, resulting in a military debacle without
parallel in the war. "If the Germans had thirty to forty
divisions in France I did not think the force we were going
29
to put across the Channel would be able to hold on." The
Prime Minister did not allow himself to be persuaded by the
optimistic estimates produced by Marshall and the Opera-
tions Division of the General Staff. Churchill's gloomy
forecasts now proved futile, however. Much to Marshall's
29Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring . (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 390. It is possible that,
by this time, the difficulties encountered at Anzio-Nettuno
reinforced Churchill's anxieties about a cross-Channel attack,
182
satisfaction, Roosevelt would not balk from his commitment
to the Second Front. Stalin proved equally inflexible. In
thinly-veiled terms, he hinted that the British had no
stomach for a fight with the flower of the German Army.
They preferred minor contests against second-rate troops
in indecisive theatres. For the remainder of the conference
"Stalin kept needling Churchill without mercy." 50 Stalin
saved his praise for the Americans, without whom, he said,
the war would have certainly been lost. These histrionics
were probably calculated. It was evident that Britain
would emerge from the war gravely weakened. The United
States, on the other hand, would come out of the war
stronger than before, she would be the new champion of the
democratic West. It would thus be wise for Stalin to play
up to the Americans, while he could afford to ignore the
British, whose star had set. In the future, it would be
the United States, not Great Britain, with which the Soviet
Union would have to deal.
The rift between Churchill, on the one hand, and
Roosevelt and Stalin, on the other, was heightened by their
suspicion of British "political" Interests — the same
suspicion that had motivated the American military staff
throughout the war. Roosevelt had, since 1941, downplayed
30Averell Harriman, op. cit., p. 273. Chapter 12
of this volume offers a number of instances of this.
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Ms anti-colonialist sentiments while Marshall and King had
not. The President was not so discreet at Teheran, perhaps
owing to Stalin's presence. For the first time the Presi-
dent clearly expressed his views on the shape of the post-
war world. During an informal session at which Churchill
was present, Roosevelt and Stalin happily set about re-
creating the world, and declared that colonial territories
should be granted independent status. That this would
include British colonies was never expressly stated, but the
implications were clear enough. 31 The Prime Minister, a
convinced imperialist, found the discussion too much to bear
in silence. "Britain, he said, would hold fast to her
territories and bases, and no one would take them away from
32her without going to war." This statement seems to confirm
the suspicion the Joint Chiefs of Staff had carried all
along that the British were interested in more than defeat-
ing Hitler. In a sense, Teheran proved to be the vindica-
tion of Marshall and King.
31Roosevelt "did not refer specifically to the
British Empire; nevertheless its implications were evident,
and it was in this spirit that Roosevelt pressed for British
moves that would have the effect of diminishing the scope of
Empire." George Woodcock, Who Killed the Brit is h Empire?
(New York: New York Times Book Co., 1974), p. 293. Churchill's
defense of Empire became increasingly anachronistic. By
1945 "American opinion was only part of a climate of anti-
imperial thought..." Ibid., p. 295. This might help to
explain Churchill's 1945 election defeat at the hands of
the Labour Party.
32W. Averell Harriman, op. cit .. p. 274.
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The importance of the Teheran sessions in settling
strategic differences on a Second Front cannot be over-
emphasized. Just as 1943 saw the decline of British influenc
on the issue, so Teheran provided the coup de p;race
. It
provided a recessional for the British: they would not
succeed in shaping a major strategic decision for the re-
mainder of the war.
It is fitting at this point to inquire into why
the British ultimately failed in their alternate Second
Front proposals, and why they failed when they did. Th< .
is, actually, no single reason but rather a combination
factors
.
First, it is important to note that, from 1941 on,
the British had an adversary relation with the American
military on strategic questions. Thus, even when their
influence with Roosevelt was at its peak, they were faced
with constant criticism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who at no time were willing to accept the governing logic
behind British "peripheral run" doctrine. As a result,
Roosevelt was always under pressure to abandon or revise
his endorsements of various British proposals. The per-
suasiveness of the British position was further weakened
by an inevitable side-effect of their conservative strategy -
the war dragged on. Further, the duration of the war
threatened to be "interminable" (to use Marshall's term)
without challenging German rule in a critical theatre,
e
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Europe. We have demonstrated that this factor was impor-
tant to the President, as it could affect his domestic
political standing and popularity at the polls. Also, it
is possible that Roosevelt was aware of his own fragile
health, and wished to see the conclusion of the war before
his death. Since British strategy would prolong the war,
the President eventually decided to back the more audacious
and promising plans of his own military advisors.
Second, Roosevelt had been virtually alone in his
initial trust in and respect for the British. The Joint
Chiefs, along with Secretary of War Stimson, believed that
the British were primarily interested in securing their
own national interests. As we have demonstrated, this
allegation was not without substance. Churchill never
wavered in his determination to preserve the British Empire,
and the Imperial General Staff tended to follow the lead of
their Prime Minister. As the British allegiance to the
Empire became more and more pronounced, the American mili-
tary began to see an atavistic motive behind every British
proposal. The charges of the outspoken Admiral King ob-
tained from this environment of suspicion. It is difficult
to deny that Roosevelt himself was eventually affected by
that attitude, probably in early 1943. He was no longer
Roosevelt was especially determined to see India
removed from the yoke of British imperialist policy. At
Teheran, the President and Stalin discussed the Indian
problem, without the knowledge of Churchill.
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willing to give the British the benefit of the doubt vis-
a-vis their intentions on strategic proposals. Roosevelt
was willing to fight a war to preserve Great Britain, but
not to maintain the British Empire, a territory he viewed
as obsolete.
Finally, there is the question of Churchill's
anti-Communism as contributing to the decline in his
relationship with Roosevelt. Churchill's antagonism toward
Stalin was evident in 19^0 (see Chapter III), and never
really disappeared. His anti-Soviet sentiments were not
aroused so long as Russia was threatened by the German in-
vasion. With the turn of the tide on the Eastern Front,
however, the Prime Minister's old fears of Russian expansion-
ism re-emerged. This, as we have explained, was in part
responsible for his interest in the "soft underbelly" of
Europe. Neither Roosevelt nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff
regarded Russia as a danger to be guarded against. This
was in part due to their disinclination to face postwar
and geographical realities. For his part, the President
preferred to think in vague terms of a four-power "United
Nations" keeping peace in a new world. He would thus be
irritated by any Churchillian suggestion that they gird
themselves against an "Ally," the Soviet Union. The Joint
Chiefs, for their part, were unwilling to think far beyond
the contest against Germany and Japan. Indeed, their main
interest was in bringing Russia into the war in the
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Pacific theatre.
To be sure, too much can be made of Churchill's
anti-Soviet leanings, in 1943 it was little more than a
secondary theme in the totality of his thought. His fear
of Russia was still rather inchoate, and would not clearly
emerge until the end of 1944. Nonetheless, it was evident
enough in 1943 to be recognized by Roosevelt and certainly
by Stalin. Since this attitude of Churchill's put addi-
tional strain on the three-power alliance, it contributed
to the cooling of the Roosevelt-Churchill friendship.
We have posited three reasons for the Roosevelt-
Churchill split. In two of the three cases, the Chiefs of
Staff were involved in shaping the President's attitude
toward the British. Also, two of the three points of con-
flict between the President and Prime Minister revolved
around the issue of a Second Front. This issue provided
an arena for Anglo-American conflict. Roosevelt saw in
the Second Front an alternative to the increasingly unattraC'
tive proposals of the British. A Second Front in France
would have these advantages:
1. It might end the war quickly.
2. It would not render assistance to the
British In their aspiration to rebuild
the colonial Empire.
3. It would please Stalin and thus bring
the "United Nations" closer to reality.
Churchill's strategy would have the
opposite effect.
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If this formula can be taken as valid, It suggests
that Roosevelt's endorsement of a Second Front was not
dictated solely by strategic concerns. Opposition to the
British Empire, and a vision of the "United Nations" were
political, not military, motivations. Thus, although the
President backed the plan of his military advisors at
Teheran, he was doing so for his own reasons.
Just as Teheran marked a new low point for the
fortunes of the British Prime Minister, so it marked the
almost exponential rise of American military influence.
Given a clear mandate by the combined forces of Roosevelt
and Stalin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw nearly all of
their strategic proposals adopted from December 1943 until
the end of the European war in May, 1945. The ability of
the British General Staff to block American ambitions
proved negligible. The British objected to plans for an
invasion of southern France to follow "Overlord." Their
protests were futile, and the operation was eventually
carried out. The British objected to General Arnold's
proposal that the American air forces be placed under all-
American command (rather than joint Anglo-American command).
All-American command was effected in 1944. Down the line
it was American military proposals which were ultimately
34
adopted. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, formed during the
34
See Maurice Matloff, op. cit., Chapter 7.
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Arcadia conference at Washington, proved to be a hollow
structure. There is no evidence to indicate that it ever
functioned as a decision-making body on military affairs
for the alliance. Although this was the initial intention,
the raison d'etre
,
the organization was nothing more than a
forum for debate. Strategic differences between the two
camps were discussed, but agreements were not arrived at.
In short, the Combined Chiefs of Staff could not effectively
function because of the deep adversary relationship between
the British and American military staffs. It proved im-
possible to transcend national differences. In addition,
the body was essentially helpless since all matters of Grand
Strategy had to be referred to Churchill and Roosevelt.
Real decisions were made by these statesmen, with the
Combined Chiefs splitting up to advocate their respective
proposals. And, it was in the role of advocates that the
military representatives were able to wield their influence.
Prom the outset of Anglo-American collaboration,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led by the dynamic Marshall, had
demonstrated an aggressive spirit in arguing their position
(the launching of a Second Front). British military repre-
sentatives had been more docile, giving deference to the
wishes of the -Prime Minister. The American military refused
to abandon their position even when it seemed certain that
other opinions had carried the day. This obstinate posture
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was in no small measure responsible for the final adoption
of Second Front strategy. In contrast, the British General
Staff proved more fatalistic. After the conclusion of the
Teheran conference, their objections to American strategy
were half-hearted, and they were not vigorous in pressing
for Aegean and Balkan involvements. This fatalism made it
increasingly easy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have
their strategic suggestions approved without serious con-
flict. The vastly increased powers of the Joint Chiefs
would be evident in the year 1944.
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CHAPTER VI
THE SECOND FRONT REALIZED: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Historical Summary
In terms of the high-level military and political
discussions of Second Front policy, Teheran proved to be
the end of the road. Another three-power meeting of minds
would not take place until the Yalta conference of February
1945. Bi-lateral meetings betv/een the British and Ameri-
cans continued to take place regularly after Teheran, and
Churchill and Brooke continually voiced reservations about
"Overlord," but to no avail. D-day for the invasion had
been tentatively set for the first of May, 1944. The
alliance of opinion between Roosevelt, Stalin, and the
American military was, of course, crucial in reaching this
decision. But it is also certain that British anxiety over
a Second Front was lessened by events of war. That is, by
January, 1944, it was starkly apparent that the Axis was
going down to almost inevitable defeat. Italy was out
of the war, Germany was losing Finland and other satel-
lites, Hitler's offensive at Kursk had been resoundingly
crushed. The apocalyptic vision of an Allied catastrophe
in France became increasingly unconvincing. There were
no longer compelling reasons for postponing the long-
delayed Second Front. Thus, the strategic decisions made
at Teheran proved final.
Roosevelt had named General Eisenhower Commander
of the European Theatre of Operations, with full respon-
sibility for "Overlord." it had been generally assumed
in American and British quarters that Marshall would be
given this post. He desired the appointment, and seemed
the natural selection as Chief of Staff. Too, he had
demonstrated time and again his ability to stand up to
Churchill and the Imperial British Staff. The reasons
for Marshall's failure to secure the appointment, however,
lie not in his weaknesses but in his strengths. His un-
questioned primacy on the American military staff, and
his evident decision-making ability, made Marshall
invaluable in Washington. Put bluntly, Roosevelt did not
want to lose him, and probably did not want to begin work-
ing with a new Chief of Staff at this stage of the war.
This is a further indication that staff officers, not
field commanders, v/ere the primary source of military
authority at this time, unlike their predecessors of the
First World War. Marshall especially must be accorded
important status. Indeed, Harold Macmillan may not have
been far wrong when he described the American Chief of
Staff as "the most powerful figure in the United States
after the President.""'" Even a more modest assessment of
Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War (New York:
Harper and Row, 1968), p. 415.
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Marshall nmst recognize that his advisory and decision-
making authority far outstripped that of two civilian
leaders, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War.
With his appointment a 3 Supreme Commander in
Europe, Eisenhower too became a decision-maker of
formidable dimensions. Formerly a subordinate of Marshall,
he now enjoyed a special status. His powers are attributable
to two factors: his direct control of "Overlord," and his
permanent presence in Britain. He thus served as the
"front line" against any last-ditch efforts by the British
to sabotage the invasion. This is in fact what happened
in early 1944, and our historical summary will now focus
on this point.
Churchill's gloomy predictions as to "Overlord's"
fate were no longer of concern to the Americans, and cer-
tainly not to Eisenhower. By the end of 1943 prepara-
tions were well under way for the operation, and there was
virtually no chance that the assault would be called off.
Coordination of the attack with the British was still
fraught with difficulties, however. The main point of
contention revolved around use of the combined Anglo-
American air forces. Establishment of a Second Front in
France necessitated a heavy air offensive against the
area to be attacked. Thus, Eisenhov/er (with the concur-
rence of Arnold) requested that coastal targets in
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Normandy be given priority in Allied sorties. 2 Under
normal circumstances this request would nave been non-
controversial. Unfortunately, recent military intelligence
reports had revealed the presence of flying bomb and rocket
sites in various regions of Nazi-occupied Europe. These
weapons, whose effectiveness could only be guessed at,
were clearly intended for use against Britain in the near
future. 3 Fearful of a second blitz on London, the British
Staff demanded that priority be given to the destruction
of the new German weapons. Air Marshal Tedder was
especially vociferous in urging this course. The matter
was taken up with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but the
Americans could not be persuaded to redirect the air
offensive from "Overlord" areas to the rocket sites. The
Anglo-American disagreement continued into March, 1944,
with neither side willing to make some form of compromise.
Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coali-
tion Warfare, 1945-1944 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, Office of the Chief of Military History,
Dept. Army, 1959).
The German Verge ltungswaffen proved to be a
formidable weapon. Launched first as flying bombs and
later as rockets, these devices were directed mainly at
London and Antwerp. London productivity was cut down by
approximately one-sixth, and 9,000 civilians were killed.
See David Irving, The Mare T 3 Nest: German Secret Weapons
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1965)
.
This refusal to see or consider a middle course is
reminiscent of the Arcadia impasse of 1942. in 1944,
however, the American military no longer had to combat
the opinions of their Commander-in-Chief, who had in the
past come to the rescue of the British. Aware that
Roosevelt would no longer interfere, Eisenhower acted
forcefully. On March 22 he instructed British military
representatives to "inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff
that unless the matter is settled at once I will request
relief from this command." 4 Doubtless aware that such a
move would provoke American and probably Soviet wrath,
the British backed down. Eisenhower, in his capacity as
Supreme Commander, was granted specific authority to
direct the air war, including use of all British air
forces. Explaining his insistence on controlling all
Allied forces, Eisenhower stated in his memoirs that
"when a battle needs the last ounce of available force,
the commander must not be in the position of depending
upon request and negotiation to get it." The
Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Office of the Chie
of Military History, Dept. Army, 1954), p. 125. It is of
course possible that Eisenhower's threat was a bluff.
Nonetheless, it demonstrated that he was dealing from a
position of strength.
5Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New Yorkj
Doubleday and Co., 1948).
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preponderance of American strength had by March, 1944,
reached such a point that the British we re forced to let
as subalterns to the American giant. With this final
struggle between Eisenhower and the Imperial Staff, even
the pretense of equality was taken away. For the British,
and certainly for the defiantly nationalistic Prime Minis-
ter, this incident must have been a humiliating demonstra-
tion of British decision-making impotence.
The argument over utilization of the air forces has
other implications as well. it clearly indicates that on the
military level (Combined Chiefs of Staff) the alliance struc-
ture was hollow. Even at this stage of the struggle, with
the tide of war obviously in their favor, the two military
staffs were unable to function smoothly as a single unit.
It could be reasonably argued that this incapacity was
understandable in a 1942 or 1943 context. Smoothly run-
ning bodies do not spring ready-made into existence, but
take some time to mature and evolve into an efficient
organization. Nationalistic thinking (a necessary and
inexorable commodity in any military establishment) does
not easily give way to a coalition perspective demanding
compromise. Only after a certain passage of time can two
military teams be expected to merge and to sublimate their
individual characters. This argument, while not without
merit, cannot explain the state of the alliance at such a
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late date as March, 19^. The continuing difficulties
between the British and American military leaders seem to
indicate that neither side took coalition warfare very
seriously. That is, neither side made an effort to reject
the prejudices they held.
It is accurate to maintain that the Combined Chiefs
of Staff remained a chimera throughout the war (existing
mainly in press dispatches), and the American and British
forces fought as distinctly national armies, unless one
or the other was forced to adapt by external pressure.
Throughout 1944-19^5 it was the British who would have to
adapt to the wishes of an American Supreme Commander.
That he occasionally chose to defer to their requests
only allowed the British military to save face. These
requests were like supplications to the throne, and did
not alter the subordinate role of the British.
A Second Front was not established on May 1, 19kk t
as had been decided at Teheran. Last minute delays were
due to technical and capricious problems, however, not
to diplomatic difficulties. "When it became necessary
to enlarge the assault area and seek more landing craft,
the date was changed to the end of May."^ Problems
with the weather and the tides caused a further delay
Forrest Pogue, op. cit.
, p. 16?.
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until June 5, when the weather along the Channel coast
cleared. Eisenhower decided that the invasion would take
place on June 6, in spite of last-minute British advice
to delay it. Up to the very last, Churchill "refused to
let his expectations conquer his doubts."
"Overlord," the largest and most ambitious
amphibious assault in history, was a singular success.
Allied casualties were light, probably due to the low-
grade German defenders in the Normandy area. Moreover,
the victorious landing was certainly due in part to the
massive bombings of the beachhead that took place at
Eisenhower's behest. In any event, the fears that gripped
Churchill and his military staff proved to be entirely
unfounded. "Overlord" was never in danger of being driven
back into the sea, nor was the Channel "choked with
British and American corpses," as the Prime Minister had
envisioned.
From the Arcadia discussions onward, the American
military staff had argued that a Second Front in France
would serve as a dagger thrust into the heart of Germany.
Marshall and his Joint Chiefs consistently viewed such
an operation as the only one capable of ending the war
7Dwight Eisenhower, op. cit ., p. 243.
199
against Hitler. The validity of this opinion is born
out by historical fact. Three months after the "Overlord"
landings, all of France was cleared of German armed forces.
A little more than one month after the invasion, the
Stauffenberg coup attempt against Hitler took place. The
conspiracy materialized because non-National Socialist Ger-
man military leaders saw the war in the West as hopeless.
Finally, the war in Europe ended eleven months after the Second
Front had been opened, and Allied troops stood on the far
side of the Rhine. The rapid conclusion of the war in the
spring of 1945 would clearly have been impossible if British
"peripheral run" strategy had carried the day at Teheran.
Thus, although "history does not reveal its alternatives,"
the Second Front can be credited with bringing about vic-
tory in the West. In their unyielding advocacy of a
Second Front, the American military was ultimately vindi-
cated.
Conclusions: The Military Relationship With
The Commander-in-Chief
Examination of the Second Front decisions allows
us to extrapolate a number of cautious conclusions on the
relationship between Roosevelt and his military during
World War Two. In doing so we should view this relation-
ship as against past relationships between the American
military and Presidents. In this manner we are able to
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chart an evolution in the American decision-making struc-
ture during wartime. It becomes evident that this struc-
ture has undergone great change since 1776.
Decisions on the Second Front were effected
without the participation of two formerly powerful forces,
the Secretary of War, and the commanders in the field. As
has been observed in Chapter I, field officers have exerted
considerable influence on decision-making since Washington.
For numerous reasons (poor communications, closeness to
the battle, charismatic appeal) the decision-making power
of the field commander was retained in relatively unbroken
sequence from the War of Revolution until the end of V/orld
War One (1918). This broad decision-making prerogative
was, however, beyond the ken of the various field commanders
fighting in 1941-1945. General officers such as MacArthur,
Bradley, Patton and Clark were effectively reduced to mak-
ing tactical decisions. Strategic decisions were handled
by the Commander-in-Chief, with the assistance of the
Joint Chiefs and their subordinates on the General Staff.
Command responsibility had manifestly shifted to these
staff officers, most of whom had never heard the sound of
guns or experienced small-unit battle. What were the
reasons for the sudden eclipse of the field commanders?
It may well be that the nature of the Second
World War was fundamentally different from all previous
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armed struggles involving the United States. This was
true for two reasons. First, the 1941-1945 contest was
total war in a different sense from the First World War,
both in terms of how it was fought, and why it was fought.
The scope of the war and the nature of innovative tactics
employed (blitzkrieg, mass bombing, retributive acts) made
civilians as vulnerable as uniformed combatants. This had
not been the case during 1914-1918. Since the scourge of
war was not restricted to army groups, it was inappropriate
for army commanders to serve as primary wartime decision-
makers. There were non-military considerations and conse-
quences to be reviewed involving civilian politicians,
and ultimately national leaders. This accounts substan-
tially for the reduced purview of field commanders. More
important than the manner in which the war was fought were
the reasons why it was fought. Unlike the "Great War, "
World War Two was not primarily waged against the expan-
sion of German arms but against the ideological system that
impelled it. It was not enough to win back German con-
quests, but rather to destroy a dark nemesis, National
Socialism and kindred creeds. This prompted Roosevelt's
statement on "unconditional surrender" at Casablanca.
Accordingly, the war became an ideological war, its spirit
not inaccurately captured in Eisenhower's phrase, "Crusade
in Europe." Since ideology is quintessentially a politi-
cal matter, politicians actively determine the goals of
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such wars. It is this factor which was responsible for
Roosevelt's direct participation in strategy, and the
triumph of reasonably far-sighted staff officers over their
warrior comrades. Strategy was beyond the metier of field
commanders, and they were reduced to technicians implement-
ing plans decided upon at higher levels.
The second main reason for the decline of the
field commanders can be traced to the demands of coalition
warfare. The United States was bound in an alliance with
two distant and internally distinct states. Maintenance
of the alliance demanded (as we have seen) both diplomacy
and compromise. The almost constant inter-alliance quar-
rels on Grand Strategy attest to the fragile bonds holding
the Three Powers together. There is no precedent for this
situation in American history. America's alliance in
World War One was a far simpler affair, and was effectively
restricted to Britain and France. American armies fought
alongside these national armies but remained under American
command. More importantly, the alliance was not a fragile
one, and there was no occasion for strategic controversy,
the war being static in nature. During World War Two,
strategy had to be constantly made and revised to keep up
with fluid situations. This in itself put a premium on
conciliation and compromise. Further, the Three-Power
alliance was composed of diverse national systems, provid-
ing a built-in tension. Thus, the very nature of the alliance
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reduced the authority of the field officers and increased
the role of the Commander-in-Chief.
We have explained the lack of field commanders'
decision-making but not the power of high level staff
officers. The decline of the field commanders should not
be viewed as the cause of the commensurate ascent of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is, the Joint Chiefs did not
acquire power simply because the field officers had none
and a "power vacuum" had been created. Such an explana-
tion is not supported by concrete realities. The success
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was due to two factors*
(1) their demonstrable competence, and (2) their monolithic
organization.
Operating efficiently as a reliable source of
information and analysis, and maintaining a solid front in
presenting their views, the Chiefs were impressive advo-
cates. President Roosevelt's unfamiliarity with military
affairs, as well as the increasingly technical nature of
war itself, perforce maximized his reliance on the military
staff. As Hans Speier has observed, "As science and
technology increased man's comfort, war, too, became more
o
scientific and technologically more efficient." These
Hans Speier, Social Order and the Risks of War
(New York: George W. Stewart Publishers, Inc., 1952),
p. 115.
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rather than the duties of the field commanders were the
basic reasons for the rise of the general staff structure.
Taken as a unit, the Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned wel'i
as a high-level organization capable of coordinating and
expediting the war effort. Field Commanders were no
longer able to perform such sweeping tasks.
In addition to the decline of field officers, the
Second World War also saw the eclipse of a formerly power-
ful civilian decision-maker, the Secretary of War. The
traditionally extensive role of the Secretary in wartime is
described in Chapter I. Before the emergence of a general
staff, the Secretary of War served as an Intermediary be-
tween commanders in the field and the Commander-in-Chief.
In cases where the President was not active as Commander-
in-Chief, the Secretary of War assumed his duties as a
surrogate. Too, the Secretary of War was frequently at
loggerheads with his military subordinates. With the
development of a general staff under Elihu Root, however,
the Secretaryship suffered an inevitable weakening of
authority. This was so because functions once exclusively
delegated to the Secretary of War -- overall command,
coordination, logistical responsibility — now devolved to
departments of the general staff. That Secretary Lansing
retained notable power during World War One can be
attributed to the weakness of the military staff. Since
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Pershing acted as the primary military representative
(refusing to defer to the Chief of Staff), and the military
staff was accorded little responsibility, the Secretary
was able to keep his prerogatives. By 1941, however, the
military staff structure had been reorganized. It now
operated effectively and thus took over many of the func-
tions previously accorded the Secretary of War. As a re-
sult, the Secretary (Stimson) was reduced to the role of
"yes man" for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In effect, the
Joint Chiefs had usurped power from the Secretary. This
in turn increased the range of responsibilities of the
military staff to a level they had never before enjoyed.
Clearly, the traditional wartime decision-making
hierarchy had undergone drastic change by 1941. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff had, for the first time, become the pri-
mary voice of military opinion. As we have attempted to
demonstrate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was without serious
rival, and answered only to the Commander-in-Chief,
The military ran the war because
the civilian leaders wanted them
to run the war. On strategic
matters the only civilian control
was the President's.... Civilian
supremacy became Presidential sup-
remacy, as the Joint Chiefs were
given direct access to Roosevelt.
This returns us to our central interest, the
Forrest Pogue, op. cit
., p. 204
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relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and his mili-
tary subordinates. From our examination of the Second
Front decisions we can draw a number of observations. It
should first be understood that Roosevelt acted as an
active Commander-in-Chief who was directly involved in the
determination of Grand Strategy. He took an even more
active role than Lincoln had. Nonetheless, his personal
involvement was less extensive than Churchill's, who did
not hesitate to make even tactical decisions. Evidently
there were certain areas regarded by the President as the
exclusive realm of military experts.
Although an active strategic decision-maker,
Roosevelt was not consistently active. We have noted that
between Arcadia and Casablanca, the President absented him-
self from strategic affairs, and allowed the Joint Chiefs
to make decisions virtually on their own. We have sug-
gested that this delegation of authority was due to Roose-
velt's temporary unfamiliarity in the new wartime environ-
ment. Following Casablanca, however, Presidential in-
volvement in strategic matters remained at a high pitch.
Thus, civilian leadership of the war effort was maintained
and the military were not given free rein for any extended
period of time
.
The pattern of Roosevelt's decision-making vis-a-vis
the Second Front also indicates that his views were flexible.
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Generally it can be said that Roosevelt shifted from an
initial preference for British ideas to a preference for
the opinions of his military staff. The early acceptance
of British strategy can be attributed in part to the per-
suasive powers of Churchill, as well as to an understand-
able inclination to regard the British military as more
experienced than his own staff. The events of late 1942
seem to have shaken the President's confidence in the
British, however. Now realizing their fallibility, Roose-
velt appears to have considered more carefully the advice
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, Marshall had
made the telling point that acceptance of British strategy,
though minimizing risks, was bound to prolong the war.
The effect that a lengthy war might have on domestic
politics (and on his own popularity) made the President
more inclined to endorse a Second Front operation. These
were the initial reasons for his abandonment of the British
strategic position.
Only later did Roosevelt begin to suspect British
intentions, and see in their strategic plans traces of a
vestigial colonialism. These suspicions are evident in
mid-1943 when Roosevelt failed to censure the outspoken
remarks of Admiral King, More importantly, his anti-
colonial pronouncements (especially with Stalin at Teheran)
take on a more imperative tone. The continued warnings of
the Joint Chiefs concerning British intentions doubtless
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played a role In the formation of this attitude. It is
another example of their growing influence with the Presi-
dent. Also, Roosevelt's increasingly anti-Bri tish atti-
tude owes something to Stalin, but we will deal with that
in a later section.
Roosevelt came to adopt the positions of his
military advisors on the advisability of a Second Front
and to share their suspicion of British imperialism. He
did so, however, for reasons of his own. While the Joint
Chiefs thought consistently and entirely in military terms,
the President retained a broader perspective, including
the political consequences of his decisions. Thus,
although by late 1943 he tended to endorse all the opinions
of the Joint Chiefs, he did so for his own reasons, which
is further evidence that civilian control over the direc-
tion of the war was never lost.
Despite the fact that Roosevelt always maintained
himself as the ultimate American decision-making authority,
the power he conceded to his military staff should not be
underestimated. During the war years, all other branches
of the government were effectively ignored. With the
almost singular exception of Harry Hopkins, only military
advisors affected the President's decisions. To be sure,
wartime clearly demands the ministrations of military
experts, but this nonetheless poses problems in a democratic
republic. The question may appropriately be asked, did the
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military abuse their prerogatives with respect to the deci-
sions concerning the Second Front, and how are the activi-
ties of the military staff to be described?
In characterizing the role of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, special attention must be paid to General Marshall,
whose activities occupy a major portion of this study, It
is difficult to contest the observation of Harold Macmillan
that Marshall was the most powerful American figure, next
to the President. As Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
he enjoyed a special relationship to the President in serv-
ing as the primary military spokesman. Marshall is also
responsible for the monolithic front presented by the Joint
Chiefs. In his meetings with the President, or with foreign
dignitaries, he presented a unanimity of American military
opinion. This strengthened his hand in the presentation
of a proposal, as is evident in matters pertaining to the
Second Front.
We have commented on Marshall's distrust of
"politicians," a term he used indiscriminately to describe
any civilian authority. This attitude was common to the
Joint Chiefs, and to Eisenhower as well. The voicing of
this attitude by Marshall and other staff officers was
unprofessional, since commenting on the shortcomings of
civilian leaders exceeds the functions of the military.
This prejudice, which has historical precedence in the
American military, eventually got Marshall and the Joint
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Chiefs of Staff into trouble. Although the matter did not
involve the Second Front issue, it is relevant enough to be
mentioned here.
In December of 1943, in the face of labor strikes
in the United States, Marshall denounced the unions and
government sympathizers in strong terras. William Green,
president of the American Federation of Labor, responded
that Marshall had overstepped his authority, and warned
that the military was becoming involved in civilian affairs.
Marshall was defended by the President, but was nonetheless
stung by the criticism. By 1944, Congress, roused by
Green's accusation, began investigations of the War Depart-
ment. Eventually thirty committees and sub-committees
were involved in these investigative activities, in an
attempt to prove "the thesis that the Army and the Navy
have an inordinate ambition to control the civilian econ-
omy...."10 The investigations came to nothing but did
signal that Congross considered the authority of the Chiefs
as excessive and dangerous. The hostility probably would
not have arisen if Marshall and his subordinates had exer-
cised more tolerance and discretion toward politicians.
The Congressional activity was probably also in response to
Forrest Pogue, George C. Mars hall; Organizer
of Vict ory (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 197.
Pogue maintains that the allegation was "The red herring
that beclouds the basic issue."
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their being "left out in the cold" in wartime decision-
making. V/hatever the reasons, it was a warning to the
military to confine itself to strategic affairs.
At the same time, the importance of the afore-
mentioned incident should not be exaggerated. Like
McClellan, Marshall and the joint Chiefs never entertained
thoughts of defying civilian control or changing the nature
of the Republic. At most, they made the impossible
(though understandable) request that they be left alone in
deciding military issues. There is no evidence to suggest
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (or any section of the mili-
tary community) desired martial law or military control of
civilian affairs. Presidential control was never ques-
tioned, although the President's decisions were frequently
criticized. The attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
toward the Commander-in-Chief can perhaps be accurately
characterized as an uneasy deference. Placed in the histori'
cal context of military-Executive relations, this attitude
is not unusual.
The military aversion to "political motives" in
wartime decision-making has been sufficiently commented
upon. However, it bears noting that the Joint Chiefs
were aware of Roosevelt's political concerns, and were
not above using this knowledge to effect. Thus, Marshall
constantly informed the President that various British-
sponsored operations would prolong the war, knowing that
212
Roosevelt feared this for domestic political reasons.
The tactic, developed in the post-Arcadia timeframe,
illustrates the evolving sophistication of the Joint
Chiefs advocacy. This technique certainly assisted
the military in gaining Roosevelt's endorsement of their
proposals. It is best understood as a form of salesman-
ship, and should not be interpreted as an abuse of the
Joint Chiefs* advisory capacity.
A further issue of interest revolves around the
fidelity of the military staff to their Second Front idea.
The constancy which they exhibited toward "their plan"
is notable, especially in contrast to the fatalistic
resignation that eventually afflicted the British
Imperial Staff. Ordered at various junctures to abandon
plans for a Second Front, the Joint Chiefs of Staff never
did so. Forced to work on alternate schemes ("Torch," for
example), they did so half-heartedly and were always eager
to resurrect "Sledgehammer" or "Super-Gymnast." Their
unwillingness to accept alternate operations comes close
to constituting a sort of covert disobedience. Even so,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not refuse to follow orders
(in the traditional sense). Attempts to sabotage the
acceptance of British plans (see Chapter II) can be
reasonably viewed as a form of insubordination. From
another perspective, however, the Chiefs, in their capacity
as military advisors, were pressing for acceptance of what
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they saw as a critical operation. In a sense, an abuse
of their authority would have occurred had they accepted
a plan they regarded as inferior or, worse, disastrous.
In retrospect, the inclination of the American
military staff to distrust civilian decision-makers, arrf
to hold to their own opinions on strategic matters, should
not be judged too severely. To characterize these ten-
dencies as an abuse of authority or an attempt to extend
military prerogatives seems overly harsh. Throughout this
study an attempt has been made to demonstrate that —
whatever the actions of the American military staff —
there was never an intention to go beyond their proper
relationship with the Commander-in-Chief. Although overly
zealous in pressing for a Second Front, they did not intend
to by-pass or ignore civilian control of policy. If the
Joint Chiefs can be said to be guilty of anything, it is
their lack of sophistication in imders^ding their role in
the decision-making process. Their continued petulance
and rancor towards "politicians," 11 both domestic and
Marshall retained his dislike of politicians
after the war. Commenting on Eisenhower 's difficulties as
President, he remarked, "I knew he wouldn't like it up
there once he got up there with all those politicians."
U.S. News and World Reports, Vol. XLVII, No. 18, Nov. 2,
1959. "The Story General Marshall Told Me," John Suther-
land, p. 56.
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foreign, reveals a surprising naivete of the complexities
of foreign policy.
General Marshall and the other Chiefs of Staff
failed to understand the maxim of Clausewitz that "War is
only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no
means an independent thing in itself." 12 That is, war
can never be regarded as divorced from politics. The Joint
Chiefs seem to have adopted the less cogent observation
of Ludendorff that, once begun, war is properly the exclu-
sive domain of the military. Marshall was inclined to re-
gard civilians as interlopers in their wartime realm.
Even so, this inclination was more visceral than cerebral,
something felt rather than well thought out. Accordingly,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not so much abuse their role
in the decision-making structure as they failed to under-
stand it.
This failure to understand fully the role of
civilian decision-makers in wartime is something for which
the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held accountable. Their
"Ludendorff" view of war and politics could well have led
to dangerous abuses of military pov/er, but it did not. The
visceral anti-political stance of the American military
was simply not strong enough to overcome observance of their
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Harmondsworth,
England: Pelican Classics, 1968), p. 402.
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oath to uphold the Constitution, and of the historical
tradition of grudging deference to civilian authority.
Nonetheless, the strategic decision-making process would
have functioned more smoothly had the Joint Chiefs posses-
sed a more sophisticated outlook.
The persistence with which the Joint Chiefs argued
their own views had advantages as well as disadvantages.
They did, after all, have a legitimate role to play in
strategic planning. Secretary of War Stimson noted that,
as military advisors to the Chief Executive, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff "had a most salutory effect on the Presi-
dent's weakness for snap decisions . "13 Had the military
been less obdurate in their opinions on Grand Strategy,
the West might have been plunged into a number of mili-
tary adventures of dubious merit. Still and all, their
position would have been better served had their dealings
with the President and his advisors been less of an adver-
sary relationship. In this connection it is perhaps rele-
vant to note that the relations between General William
Westmoreland and President Johnson during the Vietnam era
were far more conciliatory than the Marshall-Roosevelt
encounters. This may indicate the evolution of military
understanding of their role to a more sophisticated level
Henry L. Stimson, On Active Service in Peace
and War
, p. 428.
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than in 1941-1945. 14
The American Military and the Aliiance
A final point to be considered is the role of the
American military staff within the alliance structure.
Here too the performance of the Joint Chiefs can be
faulted. Confronted with a Three-Power coalition, the
American military contributed to, rather than eased,
existing tensions. To be sure, the Joint Chiefs cannot
be criticized for disagreeing with the strategic concep-
tions advanced by Britain or Russia. As military experts
they were clearly entitled to present their views on any
strategic proposal. Nevertheless, coalition warfare de-
mands both diplomatic prowess and a sensitivity to the
needs and interests of Allied powers. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff lacked these traits. Throughout the wartime con-
ferences, the American military exhibited a disinclination
to regard their Allies objectively and fairly. Their mis-
trust of the British, coupled with their failure to appre-
ciate the role played by Russia, cannot be attributed to
strategic differences alone. Rather, these attitudes
point up what Harold Macmillan called an "almost patho-
logical" suspicion of foreigners. The result was to
Of course, it may also indicate a weakness or
error on Johnson's part: inordinate faith in decisions
made by the military.
15Harold Macmillan, _ojyL_cits , p. 423.
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make an uneasy alliance even more uneasy. The manifest
'
duty of the Joint Chiefs was to make the alliance struc-
ture as workable as possible; their prejudices prevented
them from so doing. It was not the duty of the Joint
Chiefs to assess the motives and intentions of the British
and Soviets, but simply to examine their strategic pro-
posals, and to draft plans advantageous to the alliance as
a whole.
It can be said with some justification that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff ignored coalition warfare. Evidence
is provided by their failure to appreciate the contribu-
tion of the Soviet Union to the war effort. The minimal
importance they attached to aiding the Soviet Union is
eloquent testimony. Moreover, their rejection of British
advice early in the war seems high-handed, at least in the
context of a coalition war effort. The suspicion that the
Joint Chiefs desired to wage unilateral war on Germany is
thus given substance. The American military did not feel
comfortable in the alliance structure and regarded supra-
national considerations as somehow unpatriotic. Evidently,
the Joint Chiefs were more nationalistic than their Com-
mander-in-Chief and this interfered in their dealings with
the British or Soviets.
The nationalism and resultant anti-British and
anti-Russian stance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again
reveals a lack of political sophistication. The views of
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the military were not in step with those of the President.
Steeped in a national tradition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were unable to rise above it. This was perhaps their most
glaring deficiency during the war. In an environment that
demanded political sensitivity as well as martial ability,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be found wanting. Granted
extensive decision-making powers within the top stratum of
the alliance, they failed to understand that "strictly
military thinking" was inappropriate and anachronistic.
The Joint Chiefs were confronted with a war which had
marked political complexities and consequences, yet their
training had not prepared them for such a situation.
We have observed the inclination of the American
military staff to disdain any concern with politics and
diplomacy. This inclination is apparent with respect to
the Second Front decisions ard goes far to explain the dis-
putativeness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward the
President, and toward Allied leaders. The desire of these
staff officers to take the narrow, military view is under-
standable given the historical hostility toward civilian
interference in wartime affairs. Even so, the difficulties
caused by the Joint Chiefs, and their considerable blind-
ness to the political implications of the war are telling.
Their position and powers prevented them from remaining
mere soldiers and required an appreciation of the political
world and international relations. Their failure to
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understand this, rather than any positive abuse of power,
was their true weakness.
Since 1945, the political world has become more
complex. The emergence of superpowers engaged in national
or ideological struggle, as well as their capacity for
global destruction, puts a further premium on politically-
sensitive military leaders. This fact emerges clearly
with respect to the Truman-MacArthur confrontation. To
maintain that the v/aging of war is solely the concern of
military men is no longer a tenable position. The origin
of this truth can be traced back to the Second World War,
and is exemplified in the military's role in the Second Front
decis ions
.
Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief
Conventional wisdom asserts that Roosevelt was a
strong President, and a man of decisiveness. This is
incontrovertibly true with respect to his performance in
domestic politics, and needs no further elaboration. By
comparison, his role in the Second Front decisions betrays
a more timorous nature. The changing course of Second Front
strategy is a chronology of Roosevelt's submission to
influences from various quarters: by Stalin, Churchill,
the British staff, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs. At dif-
ferent times Roosevelt endorsed the respective positions
favored by each. From Arcadia on, the President was
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surrounded by persuasive policy advocates, and seemed almost
infinitely malleable. That is, he was receptive rather
than originative of Second Front ideas. He did not act
decisively on the issue, but altered his opinions frequently
and diffidently. It was this vacillation that exasperated
both Churchill and Marshall.
We have observed that in the role of Commander-in-
Chief, troubled by ultimate responsibility for American
military fortunes, Roosevelt seemed insecure. Although
occupying a position of enormous power, he failed to act
powerfully, thus insuring his role as "kingmaker" rather
than king.
Wartime developments, as well as personal inde-
cisiveness, also tended to curb Roosevelt's authority. It
should be recognized that from 1941 until 1943 the outcome
of the war was still in doubt. The war was brutalizing to
morale as well as materiel, and the Allies suffered
appalling losses as well as gained remarkable victories.
In this uncertain atmosphere the political visions of
Roosevelt (and Churchill for that matter) had to defer to
military exigencies. Since a victorious conclusion to the
war was a prerequisite to all other considerations, the
counsel of military technicians was at a premium. In this
respect the situation itself limited Roosevelt's authority
as Commander-in-Chief. Had the war been a more limited
conflict (on the scale of a Korea or Vietnam), and had the
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outcome never been in doubt, the hand of the Commander-in-
Chief would have been strengthened. President Johnson was
able to exercise detailed control of the Vietnam war because
the specter of an American military defeat did not seem to
exist. Thus, political considerations and goals could
play a large role in the conduct of that war. It may well
be that the existence of a "strong" Commander- in-Chief is
dependent upon the wartime situation as well as on Presi-
dential character.
The portrait of Roosevelt that emerges is not of
a strong Commander-in-Chief, but of an insecure one rely-
ing heavily upon outside advice. To the extent that out-
side advisors sensed his insecurity, they could be expected
to try to have their own views adopted by the President.
Throughout the war he was hesitant in making policy over
and against the advice of "experts." Only when it became
clear that the experts themselves disagreed did he feel
compelled to act.
Despite his reliance upon military advice, and the
status consequently enjoyed by the Joint Chiefs (especially
Marshall), Roosevelt was never in thralldom to their
opinions. The freedom of action given Marshall and King
was due ultimately to Roosevelt's allowing them a loose
rein. As we have observed, the President was able to curb
their enthusiasms now and again. By comparison, some of
his predecessors were unable to exercise much power over
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their military subordinates (Lincoln and Wilson fall into
this unhappy category, Truman would later join them). 16
Why was Roosevelt able to exert more control over the mili-
tary?
For the first time in American history the
Commander-in-Chief was dealing mainly with a Washington-
based General Staff rather than with a field commander
stationed on some remote battlefront. This vastly improved
his control over military leaders. Orders and instructions
could now be communicated directly. Opinions could be re-
ceived and arguments resolved with celerity. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff constituted a new link in the chain of
command and revolutionized the control of far-flung armies.
The importance of having a military staff in con-
stant contact with the Commander-in-Chief should not be
minimized. It insured that the President would be in-
formed of the military situation, and thus be in a posi-
tion to control it. By comparison, civilian control over
field commanders had proven almost impossible, attaining
16Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of
American Foreign Relations. 1865^1900 (New York: Harper
and Row, 1976), p. 177. The sometimes heavy-handed and
unauthorized actions of the American military were com-
monplace in the post-civil-war period. Separated by vast
distances from the authorities in Washington, military
commanders in overseas locations at times had little re-
course but to order military commands in their own name.
Results were sometimes unfortunate, as with the invasion
of Hawaii by American troops on January 17, 1893.
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crisis proportions during World War One. Haig, Pershing,
and Foch conducted the war largely on their own terms,
laws unto themselves, because the political leaders were
separated from the battle geographically and in terms of
information. In Great Britain, "The civilian head of the
British democracy found himself unable to impose his will
17
on his generals." Similarly, in France, "Petain merely
made a pretense of carrying out the directives which he
felt were unwise." These military figures justified the
extent of their power by implying that the technical in-
tricacies of the war were beyond the ken of civilians.
As we have seen, the Joint Chiefs' claim to
special knowledge was far more modest than that of the
First World War field commanders. The Chiefs did not so
much attempt to exclude the President from military
affairs as to guide his decision-making hand. In any
event, the presence of the Joint Chiefs in Washington, and
the fact that they were trained as managers and not
warriors, prohibited a replay of the World War 0ne
scenario. To this extent the nature of the general staff
itself greatly increased Roosevelt's control over his
military.
The Interminable Problem
It is clear that Roosevelt was the ultimate
author of American military policy, although he was heavily
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influenced by the constant advice and occasional strate-
gems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A dramatic civilian-
military struggle for decision-making power, on the scale
of World War One, did not take place. Nonetheless, it is
equally evident that a state of tension existed between the
civilian and military branches of government. The potential
dangers inherent in this tension should not be underesti-
mated for the f ollowing reasons.
The tension between the American military staff
and the Chief Executive was partly due to the gulf the
Joint Chiefs saw (or placed) between themselves as soldiers
and civilian members of the government. The slighting
references of the Joint Chiefs towards politicians seems
to reveal the presence of "the primeval veneration of
atrength and freely chosen risks." 19 Which is to say that
the military staff saw themselves as warriors not only
separated from politicians, but heirs to a more honorable
tradition. That such a view holds seeds of danger for a
democratic society needs no elaboration.
As we have seen, the tension between Roosevelt and
the military was not due solely to the latters ' contempt
for politicians, but to their aversion to political con-
siderations as well. In this sense the rigid profession-
alism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be regarded both
Speier, Social Order and the Risks of War , p. 127.
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as a blessing and a curse. On the positive side, a mili-
tary unwillingness to consider political motives in wartime
carries with it a disinclination to meddle in politics.
This attitude minimizes the risk of the military acting
to usurp political power, or serving as an intrigue-
ridden praetorian guard. Still and all, the American mili-
tary's fear and loathing of the political implications
of the war is troublesome. The Joint Chiefs were, after
all, the ultimate military authorities, operating in the
highest level of government. Thus involved with Grand
Strategy, a purposeful blindness to political concerns is
indefensible. A general staff awareness of political
realities is not the equivalent of a military intervention
in politics. It is unreasonable to suggest that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff could not have become aware of the politi-
cal world without acting upon it. Such an awareness of
politics would have done much to mitigate their conflict
with Roosevelt and the Allies.
By sanctimoniously avoiding the political impli-
cations and ramifications of Grand Strategy, the military
avoided one danger and wandered into another. Their
avoidance of political involvement caused them to see
purely military concerns as against politics, and perhaps
as above politics. There is a danger endemic in the
belief that strictly military concerns are noble and polit:
cal concerns craven. From such a viewpoint obtains an
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inclination for the military to accord their own opinions
excessive respect. The Joint Chiefs' refusal to abandon
their Second Front strategy contains this inclination, and
seems close to insubordination (despite its happy ending).
Swaddled under the cloak of "purely military thinking"
there seems to lie non-political thinking, and across a
thin line, anti-political thinking. This attitude was
present in Second Front dec is ion-making, if only as a
potential threat. Even so, the military inclination for
purely military thinking is disturbing for its exclusive-
ness. A military that is suspicious of politicians and
the political is hardly a healthy organization. It is such
a situation that has in the past given rise to the ques-
20
tion, "Who will guard those who guard?"
2Q
"Sed q uis custodiet ipsos custodes?"
— Decimus Juvenal
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